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ABSTRACT 
 
This study attempts to explain why ALL of South Korean presidents, without exception and 
notwithstanding their individual major contributions to the process of Korea’s development, have 
fallen victim to disgraceful downfalls. 
 For the analysis, I employ S.N. Sangmpam’s middle-range theory that establishes a causal link 
between society-rooted politics and political outcomes. Building on his analytical frameworks that 
non-Western countries are characterized by over-politicization in politics as a function of social 
context, I argue that patterned downfalls of all Korean presidents are an institutional outcome of 
over-politicization in Korean politics, which is itself a function of not fully entrenched capitalist 
society.  In support of my thesis, I test three hypotheses. Hypotheses one and two posit Korea’s 
tenacious traditional and cultural traits as an internal modifier of capitalism and the nation’s dependent 
nature of its relationships with the United States and Japan as an external factor that prevented capitalist 
entrenchment in Korean society.  The combined effect of these two variables is the alteration of 
capitalism in South Korea that defies the three cardinal rules of democracy, leading to over-politicized 
behaviors in presidential politics.  
 As for the patterned downfalls of the presidents, I test the hypothesis empirically that as the nation’s 
most supreme political institution, the Korean presidency displayed the effects of over-politicization 
most saliently. The evidence reveals that both authoritarian (1948-1987) and democratic (1988-2009) 
presidents display diverse manifestations of over-politicized behaviors. However, there is also a striking 
difference between the two eras: Authoritarian presidents seem more influenced by the external causal 
variable mainly because of Korea’s heavy dependence on the United States and Japan in the formative 
years of the nation building. Democratic presidents are more challenged by internal causal variable, 
especially the characteristics of what I call familist collectivism, the dominant operating principle and code of 
conduct for most Koreans in the period of 1948-2009.  Thus, unless the social causal variable is properly 
addressed, the problem may remain regardless of regime types.  
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A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION 
 
In Romanizing Korean words/proper nouns, this study, in principle, uses a system developed by the 
National Institute of the Korean Language and formalized by Notification No. 2000-8 of the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism on July 7, 2000.  Under this system,1 Romanization is based on 
standard Korean pronunciation, and no symbols except Roman letters are used as far as possible.  
Please note the following:   
      1. The same surname, 李 in Chinese character, can be spelled in several ways according to the 
individual’s preference: Lee (as in the case of Lee Myung-bak), Rhee (as in the case of Rhee Syng-
man), Yi (as in the case of Yi dynasty).   
      2. In case of presidents’ names, I follow their spellings as recorded in the South Korean 
government’s official presidential archives.2 
     3. For other names including scholars and authors, I used the way South Koreans generally order 
their names: surname followed by first name (i.e. Rhee Syng-man).  
    4. Unless preferred spellings are clear, I followed the standard Romanization method.   
                                                          
1 For details on the Korean Romanization system of 2000, refer to www.korean.go.kr/front_eng/roman/roman_01 
2  http://english1.president.go.kr/cheong-wa-dae-info/presidentialArchives.php 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Problem: The Paradoxical Reality of South Korea’s Presidential Democracy   
Once considered a basket case, South Korea has become a model success story for the developing 
world. In the aftermath of a series of events, including Japan’s colonialism (1910-1945), American 
military rule after the liberation (1945-1948), and the fratricidal Korean War (1950-1953), there 
seemed to be little hope for the nation’s future. However, approximately sixty years after its 
founding in 1948, the war-torn country has become “one of the few to emerge as a wealthy 
democracy at the end of the 20th century.”3  Its economy now ranks the third largest in Asia only 
behind China and Japan and the tenth largest in the world.4 This formerly poverty-stricken nation 
has transformed itself from a “sinkhole of American aid”5 to a donor country and a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  In 2012, South Korea also joined the 
exclusive “20-50 club,”6 which requires a population surpassing 50 million and maintaining per 
capita income of US$20,000.  Considering the fact that GDP per capita was below $100 at the end of the 
1950s7, this economic development was indeed remarkable. The average life expectancy was 53 in 1960 
and reached 77 for men and 84 for women in 2010, the largest increase over the same period in the world.8 
Politically, South Korea joined the group of democratic nations9 in 1987, when its people voted 
to adopt a democratic constitution created through peaceful negotiations between ruling and 
                                                          
3 Brazinsky, Gregg. Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007), 1 
4 Korea’s economic rankings vary according to citations and financial market fluctuations. 
5 Chapin, Emerson. “Success Story in South Korea.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 3 (1969), 560–574. (www.jstor.org/stable/20039397.) 
6  “S. Korea Joining ‘20-50 club’ marks new chapter in development history." Yunhap News Agency, n.d. Web. 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/23/56/0302000000AEN20120623001200320F.HTML 
7 Tudor, Daniel. Korea: The impossible country. (Tuttle Publishing, 2012.)  
8 Ahn Byong-man. Hankuk Jeongburon.  (Seoul: Dasanbooks, 2008), 27 
9 How to define democracy has been a matter of heated scholarly debate for a long time. For a succinct summary of its discussions, 
especially with respect to Korea, see Carl. J. Saxer’s From Transition to Power Alternation: Democracy in South Korea, 1987-1997 (Edited by 
Edward Beauchamp. New York: Routledge, 2002), 5~10.  
 
2 
 
opposition parties. Among others, the revised constitution allowed the populace to elect their 
presidents directly.10  Considering oppressive rules under authoritarian leaders, the constitutional 
mandate of direct presidential elections was indeed a positive step toward democratic development. 
The world also witnessed a power transition to the first civilian president and a power alternation 
with an opposition candidate winning a presidential election for the first time in Korea’s modern 
history in 1993 and 1997 respectively.  According to ‘Democracy Index 2010,’11 South Korea ranked 20th out 
of 167 countries surveyed with its score of 8.11 out of 10, indicating the overall stability of democracy.12  
Now, South Korea has been enjoying democracy for almost three decades without interruption.  
Although it is easy to appreciate the remarkable socio-economic and political development in 
Korea, it is not a simple question to answer as to what and who have made all these spectacular 
achievements possible. Some argue it is the developmental characteristics of the state that led to 
Korea’s economic growth,13 whereas some challenge such a conventional wisdom by claiming it is 
the people, especially the workers, who have been the main driving engine.14  With respect to 
democratization, some argue for the significant role civil society played in Korea’s democratization,15  
while others also bring our attention to the importance of external factors, especially the role of 
America’s nation-building efforts during the Cold War and aid policies toward the Korean 
                                                          
10 For instance, Arend Lijphart considers 1988 (the year of the first direct presidential election based on the 1987 constitutional 
revision) to be the ‘year of democratization in Korea’, in Lijphart, A. (Eds.). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in 36 
countries. (NY: Yale University Press, 1999), 54 
11 This is the third edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index by the Economist. It reflects the situation as of 
November 2010. The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—
this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world’s independent states (micro states are 
excluded). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil 
liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of 
regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. Korea was up from 28th with 8.01 in 2008. 
(http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=demo2010). 
12 Scholars such as Choi, Jang-jip and others, argue that although South Korea achieved procedural democracy, it needs to work more 
on the substantive side of democracy: Choi, Jang-jip. Democracy after democratization. (Seoul: Humanitas, 2010.)  
13 Kohli, Atul. State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery. (Cambridge, UK: NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004.) 
14 Yoo Jong-il. Park Chung-hee’s maeneolgul: pal-in-ui hakja Park Chung-hee gyongje sinhwa jiwooda. Edited. (Seoul: SisaINbook, 2011). 
15 Kim, Sun-hyuk. Politics of democratization in Korea: the role of civil society. (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh press, 2000.) 
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peninsula.16 It would be more logical to admit that a mixture of these factors have contributed to 
making Korea as we know it today.  
However, regardless of one’s perspective, few would deny the fact that the modern history of 
South Korea can also be described as one of presidential leadership.17 Presidents stand at the apex of 
South Korea’s national and international politics. In 1948, the newly independent nation-state was 
established with the founding constitution that stipulated presidential democracy along with a capitalist 
economic system.  As a matter of fact, it is the exercise of presidential leadership and authority that has 
played a crucial role in helping Korea become what it is today, both good and bad, in most part because of the 
presidency’s preeminence in Korean society and politics.  
Ironically, the story of Korean presidents and the presidency is heroic and tragic at the same 
time. The founding president of the Republic of Korea was Rhee Syng-man (1948 ~ 1960) who was 
elected under the United Nations’ supervision. President Rhee led the fledging nation during the 
most tumultuous and formative years from 1948 to 1960. The period was characterized by daunting 
tasks and events including the establishment of an independent state after approximately forty years 
of Japanese colonial rule, the forced national division by warring superpowers, and the destructive 
Korean War. Under these dire circumstances and uncertainties, Rhee took on “the nearly impossible 
task of rebuilding a nation,” while vehemently defending democracy and national security for the nation’s 
                                                          
16 Brazinsky, Greg. Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007).  
17 Except a very short-lived experiment with parliamentarism, South Korea has been under the Presidential system through most of 
her modern history. Regarding the typology of the governmental or regime type of Korea, some argue it is a presidential system with 
parliamentary characteristics; for others it is more of a hybrid kind; and for some others a dual government form. Generally, however, 
scholars agree that South Korea has a presidential system in that the president is elected by the constituency, for a fixed term, and 
holds legitimacy because it is independent of the legislature, responsible only to the people. 
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future.18 However, he was forced to resign in 1960 during a student protest movement called the April 
19 revolution. Five years later, he died in exile in Hawaii without an heir, biological or political.19  
President Park Chung-hee20 (1961~1979) took power through a military coup known as ‘the 
May 16 Revolution’ in 1961, toppling down the democratically elected but incompetent Chang 
Myon government. Despite controversy over his dictatorial rule and hatred by some of his victims 
and opponents, President Park was highly regarded and most respected for his significant 
contributions to the nation’s economic development through vigorous industrialization and 
modernization.  His eighteen-year rule abruptly ended in 1979 when one of his closest aides 
assassinated him at a dinner.  His descent, as sudden as his ascent, was even more tragic because his 
wife was also killed in 1974 by an assassin who targeted him but victimized her instead.21  
Under the leadership of the general-turned-President Chun Doo-hwan (1980~1988), South 
Korea also made substantial progress economically, socially, and diplomatically. Prominently, he 
kept his promise to confine his presidency to a single term of seven years and set a precedent for the 
peaceful transfer of power upon his departure in 1988.22  Chun’s de facto political heir and a life-long 
friend/mentee, Roh Tae-woo (1988~1993) was elected directly by the people, managed the difficult 
democratic transition, laid the groundwork for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and 
normalized relations with the countries of the former socialist bloc.  Notwithstanding their respective 
                                                          
18 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building. (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007), 33. 
19 He had one biological son (1899~1906) from his first marriage who died of diphtheria in the United States. On March 26, 1957, his 
83rd birthday, President Rhee adopted Lee Kang-suk, the son of vice president Lee Ki-bung. Since then, Lee Ki-bung became the de-
facto political-heir to President Rhee. On April 28 in 1960, two days after Rhee stepped down, Lee Kang-suk was allegedly known to 
have shot to death the entire family of Lee Ki-bung, after which he committed suicide.  Lee, In-su, a member of Rhee’s lineage clan, 
was chosen to be adopted as Rhee’s son on November 13, 1961.  Since then, Lee In-su has taken care of President Rhee’s life legacies.  
20 The current president, Park Geun-hye, is the eldest daughter of President Park Chung-hee. She served on her deceased mother’s 
behalf as the first lady for President Park. 
21 In recent scientific research revealed that the First Lady was not shot by the assassin, but was killed by a misfired shot by one of the 
body guards on the stage: MBC documentary: Yijeneun malhalsooyissda https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNkXBamZ5z8 
22 Some may argue that his decisions were not of a voluntary kind but of necessity for his political survival and personal welfare.  It is 
very likely that his agreement was in response to the popular pressure to revise the constitution and out of a secret political deal with 
presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo, his political heir and friend.  However, these facts or speculations still do not discount the fact he 
was the final decision-maker, at least officially, who made all this eventually happen.  
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political, economic and diplomatic contributions to South Korea’s development, both presidents were 
jailed on charges of corruption and treason, and became the object of much ridicule and criticism from the 
media and the public. In fact, President Chun was sentenced to death, only to be spared later.    
The tragic endings of South Korean presidents did not stop with Korea’s transition to 
democracy in 1987.  Presidents Kim Young-sam (1993~1998) and Kim Dae-jung (1998~2003) were 
known for their life-long dedication to and fight for democracy and entered their respective 
presidential terms with great expectations from the people. The first civilian president since 1961, 
Kim Young-sam, pushed for strong drives for globalization, economic reform and political purges 
for past presidents, especially Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. Kim Dae-jung steered the nation 
away from the disastrous 1997 financial crisis and pursued the Sunshine policy toward North Korea, 
among others. President Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 “for his decades-
long work for democracy and human rights in South Korea and peace and reconciliation on the 
Korean peninsula23.” However, both presidents had to leave office in much disappointment amid a 
series of policy failures and corruption scandals, the aftermath of which put their own children in 
prison for corruption charges. President Roh Moo-hyun (2003~2008), a radical reformist, pursued 
lofty goals such as social justice and a participatory democracy.  However, he became the first 
president to face impeachment trial in 2004 and committed suicide in 2009 amid a barrage of 
corruption charges against his family members, close friends and aides.   
 
 
 
                                                          
23 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/. 
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Table 1.1. The Rise and Fall of South Korean Presidents (1948 ~ 2009) 
Presidents Term  Significance / Achievements  Failures / Endings  Main Charges 
Rhee Syng-man 1948-
1960 
- Founding president  
- Defended the nation from 
communism  
- Universal Public education 
- Stepped down in a 
student protest 
- Died in exile  
Prolonged 
dictatorship 
through 
constitutional 
revision and 
illicit elections 
Park Chung-hee 1963-
197924 
- Economic development through 
industrialization and 
modernization 
- Assassinated  Prolonged 
authoritarian rule 
through 
constitutional 
revision known 
as the Yushin 
Constitution and 
human rights 
violations 
Chun Doo-hwan 1980-
1988 
- Economic stabilization  - Imprisoned Mutiny, treason, 
bribery 
Roh Tae-woo 1988-
1993 
- Restoration of diplomatic 
relations through northern policies 
- 1988 Summer Olympics  
- Imprisoned Mutiny, treason, 
bribery 
Kim Young-sam 1993-
1998 
- Radical economic reforms,  
- Correcting past wrongs 
- Imprisonment of 
children 
- Tarnished image 
Family 
corruption 
Kim Dae-jung 1998-
2003 
- Sunshine Policy for North Korea 
- Recovering from 1997 financial 
crisis  
- Imprisonment of 
children 
- Tarnished image 
Family 
corruption 
Roh Moo-hyun 2003-
2008 
- Political reforms 
 
- Impeachment 
charge/ suicide  
Family 
corruption 
 
                                                          
24 Park Chung-hee toppled the second Republic of Korea through a military coup. He ruled as the head of the Supreme Council for 
National Reconstruction until his election and inauguration as the President of the Third Republic of South Korea in 1963. The 
official government archive records his official presidency starting from 1963.  
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The history of the presidency itself is not much different from the fate of its occupants. Within a 
short span of just forty years between the nation’s founding in 1948 and democratization in 1987, 
Korea’s constitution was either rewritten or revised a total of nine times, eight revisions of which 
were concerned with presidential power structure including election methods, terms of office, and 
exercise of authority.  Moreover, such a call for constitutional revision concerning the presidency 
has continued even after 1987 when Korea became finally democratized, at least in terms of 
procedural democracy.  The 1987 constitution was touted as the most democratically adopted 
constitution because it was negotiated by both ruling and opposition parties as well as approved by 
the public in a national referendum with a 93.1 percent approval record.  The frequency of 
constitutional revision speaks volumes for the significance of the presidency in South Korean 
politics. In other words, this obsession with presidential power and authority also highlights the 
preeminence of presidents in South Korean society.  Often, such a proposal or demand for 
constitutional reform or revision comes from the sitting president or presidential candidates. “With 
almost all past presidents, toward the end of their terms, arguments for a change to a parliamentary 
system were inevitably raised,” either because a change of parties in power was likely to happen, or the 
incumbent wanted to maintain an influence in the National Assembly even after the term of office.25    
In America, the prototype of presidential democracy, people do blame and criticize their 
presidents for obvious policy failures, personal misjudgments, violations of the law, excessive 
exercise of presidential power and corruption scandals, etc.  However, American politicians and the 
populace do not dishonor and oppose their presidents as vehemently and continually as South 
Koreans often do, once presidents end their official tenures. Seldom do they wage serious political 
purges or personal revenges against their former presidents, who may be their political foes in terms 
                                                          
25 Mo, Jongryn, and David W. Brady. The rule of law in South Korea. Stanford, (CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford U, 2009), 16. 
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of party affiliation and political goals. Obviously, it is not that the United States is without its own 
share of failed or disappointing presidents, various kinds of political and corruption scandals, alleged 
or convicted, against presidents, their family members and aides.26 However, situations are different 
in the United States. The system of the American government “has survived many tests, including 
the times when less than honorable men steered the ship of state,” despite the kinds and nature of 
presidential scandals that “might have led to the collapse of the government or worse”:27 President 
Nixon’s Watergate scandal and his dishonorable resignation, Bill Clinton’s globally broadcast sex scandal, 
and the contested 2000 Presidential election when Al Gore won the popular vote but lost to George 
Bush, to name a few.  
Nevertheless, the United States celebrates ‘President’s Day’ as a national holiday on the third 
Monday of every February.  Museums and various organizations have been established and events 
are held to honor their role in the making of the nation’s history. Retired presidents are free to travel 
the world and engage in various activities including speeches and book publications.  Moreover, few 
challenge the institution of the presidency itself. The prolonged and expanded power of the 
presidency under Franklin D. Roosevelt led to the adoption of the 22nd Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States,28 which sets a term limit for election and overall time of service to 
the office of President of the United States.  It is noteworthy that the nature of the amendments to 
the American constitution is different from that of South Korea.  Most of the amendments to the 
American Constitution are concerned more with protecting the civil liberties and civil rights of the 
American public from the government than with redefining presidential powers and authorities.   
                                                          
26 For a detailed discussion of all the scandals of American presidents, see Jeffrey D. Schultz’s Presidential Scandals (2000). The book 
records as many as 20 scandals including sexual misconduct, bribery, etc. 
27 Schultz, Jeffrey D. Presidential Scandals. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), xix. 
28 U.S. Congress passed the Amendment on March 21, 1947, ratified by 36 states of the then 48 states on February 27, 1951. The 
Amendment confined the presidential term to two terms.  
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By any standards, what Korean presidents have contributed to the nation’s development is 
neither trivial nor insignificant compared to that of their American counterparts, given the 
formidable challenges that faced the nation. All presidents had to defend the nation from constant 
security threats from North Korea, while managing the state affairs amid changing political and 
economic circumstances outside and domestic conflicts within.  Against all these challenges and 
crises, and notwithstanding their often undemocratic practices and wrongdoings, South Korean 
presidents made instrumental and positive contributions to the country’s nation-building, economic 
and political development. Of course, any individual president should be held responsible for 
personal wrongdoings, serious policy failures, political miscalculations, misuse, and abuse of power.  
However, South Korea seems to be one of the very few economically advanced countries in the 
world that has witnessed the patterned downfalls of every president in its presidential history.29   
Both politicians and the public have not duly appreciated the achievements of former presidents. 
Instead, they continually challenged the existing presidential system. Furthermore, Korea is perhaps 
the only country in the world that has few monuments, statues, or official museums in honor of a 
former president, while there are countless such memorials elsewhere, even in countries whose 
presidents ran the country far worse than South Korea in terms of political and economic 
development.30 The media, pundits and scholars alike have come to a conclusion that Korea has had 
no single successful and respectable president to date.31  The American ambassador to South Korea, 
Kathleen Stephens, was attacked in 2011 by an angry South Korean while she was attending the 
ceremony for the unveiling of the Rhee Syng-man statue.32  
                                                          
29 This assessment echoes the general consensus by the academia, the media, and the public in South Korea. One may argue against 
such a categorically sweeping argument.  For this debate, refer to Kim, Chang-ho, et al. Presidential Power and Decision. (Seoul: The 
PLAN, 2015), 21-44. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that there is a general perception of failed presidents. Ibid, 30 
30 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building. (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007).  
31 Ham Sung-deuk. Presidential Studies. (Paju: Nanam Publishing, 2003); Yoon Yu-joon. Statecraft]. (Seoul: Medichi Media, 2011) 
32 August 27, 2011. Joongang ilbo.  
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Research Question 
Thus, this study attempts to solve a paradoxical puzzle in South Korean presidential politics. On the 
one hand, the presidency is considered the most powerful and supreme institution, and presidents 
have made significant contributions to the nation’s economic and political development as the 
country’s top leader. On the other hand, all the occupants have suffered from personal downfalls 
and disgraceful endings.  
Indeed, the Korean presidency is like a black hole. On the one hand, it draws huge national 
attention and energy both from the public and politicians to elect its occupant. On the other hand, 
once their term of office nears to end, all Korean presidents to date have faced disgraceful endings. 
This situation is puzzling on many levels: despite the preeminent role of presidents in South Korea’s 
remarkable political and economic development in the nation’s modern history since 1948, 
presidents in their post-tenure period, without exception, suffer from lack of proper appreciation for 
their contributions.  Although presidents are legally the most powerful and influential as the final 
decision makers for the nation’s fate, which is true for all presidential democracies, all Korean 
presidents ended their presidencies in humiliation, disappointment, tragedy and public disdain. 
There have been repeated patterns of the Korean presidents’ entanglement with political and 
corruption scandals during and after their tenure, especially in the post-1987 democratization when 
Korea had its constitution rewritten to correct the drawbacks of the past presidencies. Unlike other 
presidential countries around the world, including the United States, where both the government 
and the public give honor and respect to their presidential office-holders regardless of their 
individual weaknesses and obvious policy failures—maybe for the nation’s pride, if not for the 
excellence of their job performance per se—most Korean presidents are not duly appreciated. This 
series of puzzles leads to the following research question:  
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Why have all of South Korean presidents, without exception and notwithstanding their individual major 
contributions to the process of Korea’s development, fallen victim to disgraceful downfalls? 
 
The Thesis 
To advance my thesis, I will employ the analytical concepts of “liberal compromise” and 
“overpoliticization” proposed by S.N. Sangmpam.33 According to him, all Western democracies share 
“liberal compromise” as a common property, despite their regional or national variations, while non-
Western countries are all characterized by “overpoliticization” or “tenuous or a lack of liberal 
compromise,” despite their regional or national variations.  Sangmpam argues that non-Western 
countries have the tendency to resist liberal compromise when political conflicts arise, as opposed to 
Western democratic countries where these are resolved within established institutional arrangements. 
Liberal compromise can be defined as attempts to solve political conflicts within the established 
legal and institutional boundaries, whereas overpoliticization refers to situations when these attempts 
are made outside these boundaries.  Non-Western countries tend to resort to non-democratic, often 
violent, means including various forms of electoral frauds, use of state coercion for personal 
vendetta or political advantages, and the like34. Broadly speaking, liberal compromise takes place in 
the political competition at three levels: (1) basic compromise about the values, beliefs and goals of 
the political society, (2) power relations and procedural compromise and (3) policy compromise.35  
                                                          
33 Sangmpam, S. N. Comparing Apples and Mangoes: The Overpoliticized State in Developing Countries. (NY: State University of New York 
Press, Albany, 2007).  The earlier formulation of the theory can be found in Sangmpam, S.N. “The Overpoliticized State and 
Democratization: A Theoretical Model.” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (July 1992), 401-417; “The Overpoliticized State and 
International Politics: Nicaragua, Haiti, Cambodia, and Togo.” Third World Quarterly 16, no. 4, (1995), 607-629 
34 Ibid. Sangmpam proposes about eighty specific manifestations of such overpoliticized behaviors in non-Western countries. For a 
detailed list, refer to the tables 1.1., 1.2, and 1.3 in pp. 45~47 
35 Ibid, 223. 
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It is noteworthy that this analytical dichotomy between liberal compromise and 
overpoliticization is a matter of degree or frequency, not a matter of absence or presence. In other 
words, there are obviously overpoliticized behaviors in such Western democratic countries as the 
United States,36 and some liberal compromise practices in South Korea. What matters is that 
empirically, liberal compromise takes place more frequently and routinely in the Western liberal 
states, while over-politicization commonly occurs in the non-western states, including South Korea. 
Therefore, there are qualitative as well as quantitative differences in the way politics is played out in 
the Western and non-Western countries.37 
In this analytical framework, political outcomes or behaviors are considered a function of social 
contexts. In other words, what accounts for this difference between liberal compromise and lack 
thereof, or predominantly overpoliticized behaviors is whether capitalism has been culturalized or 
“fully entrenched” in a given society.  All Western liberal democracies are characterized by a fully 
established free market economy in their societies to the extent that capitalist core relations38 directly 
affect social actors and their behaviors, subordinating all social relationships and all conditions under 
which the social product (goods and services) is generated.  Sangmpam calls this fully inter-
connected relationship between capitalism and society in western countries “a triple convergence.”39 It 
“constitutes the culture of capitalist societies to the extent that it shapes and determines political 
values, economic life, philosophical/ideological thinking, modes of social interactions and artistic 
expressions.”40  
                                                          
36 With respect to overpoliticized behaviors in western countries, refer to Ibid, 158-166. 
37 For quantitative data to support the validity of these two analytical concepts, refer to chapter 4 in Ibid. 
38 In Sangmpam’s theory, capitalist core relations refers to the relationship between capitalists (i.e. entrepreneurs) and the workers.  
39 Triple convergence refers to the entrenched culture of capitalism in Western societies that are characterized by (1) all social actors 
depend on the social product (2) which is entirely dependent on capitalism (3) and capitalism subordinates all social relationships.  
40 Ibid, 247 
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On the other hand, capitalism in non-Western countries is far from being fully entrenched in 
their societies, despite phenomenal capitalist expansionism in these regions in recent decades.  
Because of mutual alteration between capitalism and non-Western cultures, capitalist core relations 
become modified and display the following seven traits: (1) the non-central position of the capitalist 
core relations, (2) limited scope of private property ownership, (3) less extensive commodification, 
(4) lack of integration and interdependence of economic activities, (5) less pervasive capitalist core 
relations in agriculture and industry, (6) stagnant socioeconomic reproduction and specialization of 
material production and (7) the detachment of most social behaviors from capitalist core relations 
and the existence of competing forms of non-Western capitalist ideologies and cultures.  Simply put, 
capitalism has not become “the culture” as is the case in the Western part of the world. In non-
western societies, all social actors depend on the social product, but only a portion of which depends 
on capitalism. Unlike western capitalist societies, in non-Western societies, capitalist core relations 
subordinate only a part of social relationships.  Sangmpam refers to this loosened inter-
connectedness between capitalism and society as “a triple divergence” as opposed to the triple convergence 
in Western countries.  As a result, society is characterized by the following three basic situations: (1) 
capitalism and its attendant ties stand opposed to non-capitalist ties and activities, (2) the state and 
its attendant class/group configuration tend to assume a crucial and even an excessive control over 
capitalist core relations and non-capitalist activities (notwithstanding the forced privatization of the 
globalization era) and (3) foreign economic actors tend to control capitalist core relations. The 
following table provides a snapshot of these differences between Western liberal democracies and 
Non-Western countries.   
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Table 1.2. Distinction between Western Liberal Democracies vs. Non-Western Countries 
Classification  Western Countries (e.g., U.S.) Non-Western Countries (e.g. South Korea) 
Societal 
characteristics 
Triple Convergence 
(capitalist core relations 
dominant)  
Triple Divergence 
(altered core relations dominant) 
Society-rooted 
politics 
Liberal Compromise Overpoliticization 
State Liberal Democratic State Overpoliticized State 
 
Sangmpam’s perspective about the intrinsic correlation between capitalism and society is 
supported by other observers as well.  In a sense, capitalism can be seen as the content and the 
society as its container. The container modifies the content.  Indeed, as Nathan Rosenberg argues, 
“capitalist societies may take very different forms and function very differently from one another 
depending on cultural infrastructure.”41 E.P. Thompson states that a cultural shaping of the 
transition to capitalism is inevitable in any society: “There has never been any single type of ‘the 
transition.’ The stress of the transition falls upon the whole culture; resistance to change and assent 
to change arise from the whole culture.  And this culture includes the system of power, property-
relations, religious institutions, etc., inattention to which merely flattens phenomena and trivializes 
analysis.”42 George Lodge and Ezra F. Vogel further this perspective by dividing capitalism into two 
categories: individualistic capitalism as practiced in the United States and the UK, and 
communitarian capitalism as practiced in Asia, including Korea and Taiwan. They differ in property 
ownership, industrial organization and government-business relationships, among other aspects.43 
                                                          
41 Quote cited in Song, Byung-Nak, 1939. The Rise of the Korean Economy. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003),55 
42 Quote cited in Janelli, Roger Louis., and Dawnhee Yim. Making capitalism: the social and cultural construction of a South Korean conglomerate. 
(Stanford: Stanford U Press, 1994). 
43 Quote cited in Song, Byung-nak, 1939. The Rise of Korean Economy. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.)  
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All these observations reinforce the argument that “regardless of their level of economic 
development and exposure to globalization, non-Western societies are not exclusively capitalist.”44  
Relying on this analytical framework, my broad thesis for this study is as follows:  
Patterned downfalls of all Korean presidents are an institutional outcome of overpoliticization in Korean politics, which 
is itself a function of not fully entrenched capitalist society.  
 
To support this thesis, I advance three hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: As social and political ideologies and praxes, Confucianism and other Korean cultural traits stand opposed to 
capitalist social order. As such, they modify capitalism in Korea, preventing the development of an entrenched capitalism as 
found in the United States. 
Confucianism and other traditional cultural traits, including Buddhist and Shamanistic mindset 
and practices, dominated the country for more than two thousand years. The country was under the 
reign of the Yi family clan, commonly known as Joseon (1392 ~ 1910).45 Before this period, the 
Goryo dynasty lasted another five hundred years (918 ~ 1392).  Confucianism was dominant during 
Joseon, while Buddhism was the main influence in the prior period. Noteworthy is that Shamanism 
was operational alongside these mainstream religions and state ideologies as well.  Korea 
experienced identity-shattering events such as the Japanese colonization, American military rule, the 
Korean War, the subsequent nation-building process, and rapid industrialization and its attendant 
social upheavals.  Although drastic and transformative, these events could not wipe out or replace 
the time-honored tradition and culture of its populace overnight. I will show how Confucian and 
other traditional values and practices still persisted in Korean society throughout its economic 
                                                          
44 Sangmpam, S. N. Comparing Apples and Mangoes: The Overpoliticized State in Developing Countries. (NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2007), 6 
45 Before Korea was open to the outside in 1876, the country was under the reign of the Yi family clan (1392 ~ 1910). During this 
period, Korea was often called either the Yi Dynasty or Joseon.   
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modernization, altering capitalism to the extent that it prevented the full entrenchment of capitalism 
in Korean society. In so doing, I will argue that capitalist expansionism and its attendant social 
changes through urbanization and industrialization did not change the most fundamental traditional 
Korean values and practices. Especially, the Korean society of 1948 to 2009 was generally 
characterized by the mindset and practices of what I call familist collectivism. This mindset and practice 
allowed South Korea to take advantage of the state’s authoritarian/bureaucratic power to achieve 
rapid economic growth, while stifling the full development of a market economy based on individual 
liberty and rule of laws.  
Next, I will move to discuss the external factors that further influenced the alteration of 
capitalism in South Korea.  
Hypothesis 2: The more dependent capitalism is, the more it deviates from the norms of capitalism in the west. The 
Japanese colonial impact and the historically dependent nature of South Korea upon the United States have further 
hindered the full entrenchment of a U.S. type capitalism in Korean society. 
The country’s respective historical relationship with Japan and the United States is another 
significant factor that not only contributed to capitalist expansionism in South Korea and its 
attendant economic growth, but further distorted capitalism in ways that prevented it from being 
fully entrenched.  Since the mid-19th century, the Korean peninsula had been under the whims of the 
imperialist dynamics of major powers including Russia, Japan and the United States.  Japanese 
colonial rule for four decades and America’s involvement in political and economic development in 
post-liberation Korea led to path-dependent outcomes.  In other words, these two historical events 
structured conditions that lock in Korea’s future political and economic trajectory.  As I analyze the 
respective impact of Korea’s bilateral relationship with Japan and the United States on the alteration 
of capitalism, I will make two main arguments.  First, although Japan introduced capitalist 
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institutions and industrial infrastructure during the colonial period, colonial rule was predominantly 
in pursuit of Japanese interests.  Colonial rule was mostly arbitrary and required neither consent 
from the ruled nor electoral responsibility.  As such, the indoctrination of authoritarian rule and 
forced submission to authority distorted the proper formation and function of market-based liberal 
capitalism in the future of Korea. Second, U.S. policies for post-liberation Korea paved the way for 
the emergence of a strong state.  Although the United States publicly aimed at political democracy 
and a capitalist market economy, Washington’s response to Korea’s domestic circumstances and 
political actors betrays inconsistency. For instance, the United States often compromised democratic 
values in favor of national security during the Rhee Syng-man’s regime and in favor of economic 
development during the Park Chung-hee regime.  With the security and economic support of the 
United States, South Korea was able to defend the country from communist threats and achieve 
speedy and remarkable economic growth. However, the end result was the distortion of individual 
freedom-based liberal capitalism.  
Then, what are the implications of this altered capitalism for South Korean presidents’ disgraceful 
downfalls? To answer, I propose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The more entrenched capitalism in a society, the more politics leads to liberal compromise. Likewise, 
the less capitalism is entrenched in a society, the lower the level of liberal compromise in politics. Given the lower level of 
capitalist entrenchment in Korean society, politics in Korea is characterized by overpoliticization, or a lower level of 
liberal compromise. Because the presidency is the supreme institution in South Korea, it experiences the effects of 
overpoliticization more prominently than is the case in a country such as the United States.   
According to Sangmpam, the actual manifestations of overpoliticization are violations of the 
rules of the game: non-respect for basic liberal values, political competition taking place outside the 
confinement of democratic procedure and institutional arrangements, and disregard for compromise 
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reached among contending participants.  Building on Sangmpam’s theoretical framework that non-
Western countries are characterized by overpoliticization in politics as a function of social context, I 
argue that the alteration of capitalism through familist collectivism, as well as by the dependent nature 
of Korea’s external relations with Japan and the United States, led to the lower level of liberal 
compromise, or overpoliticized behaviors in Korean politics. The overpoliticization in Korean 
politics is most prominently manifested in the downfalls of all Korean presidents, regardless of 
whether they are authoritarian or democratic.   
 
Study Design and Methodology 
This study aims to provide an explanation for a mind-boggling phenomenon that has beset South 
Korean presidential politics since its founding of a modern nation-state in 1948. I am interested in 
uncovering the reasons why all South Korean presidents, despite their contributions to the national 
development, had to suffer downfalls without exception.  Therefore, the best strategy to achieve this 
goal is to employ a qualitative case study strategy because it is “the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.”46 More importantly, to 
understand complex social phenomena such as the focus of this study, the case study approach 
“allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.”47  
This study covers the entire presidential era from the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948 
up to the suicide of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009.48  For the sake of comparison and contrast, 
                                                          
46 Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (L.A.: Sage Publications. 1984), 13 
47 Ibid.  
48 I was inspired to tackle this research question directly by the suicide of President Roh Moo-hyun in May of 2009. As I was working 
on the current research, President Lee Myung-bak was in office.  Thus, I did not include Presidents Lee Myung-bak (2008 ~ 2013) 
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this period is divided into two sub-periods. The first covers the presidencies of Rhee Syng-man, 
Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, all of whom ruled before South Korea became a functionally 
procedural democracy in 1987.  The second sub-period deals with the presidencies of the post-1987 
democratic transition. They are Roh Tae-woo, Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Roh Moo-hyun. 
This periodic contrast and comparison will highlight the persistent nature of the problem, and the 
broader application of this study’s thesis to all presidential cases regardless of changes in political 
and institutional arrangements. The presidencies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye are excluded 
in the current study, although they are highly likely to follow in the same footsteps of their 
predecessors. The exclusion is mainly because their fate is yet to be decided.49 Also, the United States 
is used as a point of reference for comparison, if and when necessary, because the country is the 
prototype of presidential democracy and Korea’s most influential partner.  
Data and information were collected from two major sources. The first includes primary 
sources: governmental archives and internet archives; Korean and foreign newspapers and 
magazines and TV broadcasts; and participant observation methodology.  As a participant observer, 
I worked for more than six years in the Korean bureaucracy as the interpreter for two mayors50 at 
the Metropolitan Government of Seoul (1999~2003); I served as a coordinator for the Korean local 
authorities in international affairs (1997~1999), interacting closely with Korean local governors, 
mayors and their counterparts in other countries.  More importantly, I take advantage of my life in 
Korea’s fast changing society both through direct and indirect experiences (1967~2017).  Secondary 
sources include articles in scholarly journals and books in such diverse academic areas as 
                                                          
and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) in this study.  However, throughout the study, when relevant and necessary, I make comments about 
these presidents as well.  
49 On March 10, 2017, President Park Geun-hye was officially removed from her office after the Constitutional Court unanimously 
voted to upheld the impeachment decision against her. As of April 11, 2017, she is arrested and jailed, awaiting for trial.   
50 Mayor Goh Kun (May 1999 ~ June 30, 2002), and Lee Myung-bak (July 1, 2002 ~ June 30, 2003). After his mayoral service, Goh 
Kun became the prime minister under president Roh, Moo-hyun (2003 ~ 2004). Goh Kun also took presidential power during the 
impeachment process of Roh Moo-hyun (2004). Goh Kun and Lee Myung-bak competed for the 2008 presidential election, although 
Goh Kun dropped out of the race. Lee Myung-bak was elected president.  
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presidentialism, democratization, institutionalism, developmental state, political leadership, Korean 
history, social anthropology, and psychology.  
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
After this introduction and overview of the study, I will review the literature in chapter one to show 
that existing perspectives are not adequate to explain the patterned downfalls of all South Korean 
presidents.  In chapter two, I will discuss how capitalism has evolved since it was introduced by the 
Japanese colonial government during the first half of the 20th century.  This discussion will lay the 
analytical foundation for an in-depth discussion of hypotheses one and two in chapter three 
regarding the influence of Confucian and other traditional values and practices as well as Korea’s 
external relations with Japan and the United States in altering capitalism. Chapters four and five will 
be devoted to test hypothesis three by discussing empirical cases of Korean presidencies with a 
particular attention to the dynamics that led to their eventual and personal demises.  In particular, 
chapter four covers the pre-1987 presidencies of Rhee Syng-man, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-
hwan.  Chapter five analyzes the presidencies of the post-authoritarian period: Roh Tae-woo, Kim 
Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. In the conclusion chapter, I will summarize the 
findings and discuss their implications for the future of South Korean presidential democracy and 
for the evaluation of presidential politics for non-Western countries.   
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
I undertake this study to address a paradoxical political phenomenon in South Korean presidential 
democracy.  Despite the nation’s remarkable economic prosperity and democratic progress under 
the presidential system, South Korean presidents in the period of 1948-2009 all fell victim to 
patterned  downfalls.  Not a single president, both authoritarian and democratic, could escape such a 
tragic ending.  In this chapter, I start with the conventional discourse of presidentialism versus 
parliamentarism. Then, I move to show that the patterned failures of all South Korean presidents 
require a broader perspective than an analysis of a single presidency often analyzed either from 
institutional or political leadership framework.  Because politics is a function of social contexts, I 
argue that the proposed research question will be best answered by combining the mid-level theory 
of S.N. Sangmpam’s overpoliticization and liberal compromise that dichotomize the Western and 
non-Western societies and a proper understanding of specificity of Korean society.    
 
1.1. Presidentialism v. Parliamentarism? 
In the late 1980s, Juan J. Linz51 made an important observation about political systems and argued 
for the superiority of parliamentary democracies both on theoretical and empirical grounds. 
Theoretically, he presented four major “perils of presidentialism” inherent in the system itself: the 
danger of electing minority presidents52, difficulty of removing the sitting president, policy gridlock 
as a result of dual legitimacy and the rise of inexperienced outsiders. These fundamental defects in 
presidential democracy would be more likely to lead to democratic crises and even breakdowns. On 
                                                          
51 Linz, Juan J. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 1, (1990): 51-70. 
52 This term refers to a president who is elected by the largest number of votes cast but not by a majority of the electorate.   
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the other hand, periodic parliamentary crises in parliamentary systems would not necessarily turn 
into full-blown regime crises and result in the end of democracy. Therefore, he reasoned that 
parliamentarism would be more conducive to a stable democracy than its presidential counterpart. 
Empirically, with the United State being the notable exception, the vast majority of the stable 
democracies in the world were parliamentary regimes.  Logically, his prescriptive conclusion for the 
so-called third-wave democracies was that parliamentarism generally offers a better hope of 
preserving democracy in the post-independence era.53 
Despite Linz’s agenda-setting argument against presidentialism, the observed reality in the early 
21st century is that presidential democracies have not only survived the test of time, but they are as 
prosperous as parliamentary ones.  In particular, the majority of new democracies in East Asia have 
developed both economically and politically under presidential systems.  It is true that at the turn of 
the 21st century, some of the major presidential democracies in East Asia were put to test when their 
presidential systems created political crises and instability: the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea 
and Taiwan. All the presidents of these countries faced impeachment challenges (or an equivalent of 
it in the case of Indonesia). Fukuyama et al. took up these four cases of presidential democracy as a 
litmus test for the validity of Linzian thesis.54 Despite the political crises and instability caused by 
presidential systems in these countries, they found that these regimes endured and remained 
democratic throughout the challenging period.  In fact, “the military coup or other authoritarian 
backsliding is conspicuous by its absence.”55 More importantly, democratic institutions worked “as 
they were supposed to”56 in South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia.  For instance, the politically 
motivated impeachment attempt against the incumbent president Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 was 
                                                          
53 Elgie, Robert. “From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of presidential/parliamentary Studies?” Democratization, vol. 12, no. 1 (2005): 
106-122, doi:10.1080/1351034042000317989. 
54  Fukuyama, Francis, et al. “Facing the Perils of Presidentialism?” Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2 (2005): 102-116; 114. 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid. 
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resolved peacefully by the constitutional court that turned down the impeachment motion by the 
National Assembly.  In addition, the public duly punished through elections those politicians and the 
opposition party that initiated the impeachment motion against the public sentiment.  As recently as 
2016, the incumbent President Park Geun-hye was impeached by the National Assembly, convicted 
by the Constitutional Court, and imprisoned. Still, the Korean state is without any immediate threat 
of military coup or government shutdown. Thus, I agree with their conclusion that these findings 
and political reality suggest the prevalence of “much stronger norms against overt military 
intervention,” and “the immaturity of its democratic system rather than some defect of 
presidentialism as such.”57  
   
1.2. Perils of Presidentialism or Perils of Presidents?    
Today it would be safe to state that the American presidency has survived the longest, and most 
presidential democracies in the world are not necessarily more in danger of regime breakdown or of 
the end of democracy than parliamentary ones.  Rather, the presidency as a political institution has 
been maturing, as Fukuyama et al. suggest.  However, very little of the literature on this debate has 
paid attention to presidents, the very agents of the institution.  As one of the prime textbook 
examples of economic development under presidential democracy, the fate of South Korean 
presidents seems to present a new challenge to our understanding of political systems. The Korean 
presidency as an institution has survived the test of many trials including the assassination of a 
sitting president (Park Chung-hee), the transfer of power to an opposition leader (Kim Dae-jung), 
and an unprecedented impeachment motion against an incumbent president (Roh Moo-hyun), and 
                                                          
57 Ibid.   
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actual removal of the incumbent president from office through constitutional means (Park Geun-
hye) in 2016. Although there have been constant debates over constitutional reforms concerning the 
powers of the president in particular, South Korea has thrived under presidential democracy.  
However, as already discussed, every president since the nation’s founding in 1948 to 2009 has 
experienced a tragic or disgraceful fate: Rhee Syng-man’s political demise and exiled death, Park 
Chung-hee’s assassination, the respective imprisonment of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, the 
shame and disdain put on Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung caused by their respective children’s 
corruption charges, and the suicide of Roh Moo-hyun. This patterned personal downfall of Korean 
presidents is in stark contrast to the institutionalization and maturation of the presidency that has 
survived the test of many trials.  
Now the issue is no longer whether the fate of presidential democracy itself is threatened by the 
so-called institutional defects of presidentialism identified by Linz and debated by his followers.  In 
other words, although all the insights we have gained from the dominant discourse of presidential 
vis-à-vis parliamentary democracies are valuable, they are not complete.  Changing international 
norms and the human capacity to learn and fix to improve systemic weaknesses all have contributed 
to the institutionalization of the presidency and presidential regime survival.  Also, the empirical 
evidence suggests that the relative drawbacks of the presidential system compared to a parliamentary 
one may not threaten the very survival of democratic regime.  Rather, the South Korean case raises 
another set of questions about whether presidential democracy is threatened by its occupants or vice 
versa.  In the case of Korea, the prevailing perception that all presidents failed has led to distrust in 
the presidency itself,58 constantly revoking the necessity to rewrite the constitution. If the culprit for 
the patterned failure of South Korean presidents is the systemic defects inherent in presidentialism, 
                                                          
58 Kim, Chang-ho, et al. Presidential Power and Decisions. (Seoul: The+PLAN, 2015).  
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one may be hard-pressed to present a rationale for why this has not happened to other presidential 
democracies as frequently as is the case with South Korea.  
 
1.3. Limitations on Researching Korean Presidents  
Compared to the scholarship on Korea’s democratization and economic development respectively, 
there are relatively fewer scholarly efforts made to study the Korean presidency and Korean 
presidents, both in the English-speaking literature and in vernacular literature. As the oldest existing 
constitution-based presidential democracy in the world, the United States has understandably 
accumulated a wealth of scholarship on the presidency and its individual presidents over the years. 
However, the research focus is almost exclusively on the American presidency, and scholars rarely 
pay much attention to the presidencies or presidents outside the United States.  
With respect to publicly available vernacular scholarship on South Korean presidency, the 
reasons for its paucity are more complicated.  Unlike the United States, Korea has a relatively brief 
presidential history, and there are only eight presidents59 (2009 as the cut year) to research, which has 
not permitted any meaningfully systematic and statistical studies.  In addition to the shortage of 
academically available materials and resources about the presidency and presidents, there are political 
reasons that hinder any meaningful academic efforts.  Until recently, Korean scholars faced 
limitations to talk openly about their presidents and presidencies because Korea was under 
authoritarianism that hindered the freedom of speech and press.  Especially, all presidents in the pre-
                                                          
59 Rhee Syng-man (1948~1960) as the 1st ~3rd President, Yun Bo-Sun (1960~1962) as the 4th; Park Chung-hee (1963~1979) as the 5th 
~ 9th; Choi Kyu-hah (1979~1980) as the 10th; Chun Doo-hwan (1980~1988) as the 11 ~ 12th; Roh Tae-woo (1988~1993) as the 13th; 
Kim Young-sam (1993~1998) as the 14th; Kim Dae-jung (1998~2003) as the 15th; Roh Moo-hyun (2003~2008) as the 16th; and Lee 
Myung-bak (2008~ present) as the 17th President of Korea.  This study does not include Yun Bo-sun because his presidency was 
during the parliamentary system.    
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1987 authoritarian era ruled the country above the law.  All three presidents revised the constitution 
either at their whims or as a political compromise.  Furthermore, all three authoritarian presidents 
invoked martial law to eliminate opposition in the name of national security. Moreover, the chaotic 
and tumultuous nation-building process under the founding president Rhee Syng-man, the almost 
dictatorial reign of president Park Chung-hee for eighteen years, especially during the Yushin system, 
and the subsequent rule of military leaders Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo granted the 
incumbents absolute powers and unrestrained access to all sorts of state resources. The monopoly of 
such powers and resources implied institutional restrictions on access to data and information for 
any meaningful researches about the presidency and the presidents. In the Korean context, any 
criticism against the presidency or presidents during authoritarian period, secular or academic, was 
strictly prohibited and punished.  Under these circumstances, it was almost impossible to have 
access to the resources of the Blue House60 and the presidents themselves.  Even after 1987, 
research about Korean presidents has faced another difficulty because “Korean views of their 
leaders are sharply divided, and any author dealing with them will inevitably be criticized for either 
praising or degrading his subject, for being either a sycophant or a traitor.61” Furthermore, any 
appraisal of the former presidents by those who worked for them faced criticism for being 
“subjective” and merely “memoire-essays,” not “worthy of academic consideration.”62  
A careful reading of the literature reveals that presidential failures in Korea are often explained 
by (1) scholars who are informed by institutionalism, (2) those who are influenced by the Western 
and American perspective that focuses on leadership style and personality of presidents and (3) 
those who rely on cultural factors.   
                                                          
60 Official presidential residence is called Blue House named after the blue roof of the house.  
61 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building. (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007). 
62  Jin Young-jae.  Hankuk Kwonryukgujoui Yihae. (Seoul: Nanam Publishing, 2004), 362 
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The most dominant approach to Korean presidency is institutionalism.  As Korean scholars 
began to flock to the United States for advanced studies in the 1980s and 1990s, it is understandable 
that many Korean students of politics, including presidential studies, were exposed to the rise of 
institutionalism in the American academic community. This institutional focus gave false 
preeminence to institutionalism by implying that “institutions possess (1) explanatory power to 
account for differential socio-political outcomes in different contexts; and (2) prescriptive power 
that makes them the solution to socio-political problems across nations.”63 The logic of 
institutionalists argument proceeds in the following order64: First, all Korean presidents failed. 
Second, the cause for this consistent failure of presidents cannot be attributed to individual 
presidents themselves, but the failure of the presidency itself. Therefore, to prevent the repetition of 
presidential failure, the constitution should be changed. What institutionalists argue is that 
presidential failures are mainly caused by a lack of proper institutionalization: imbalance among 
government branches, which causes the executive not to be properly checked and constrained by 
other branches of government, say, the National Assembly, or the judiciary, too weak political 
parties, one term of office of the presidency; the election system of ‘winner-takes-all.’  For instance, 
Choi, Jang-jip65 repeatedly raises the issue of weak political parties not only as the cause but also, 
when made “strong,” as the remedy for presidential problems.  According to Choi, political conflict 
in South Korea reflects political cleavages created after liberation in 1945. The creation of two 
ideologically hostile states, north and south of the 38th parallel, the Korean War, and the subsequent 
strengthening of both states only worsened the cleavages. Yet, after the transition to democracy in 
1987, political parties failed to reflect and represent diverse interests in Korean society. In fact, 
                                                          
63 Sangmpam, S. N. "Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries." Political Studies, vol. 55, no. 1 (2007): 
201-224 
64 Kim, Chang-ho, et al. Presidential Power and Decisions. (Seoul: The+PLAN, 2015), 26 
65 Choi, Jang-jip. Democracy after democratization. (Seoul: Humanitas, 2010). 
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South Korean political parties have always been subordinated to the presidency. Throughout 
Korea’s modern history, presidents have created their own political parties,66 which has allowed 
them to exert their influence in the National Assembly. As such, South Korean political parties have 
been given the derogatory label of “mayfly” (or ephemeral) for their short duration. Compared to 
the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States and the Labor and Conservative parties 
in Britain, which have lasted for more than one hundred years, South Korean political parties are 
comparatively short lived,67 in part because of this subordination vis-à-vis the presidency. One of the 
consequences is that the party-based legislature does not properly control the actions by the presidents.  
Once the cause is found in institutions, these scholars propose institutional prescriptions as 
well.68  Some argue that the solution should be a change to a different type of political system, while 
others propose fixing abnormalities in the existing system. They argue, for instance, that the 
National Assembly does not check the executive properly, and the judiciary is swayed by politics, 
which strengthens presidential powers. Therefore, to address this problem, the capability of the 
National Assembly to constrain and check daily activities of the presidency should be strengthened, 
and for this, the ruling party should be separated from the executive.69 In other words, they argue 
that the problems associated with former Korean presidents are because of undemocratic 
institutional arrangements of presidential power structure vis-à-vis the National Assembly or/and 
political parties, and thus, a constitutional revision should be made to remedy this imbalance by 
adjusting changes to existing power structure.  Another line of argument proposes a more radical 
solution, which is to change the form of government to parliamentarism or other forms of 
                                                          
66 Rhee Syng-man -Liberal Party; Park Chung-hee -Democratic-Republican Party; Chun Doo-hwa -Democratic-Justice Party; Roh 
Tae-woo -Liberal Democratic Party; Kim Young-sam -New Korean Democratic Party; Millennium Democratic Party; Our Uri Party; 
Lee Myung-bak-Grand National Party. 
67 On February 2, 2012, Korea’s ruling conservative Grand National Party (GNP) decided to change its name to the Saenuri Party in 
an effort to overhaul its image prior to the general elections.  This brings about controversy regarding the identity of the ruling party. 
68 For a summary of this debate, refer to “Issues about the President: Failure and Assessment of President” in Kim, Chang-ho, et al. Presidential 
Power and Decisions. (Seoul: The+PLAN, 2015), 21-44 
69 Yoon, Seong-yee, Seoul Shinmun, November 12, 2011. 
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government other than presidentialism, along the line advocated by such neo-institutionalist scholars 
as Linz who defend parliamentarism over presidentialism for newly democratized countries.   
However, these institutional analyses and subsequent prescriptions are problematic and 
misleading in several ways. For example, it is circular with no way out (i.e., institutions are made 
both cause and effect at the same time); the institutional approach does not possess the pre-eminent 
explanatory and prescriptive powers it proclaims to have in a country like Korea, “whereas socio-
political outcomes are generally ‘explained’ or made ‘successful’ by institutional variations in Western 
democracies, such is not the case in developing countries.”70 Although the arguments for 
strengthening South Korean political parties are legitimate and command full agreement as a 
secondary solution, weak political parties are not the cause of the presidential system’s instability, but 
rather its effect. Therefore, one needs to address the question of what makes the institutions weak in 
the first place.  
As for the constitutional revision, the 1987 constitution was passed with high support from the 
public and it was agreed upon by both the ruling and opposition parties.  Five presidents have been 
elected under the revised 1987 constitution including the most recent presidents Lee Myung-bak and 
Park Geun-hye.  Over the past quarter century, despite demonstrations and serious political 
scandals, no serious social protest nor coup attempt have occurred to threaten Korea’s democratic 
order. The argument for the minor revisions or a total rewriting of the constitution raises normative 
concerns as well.  A constitution is the fundamental law of a state, embodying the principal values of 
the state and reflecting its identity, in addition to being a framework for the protection of the basic 
rights of the citizens and the government structure.  Less developed countries tend to change their 
                                                          
70 Sangmpam, S. N. "Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries." Political Studies, 55.1 (2007): 
201-24; 220. 
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constitutions often, fostering a contemptuous attitude toward the constitution and eventually 
destabilizing the constitutional order.71 Moreover, the discourse about constitutional revision has 
been used for political gains.  It is important to note, I do not suggest institutions do not matter; I 
agree with Sangmpam that institutions do matter, but they hold a secondary position in analyzing the 
issue at hand.  
The argument about the role of institutions is often reinforced by the claim that Korea’s 
economic development would eventually lead to the type of political institutions that exist in the 
West and the United States. This line of argument cannot explain the patterned failures of all South 
Korean presidents while the presidency has been institutionalized to the point where political 
conflicts do not lead to regime breakdown or the end of democracy. This perspective is also 
troubling for another reason. Western neo-liberal ideology is suggested to be a necessary condition 
for economic and political development.72 As I argue in chapter two, economic development in 
South Korea was not caused by what happened in the United States.  Rather, it was made possible 
by several aspects including a strong bureaucracy, timely financial assistance from the United States 
and international organizations, a security umbrella during the Cold War rivalry between the United 
States and the USSR, and Korea’s domestic policies including first land reform, neoliberal market 
economic policy (at a later period), and the voluntary and/or forced cooperation by the large chaebol, 
or conglomerates.  Given the nature of South Korea’s economic development, quite different from 
that of the United States, and its high performance, there is neither a causal connection nor a 
correlation between economic development and patterned presidential downfalls.  
                                                          
71 Mo, Jongryn, and David W.  Brady.  The rule of law in South Korea. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford U, 2009), 14-15. 
72  Lerner, Daniel. The Grocer and the Chief: A Parable. In The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. (Glencoe, Ill: 
The Free Press, 1958); Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review 55.03 (1961): 
493-514; Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Economic Development and Democracy” in Political man: the social bases of politics. (NY: Anchor 
Books, 1963); Przeworski, Adam., et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1550-1990. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)  
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The second group of scholars focuses on presidential leadership.  For instance, Kim Ho-jin73 
links the performance of presidents to personality, which he argues is determined by psychological 
factors such as hunger for power driven by personal life stories such as extreme poverty, illegitimate 
birth, single motherhood, etc.  According to him, personal complexities can serve both as a positive 
and negative factor in determining presidential performance. Yoon Yu-joon74 also proposes a 
‘statecraft’ thesis, as well illustrated in his simple catchphrase “It’s a statecraft, stupid!75” According 
to him, presidential success depends on the quality of the president’s statecraft skills and 
preparedness of it before taking office. Yoon asserts that anyone who wants to become a president 
needs two factors: one is the strong desire to get power and the other is necessary statecraft to 
handle well the job of presidency.  When one has only the desire for power, while neglecting 
developing necessary statecraft skills, he/she cannot make a good president.  By the same token, 
even if one has the necessary statecraft skills, if he does not hold a strong desire to take power, he 
cannot make a good president because he would not have a chance to do so anyway.76 Because of 
improper statecraft on the part of presidents, Yoon argues, the public hates politics, which is fertile 
ground for new faces in politics, and results in political failures.  
Aside from those who are informed by the Western and American perspective on leadership, 
Kim Choong-nam77 brings into the spotlight the importance of evaluating South Korean presidents 
in historical and social contexts.  He argues that presidents are at the center of South Korea’s nation-
building.  In his opinion, the reason for criticizing presidents is that they are not evaluated in 
historical context, but instead by Western or contemporary standards.  According to Kim, virtually 
                                                          
73 Kim Ho-jin. Korean Presidents and Leadership. (Seoul: Cheongrym Publishing, 2008). 
74 Yoon Yu-joon. Statecraft. (Seoul: Medichi Media, 2011). 
75 Yoon Yu-joon made this comment at a TEDxSeoul lecture at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LnGadr1MDs8. 
76 For instance, during the 2007 presidential election, Goh Kun, the former prime minister, acting president and mayor of Seoul, was 
one of the leading candidates.  But the pundits and commentators described him as someone who had the capacity to make a good 
president, but who lacked the passion and desire to go through the so-called ‘dirty Korean politics.’  
77  Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building.  
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all South Korean presidents, despite some undemocratic practices and obvious policy failures, have 
served their country with loyalty and dedication within the existing constraints at the time of their 
service. Kim reminds us that the past presidents rose to power from poor beginnings and, despite 
hardships, worked tenaciously by using their talents. He also points out that all have been proud 
patriots of South Korea who faced difficult choices.  Most importantly, they were not succumbed to 
the whims and wills of the United States, as popularly suggested, but rather they were fairly 
independent and resilient in their leadership.  Each president contributed progressively to nation-
building in the face of constant national security threat from North Korea and dire economic 
conditions, especially in the early decades.  
However, this line of argument is also problematic for several reasons.  First, Korea has had 
only eight presidents (1948-2009), which makes it difficult to make any meaningful categorization of 
leadership styles and personality that can faithfully inform us of the linkage between leadership style 
and patterned downfalls of all presidents.  Second, these studies tend to put too much emphasis on 
the role of the individual agent, ignoring political, social and institutional constraints put on 
individual presidents in office.  If every president left office in disgrace and suffered severe criticism 
because of leadership, then it must be concluded that Korea has been so unfortunate that it has not 
found a good leader for the last 65 years of its modern history.  In fact, Kim Choong-nam’s focus 
on historical and situational contexts shed light on the significance of political and historical 
constraints presidents face and thus, helps us move beyond our widespread wholesale criticism and 
degradation of Korean presidents.  Nevertheless, such an argument still does not help us answer the 
question. The sacrifices of the presidents do not tell us why they all ended their tenure in failures 
and personal tragedy.  
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The third type of studies pays attention to cultural factors.  For instance, some argue that 
because of Confucian tradition, an undemocratic concept of the presidency is endemic to Korean 
society.78 Given too much unrealistic expectation put on the president, it is not likely that anyone 
could live up to the expectations. This view is widely held by the media and the public. The most 
academically promising explanation put forward in this respect is the ‘politics of the vortex’ thesis by 
Gregory Henderson.79 He argues that the unity and homogeneity of Korea acted to produce a mass 
society, by which he means a society lacking the intermediary groups between power and society, 
opposite to the case of the United States.  According to him, mass society consists typically of 
atomized entities, related to each other chiefly through their relations to state power—a society 
whose elite and mass confront each other directly, “by virtue of the weakness of groups capable of 
mediation between them.”80 It is a society characterized by amorphousness or isolation in social 
relations. Because Korea is characterized by the compactness of territory and an absence of ethnic, 
religious, political, linguistic and other basic sources of cleavage, a Universalist value system has 
created a society in which groupings are artificial. Thus, vested interests, religious separations, basic 
policy differences and ideological divisions tend not to occur and they tend not to be a relevant part 
of the political pattern the society has formed. Hence, grouping is an opportunistic matter 
concerned only with access to power for its members, and because other differences are not present, 
each group tends to be distinguishable from the others only by the personalities of its members and 
by their relationship to power at the time. Therefore, groupings are factional; for the issues and 
interests that forge true parties from factions are absent from a homogeneous, power-bent society.  
                                                          
78 Ji Dong-wook. Hankuk Deatongryung palinui Bigeukjeok Mallo. (Seoul: Saramui Hyanggi, 2003); Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean 
presidents: leadership for nation building. 
79 Henderson, Gregory. Korea, the Politics of the Vortex. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968; 1987) 
80 Ibid, 4. 
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Thus, the result is a pattern of extreme centripetal dynamics. In his ‘unpublished manuscript’ in 
1988, Henderson claims that Korean society has not changed since his first writing of the book in 
1968 because he finds the same political pattern still in place. Because the lack of “intermediary 
groups” is considered as the main cause of the vortex-like politics, he argues for the development of 
“intermediary groups” as the prescription. Although he makes a very persuasive observation on the 
Korean political culture, his thesis does not explain the strange mismatch between, on the one hand, 
Korea’s status as a democracy with various interest groups, mass society in place, and 
decentralization81, and, on the other hand, patterned presidential downfalls. This is puzzling 
especially concerning the presidential failures after the democratic consolidation in 1987.    
By now, it has become clear that all of the existing explanations do not help us understand why 
Korean presidents have fallen victim to disgraceful and tragic endings. Of course, political 
institutions and political leadership cannot be “dismissed as irrelevant in political analyses,” and 
institutional variations do affect political and economic outcomes.82 However, it is critically 
important to remember institutions are not created in a vacuum. In every country, decisions to 
create, adopt and change political institutions are political. By the same token, “one cannot 
understand politics without the ambient society, its economy/culture, social stratifications and 
international environment.”83 Because I defined politics as a function of social context, it is 
necessary to understand how Korean society has shaped its politics.  
 
                                                          
81  It is true that the practice of appointing heads of local governments by the national government created a vertical power imbalance 
between these two levels of government, but the introduction and institutionalization of the local autonomy system since 1995 greatly 
enhanced the autonomy of local governments. When I was working for the government organization in charge of helping local 
governments with their international relations (1997-1999), local governments, especially metropolitan government entities including 
the Seoul Metropolitan Government actively pursued international relations independent of the national government.  
82 Sangmpam, S. N. "Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries." Political Studies, 55.1 (2007): 201-24, 220 
83 Ibid 
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1.4. Presidential Politics as a Function of Social Context  
What, then, are the most characteristic informal constraints of South Korean society that 
produced different outcomes in politics? Few would deny the fact Korean society is heavily 
influenced by Confucianism because it was the dominant state ideology that governed almost every 
aspect of the Korean life for five centuries during the Joseon dynasty.  Especially since the 1970s 
and 1980s, the international community was interested in determining what caused East Asian 
countries’ spectacular economic growth.  As one of the forerunners in this group, South Korea drew 
a lot of academic, not to mention economic, interests into uncovering the secret behind its 
economic performance.84 Although most of the research is in support of the meaningful correlation 
between economic progress and Confucian cultural traits in society, I argue that this wholesale 
categorization of Korean society as Confucian is dangerously misleading, if not altogether wrong, for 
several reasons.  First, Confucian influence is not as strong as it is often understood in Korean 
society.  Especially, the Korean society of 1948-2009 saw the decline of Confucian influence, and 
was characterized more by multi-religious ideas and practices including Christianity, Buddhism and 
Shamanism.  Second, Korean society existed long before the Confucian Joseon dynasty, dating back 
more than two thousand years.  It means other dominant religions and philosophies, such as 
Shamanism and Buddhism, not only co-existed in most of those times; even under state enforced 
oppression they went underground, not extinct. Therefore, the modern Korean society of 1948-2009 
is a more complicated society than what it is often labeled as Confucian.  Another reason to claim 
for the exaggeration is that Confucianism has also been criticized for being anti-thesis to capitalism. 
In other words, it was accused of being an obstacle to economic progress. This case is a very clearly 
manifested in the contrast between North Korea and South Korea, the twins of the same 
                                                          
84 Ham, Chae-bong. “The Ironies of Confucianism.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 3 (2004): 93-107. 
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motherland. This obvious gap in economic development between these two countries cannot be 
explained by relying on the Confucian argument.  
As Sohn Byung-sun makes clear,85Shamanism as a belief system had been almost equal to 
Buddhism and Confucianism in terms of its spiritual and political influences. In Korean society, 
Shamanism was the leading way of life and thinking of the mass of people through the entire history 
of Korean society.  As a participant researcher in Korean society for approximately five decades 
(1967-2016), I can attest to the validity of Sohn’s claim that Shamanism is the most important factor 
by which the great majority of the people in society have been inspired in their lives. Korean 
Shamanism, mixed with Confucian influence, produced such political cultural traits as 
destinationism, authoritarianism, familism and indifferentiated norm of consciousness.86 
With respect to Korean society, few would deny the fact the focus on family is the single most 
important characteristic that governs the mind and behavior of Korean people. Like almost every 
society, family has been the most important institution in Korea.  However, the significance of 
family in Korean society is unparalleled in the world.  Especially since 1945, after four decades of 
exploitative colonial rule, the family in Korean society had taken a particularly pronounced role. 
Even the state was conceptualized as the extended form of family.  As Choi Jai-seok, one of the 
most prominent authority on the Korea’s traditional family system, proves the single most dominant 
characteristic of Korean’s social character is familism.  Every significant trait of Korean behavior 
stems from this (authoritarianism, the focus on appearance more than substance, propensity to 
acquiring titles, differentiation between in-group and out-groups, etc.).  He goes on to say that in 
Korea, only group or class exist.  Individuals in the sense of Western individualism does not exist in 
Korea.  Focus is placed more on the community to which the individual belongs, not the other way 
                                                          
85 Sohn, Byung-sun.  “Shamanism and Political Culture in Korea.” Honam Political Science Review, vol. 1. (1989) 
86 Ibid, abstract. 
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around.  It has been a common scene during the 1960s to 1990s that when an individual achieved 
something, such as entering a prestigious university, passing a state examination to become a lawyer, 
a high ranking public official, etc., a plank card would be hung at the entrance of the town, city, or 
community.   
 
Conclusion 
To address the proposed question of why all South Korean presidents have fallen victim to 
personally disgraceful and tragic downfalls, an insight can be drawn from Douglas North’s definition 
of institutions.87 He made an important distinction between institutions and organizations.  North 
defines institutions as the rules of the game of a society, or formally as the humanly-devised 
constraints that structure human interaction.  On the other hand, organizations are the players, or 
groups of individuals, bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives within those constraints. 
Institutions are composed of formal rules and informal constraints.  Formal rules include statute 
law, common law and regulations while informal constraints consist of conventions, norms of 
behavior and self-imposed code of conduct and the enforcement characteristics of both. The 
academic debate on the relative merits and demerits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism 
focused mainly on the formal rules of the game of a society, neglecting another important 
component of informal constraints as elaborated by North.  Political leadership debate does not pay 
much attention to the broader social context in which politics plays out.  As a matter of fact, as 
                                                          
87 North, Douglas, “The New Institutional Economics and Development.” (retrieved from : 
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/NewInstE.North.pdf). 
 
38 
 
Sangmpam states, politics is “a competition within society over property, goods, services, values 
(social product) and a crucial corollary—political power.”88 
Therefore, a proper understanding of Korean society is a prerequisite to any attempts to solve the 
puzzle of Korean presidential politics. This insight is critical to understand Korean politics because 
formal institutions defined as the rules of the game of a society can produce different political 
outcomes as political reality in different societies. I agree with North that these different outcomes 
have much to do with informal constraints defined as conventions, norms of behavior and standards 
of conduct, and specific ways in which these informal and formal institutions are enforced.  North’s 
insight is also similarly shared by Sangmpam, who made a useful distinction between Western and 
non-Western societies. According to Sangmpam, Western-societies, including the United States, are 
characterized by liberal compromise, whereas non-Western counterparts, such as South Korea, are 
characterized by overpoliticization, or lack thereof. What he implies is that even though the formal 
rules of the game may be similar, the way these rules are created and enforced are very different 
between these two groups of countries, depending on their respective societal characteristics.  
Before I delve into analyzing Korean society in more detail in chapter three, I first lay out the 
foundation for the subsequent analysis in chapter two, where I will show the Korean path to 
capitalism.  
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Sangmpam, S. N. "Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries." Political Studies, 55.1, (2007): 201-24; 203. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE KOREAN JOURNEY TO CAPITALISM 
 
What are the possible options for countries when it comes to economic systems? As modern history 
attests, some countries took the capitalist path while others chose non-capitalist ways of economic 
life. Great Britain, the United States and Japan are prime examples for the former, and the now-
defunct Soviet Union and China for the latter. Many newly independent nations in the post-WWII 
era were in the situation to choose not only their political institutions but economic systems at the 
moment of their nation-building. Some of these countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, 
through the political and economic influences of their colonizers and/or historical circumstances, 
were inclined, if not necessarily forced, to embrace the capitalist mode of economy, whereas others 
like North Korea and Cuba took a different road. However, once the capitalist journey was taken for 
whatever reason, its path has not been always monolithic, producing different types of capitalist 
economy. This chapter begins with defining capitalism, followed by the main features of a capitalist 
economy, and the specificity of Korea’s version of capitalism.  The main focus of this chapter is to 
highlight the unique path of Korea’s capitalist development.  
 
2.1. Defining Capitalism 
In its simplest economic definition, capitalism refers to one of the dominant modern economic 
systems, the free market economy. A distinct social order emerged in Europe around the 18th 
century in which ‘capital’ was not “an end in itself, but as a means for gathering more wealth,89” 
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40 
 
which distinguished itself, among others, from the pre-capitalist societies. Observing such a new 
order, Adam Smith90 provided theoretical foundations for what was later known as the capitalist 
market economy. He advocated free trade in a free market governed by the invisible hand, propelled 
by the pursuit of self-interest, and protected by limited and minimal role of government. The free 
market economy is then based on the principle of individual rights including private property 
ownership, freedom of choice and competition and the rule of law. In other words, “democracy is 
the soil where capitalism flourishes best,”91 while “capitalism is the soil where firms, industries, and 
people flourish best.”92 If democracy is the embodiment of political and moral liberalism, Adam 
Smith enhanced our understanding of the economic sphere of liberalism that entails property rights, 
freedom to engage in business activities and to accumulate wealth “by placing individual economic 
material gain at the center of the liberal enterprise.”93  
The Marxian tradition clearly explained the nature of capitalism as a social system in which 
hierarchy and the tendency to exploit govern the relationship between the capitalists (bourgeois) and 
the workers (proletariat). The capitalists are those who own or control the means of production and 
employ workers for producing goods or services in exchange for wages, and the workers sell their 
labor for wages to buy goods or services. Because capitalists are mainly concerned with the 
accumulation of capital for more profits, workers are structurally forced to work beyond their own 
needs of basic subsistence such as food and clothes and to generate surplus values for the capitalists. 
In this sense, unlike the liberal claim that personal liberty is praiseworthy as long as it is consistent 
with the freedom of others and we do not hinder others to achieve it, which justifies the limited role 
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of government as a guarantor of such individual freedom, Karl Marx considers such liberty harmful 
to the overall welfare of society and the state mostly acting in support of the ruling capitalist class.  
Hence, capitalism in this study is defined as a socio-economic system in which all or most of the 
means of production and distribution are privately owned and operated in a relatively free and 
competitive market system. This is based on the principle of individual liberty, including property 
rights and rule of law, and also in which social and economic inequality tend to exist between 
wealth-seeking capitalists and waged workers for which the state is assumed to be responsible.  
With respect to Western capitalism, S.N. Sangmpam94 offers an integrated view based on the 
combination of seven distinct features. The combination generates ‘the geographical and social 
entrenchment of capitalism,’ and capitalism becomes a ‘culture’ directly affecting social actors and 
their behaviors.95 The seven traits are (1) the social class structure of capitalists and wage workers, 
(2) the extensive and pervasive nature of private property rights, (3) extensive commodification, (4) 
complementarity of economic activities, (5) pervasion of capitalist relations in agriculture and 
industry, (6) expansionist tendency through technical progress and finally, (7) more portion of 
capital is of local and national than of foreign origin. This capitalist entrenchment leads to triple 
convergence in society: (1) all social actors depend on the social product, (2) which is entirely 
dependent on capitalism and (3) capitalism subordinates all social relationships.   
American capitalism, once dubbed “the Canaan of capitalism, its promised land,” is considered 
“the fullest and most uncontrolled expression” of the “tendencies of Western capitalism.”96 
American capitalism finds its ideological roots in liberalism.  Simply put, American society in 
general, and capitalism in particular, has evolved around the principle of liberty encompassing 
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political, economic and moral aspects of liberty.  The United States Constitution, especially through 
the Bill of Rights (the first ten Amendments), provides legal protection to individual liberty.  Based 
on the liberal tenets, the core characteristics of American capitalism have not changed for more than 
a century since the end of the 19th century,97 when capitalism became entrenched in society.  The 
following are among the features.  First, private ownership of the means of production.  Publicly-
owned means of production accounts for only a very minor portion of productive capital. Much of 
publicly-owned capital is concentrated in not very productive land.98  Second, a social class structure 
of private owners and free wage earners, which is organized to facilitate accumulation of profit by 
private owners.  Third, the production of commodities for sale.  In the United States, as Michael 
Sandel sarcastically says, there are very few things money cannot buy.  Today, it is possible even to 
buy a prison cell upgrade with eighty-two dollars a night, and “Fast Track or VIP tickets” to jump to 
the head of the line in many theme parks.99  This commodification reached to a point where it 
undermines both our relationships with each other and the relationship of the individual with 
society.100  
 
2.2. Capitalist Development in Korea 
Echoing the mainstream narrative of the day, Ronald Reagan proclaimed before the Korean 
National Assembly on November 12, 1983 that Korean economic progress and “the stagnation of 
the North has demonstrated perhaps more clearly here than anywhere else the value of a free economic 
system [italics added].  Let the world look long and hard at both sides of the 38th parallel and then ask: 
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‘Which side enjoys a better life?”101  For the American President and many others, South Korea 
became a showcase of the superiority and effectiveness of the capitalist economic system and 
democracy vis-a-vis the deplorable failure of North Korean communism.  However, this official 
praise by linking South Korea’s economic growth with capitalism is not what accurately describes 
the reality of Korean capitalism.  In terms of economic growth itself, for instance, North Korea, 
under a socialist political regime and a communist economic system, was far ahead of South Korea 
up until the early 1960s.102  The state-led capitalist development in South Korea, first implanted by 
Japanese colonialism and bolstered by heavy American involvement and foreign finances, 
significantly “laid the foundations for the economic growth of the 1960s” and onward, but clearly does 
not “fit a textbook description of capitalism.”103 Roger Janelli also notes that conventions often regarded 
as antithetical to capitalism were among the more significant features of Korea’s political economy.104  
The following analysis aims to show the unique path of Korean capitalism and its own characteristics.  
 
 2.2.1. Pre-1876: Agrarian economy 
Unlike the United States endowed with spacious land, abundant natural resources and slaved labor 
force before its full-fledged capitalist development in the late 19th century, Korea (then called 
Joseon) was a small, secluded peninsular with few natural resources.  Up until 1876, when it opened 
its doors to outsiders, Korea maintained predominantly agrarian and its overall economy was 
underdeveloped.  Economic development was made possible only by the gradual improvements in 
traditional farming techniques and the development of an agricultural infrastructure, such as an 
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irrigation system.105  However, these changes were insignificant because they allowed agricultural 
output only slightly faster than the growth of the population.106 Agriculture employed almost 90 
percent of the labor force, who were mostly “near-subsistence farms with capital-deficient and 
labor-intensive technology.”107 
Commerce and industry were under the tight control of the state that “retained the right to grant 
monopolies and restricted the number of entrepreneurial establishments.”108 Commerce was mostly 
about “infrequent transactions of essential goods conducted by itinerant merchants”109 on market 
days (or changnal in Korean), which came every five days110 in designated market places throughout 
the country. The main purpose of the industrial activities was to meet the demand of the 
government. Although the use of coinage became widespread from the mid-17th century, the 
monetary system remained relatively underdeveloped and production of goods was not dominated 
by market activity.111  
Another important characteristic of Joseon-Korean economy was the widespread practice of 
lineage property ownership. Roger and Dawnhee Janelli identify three major forms of lineages in 
Korea, which were organized in a hierarchy of inclusiveness: (1) Tangnae, comprised of agnatic 
kinsmen within the range of third cousin (palchon), (2) village lineages made up of several tangnae and 
(3) higher-order lineages consisting of two or more village-lineages. In general, village lineages and 
higher-order lineages owned property.112 The most common types of this lineage property included 
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grave sites of ancestors, cultivable property, house sites, tracts of woodland, shrines, meeting halls, 
ritual implements and relics of prominent ancestors. Of these, cultivable land property carried 
economic value and provided the financial basis for a lineage’s corporate activities. Especially, the 
Korean lineage system was characterized by its economic primogeniture. This “idea of 
primogeniture became firmly implanted in the social consciousness and significantly narrowed the 
descent calculation–to the detriment of second as well as secondary sons.”113 
This lineage system existed in parallel with another distinct feature, the hierarchical class social 
order114: (1) the yangban, the scholar-officials, (2) the chungin (literally people in the middle) 
comprising technicians and administrators subordinate to the yangban class, (3) the sangmin, 
composed of farmers, craftsmen and merchants and lastly, (4) the chonmin (literally despised people). 
In principle, the yangban were a meritocratic elite. They gained and reinforced their positions through 
Confucian educational achievement. Strictly speaking, a yangban lineage was one that consistently 
combined examination success with appointments to government office over a period of numerous 
generations. Yangban serving as officials could enrich themselves because they were given royal 
grants of land and had many opportunities for graft; but unemployed scholars and local gentry often 
were poor. Below the yangban, yet superior to the commoners, were the chungin, a small group of 
technical and administrative officials. They included astronomers, physicians, professional military 
officers, as well as artists. Local functionaries, who were members of a lower hereditary class, were 
an important and frequently oppressive link between the yangban and the common people. They 
were often the de facto rulers of a local region. The sangmin accounted for approximately 75 percent of 
the total population. This group bore the burden of taxation and were subject to military 
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conscription. Farmers had higher prestige than merchants, but lived a hard life. Below the 
commoners, the “base people,” or chonmin, did what was considered vile or low-prestige work.  
By late Joseon dynasty, the government was grossly ineffective and public officials were 
extremely corrupt. The government not only failed to provide basic services, including adequate 
protection of life and property, sanitation, disease prevention and control, but also social 
infrastructure such as roads, harbors or lighthouses. National resources were wasted on no or low-
productivity projects such as palace construction, which prevented the nation’s productivity, 
technology and entrepreneurship from capitalist development.115 Moreover, the society’s rigid and 
hierarchical class relations and government’s taxation policy, extralegal taxation and confiscation of 
property by corrupt officials also served as disincentive for any capitalist development. Taxes were 
imposed on land, commerce and industry, traders at barriers on both overland and river routes, as 
well as government personal service.116 “Extralegal taxes included the collection of a tax larger than 
what the central government required, in many cases double or triple the legitimate amount.”117 It 
was under this ineffectual and corrupt government that the long secluded Korean society had to face 
an influx of foreign influences. 
 
2.2.2. 1876-1904: Transitional economy 
Geopolitically, the Korean peninsula is sandwiched between larger and more powerful countries, 
namely China and Japan. Its habitual victimization sentiment is well summed up in a popular idiom 
“When whales fight, the shrimp’s back is broken.” Although Korea was able to maintain a homogenous 
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society with relative political independence and cultural richness for more than a thousand years 
despite occasional external invasions, the long-held isolationist policy could no longer stand in the 
mid-19th century. The Joseon dynasty was under enormous pressure both from within and without. 
By the late 19th century, the country became the target of imperialist competition and territorial 
ambition not only from neighboring countries such as Russia, China and Japan, but from remote 
Western powers including the United States and Britain. As it turned out, it was Japan that arose as 
the dominant imperialist power after it defeated China in 1894 and Russia in 1904 respectively, 
thwarting their attempts to colonize the land.   
After centuries of isolation, Korea was finally forced to open its doors to Japan through ‘the 
Ganghwa Treaty’118 in 1876, and became a Japanese protectorate that ended Korea’s history as a 
sovereign state through the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty’119 in 1905. The treaty of 1876 was 
unequal, giving Japan special trading rights and other privileges in Korea that were not reciprocated 
for Koreans in Japan. The signing of this treaty was soon followed by a series of commerce treaties 
with Western countries including the United States in 1882, Great Britain and Germany in 1883, 
Italy and Russia in 1884, France in 1886, Austria-Hungary in 1892 and Denmark in 1902. This 
period of approximately three decades was a transitional time for the long isolated country as it was 
exposed to a wave of foreign goods, advanced technology, Western ideas and foreign resources for 
investment and the establishment of industries. The transitional period was also chaotic in the sense 
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that the traditional ideas and ways of living economically and culturally were, understandably, 
challenged and changed but not under clear government policies or directions.  
The government made some reform policies, but they were “ineffectual and failed to muster 
sufficient forces to adequately meet the needs of the new and modern economy.120” More 
importantly, the general public, the government and the elites were still mostly conservative, holding 
tightly on to the traditional isolationist Confucian belief. A good example of such conservativism 
was the ‘Dong-hak’ (Eastern Learning) movement. The Dong-hak movement arose in response to the 
Seo-hak (Western learning) and called for a revival of Confucian teachings.  
The opening of the country also brought foreigners to the land, in addition to the influx of 
foreign goods and direct investment mainly for the development of commerce—mining, public 
utilities such as railroads, electric power and communications, and the purchase of land.121 Of all the 
foreigners during this period, Japanese made up approximately 95 percent in 1897 and reached some 
40,000 around the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Japanese, Chinese and Westerners engaged in 
commercial activities, but Japanese by far were the most active business people in this period. In the 
ports of Busan, Incheon and Wonsan, for instance, Japan set up modern establishments including 
banks, chambers of commerce, theaters, post offices, Japanese legation and consulate, hospitals, 
schools and offices of Japanese companies. All kinds of Western goods were introduced ranging 
from rifles, cotton-textile goods, clocks to kerosene. Although Korea’s foreign trade in this period 
expanded, the total volume of its trade was very small, representing about eight to ten percent of the 
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country’s income.122 Many Japanese also purchased farmland for speculative purposes, intending to 
reap profits by reselling it or leasing it to Korean tenants.123  
During this period, Korea experienced economic growth and increase in per capita income, but 
not under its own sovereign government. Chiefly, it was because of the expansion of infrastructure 
investment by Japanese investors, particularly the introduction of electricity and communication 
facilities and the construction of railroads. However, no substantial progress in capital formation, 
economic development, or structural change took place. As late as 1904, the Korean indigenous 
economy was virtually in shambles, with cottage industries continuing to supply the bare essentials, 
and capital formation was just sufficient to support a small population growth without much 
improvement in the standard of living for the people.  
 
2.2.3. 1905-1945: Colonial economy and Japanese capitalism introduced 
Japan formally annexed Korea through the ‘Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty’ signed on August 22, 
1910.  But its de facto colonization began when it made Korea its protectorate through the ‘Japan-
Korea Protectorate Treaty’ in 1905, followed by the ‘Korea-Japan Treaty’ in 1907 by which Korea 
was deprived of the administration of internal affairs.  Like it or not, the Japanese legacy of its four 
decades of colonization not only initiated capitalist modernization but, more importantly, left an 
indelible imprint on the shaping of a unique capitalist path in Korea.  In other words, the Japanese 
imperial colonialism served in some sense as “a usable past for the 1960s onward.”124  Some of the 
main characteristics of Korean capitalism can trace their origin to the patterns of capitalist 
development in this period.  They include the state-business relations that are characterized by (1) 
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the limited scope of capitalist social relations, (2) the state’s role in comprehensive and semi-coercive 
channeling of capital to target industries and (3) the dominant influence of big companies, later 
called chaebol in the Korean economy. 
Japanese colonization also introduced some of the most essential elements of capitalism into 
Korea: legal institutions including private property ownership, industrial infrastructure, as well as 
financial institutions. Through the Land Survey Bureau established in 1910 and the promulgation of 
the Land Survey Law, Korean farmers were required to register to have their ownership rights 
recognized. This way, the Japanese colonial government “accelerated the separation of the means of 
production and subsistence from farmers, turning traditional land-ownership to capitalist private 
property rights and commodifying the products of labor and labor power.”125 Colonial rule was 
accompanied by large investments in Korea. The colonial government took up approximately 
twenty-two percent of all investment in Korea, which was mainly used to construct social overhead 
capital such as railways, communications systems, modern ports and harbors, irrigation works for 
farmland and hospitals. The private sector accounted for three-quarters of the investment, most of 
which was used to fund manufacturing in both heavy and light industries such as mining, electric-
power generation and a relatively small amount in agriculture.126 The Japanese investment enabled 
the Korean economy to realize discernible economic gains, and transforming it to become a semi-
industrial economy. During the period of colonization, Korean GDP and population increased 
approximately 120 and 62 percent respectively, and per capita income rose from $745 to $1,130 (in 
year 2000 U.S. prices).127  
However, the Japanese dominated approximately eighty-four percent of private investment, 
whereas Koreans accounted for sixteen percent, mostly in commerce and light industries to produce 
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consumer goods, such as food production and textiles, which was only to meet traditional and daily 
needs of Koreans.128 Moreover, Korean capitalists could survive only by collaborating with the 
colonial government in line with its industrialization policy for military demands. This practice set 
the precedent for future state-business collusive patterns that have characterized Korean economy 
ever since. Furthermore, the landed class was barely allowed to become industrial capitalists in that 
they were discouraged to establish their own firms through strict regulations.129 The Japanese 
colonial government also failed to integrate the masses into capitalist wage relations.130 Urban 
residents rose from three to seven percent of the total population between 1910 and 1935, and 
thirteen percent by 1944,131 by which time the vast majority of people remained in rural areas merely 
as surplus population instead of waged workers. Although wage labor existed, these petty farmers 
considered their labor “largely as a secondary source of income” in the form of seasonal jobs in 
agricultural, construction and mining sectors, especially during the winter season.”132 In short, the 
Japanese colonial government introduced basic infrastructure and institutions for capitalist economy 
in colonized Korea, but capitalist social relations under the Japanese-led capitalism was quite 
restricted and limited.  
The colonial government favored the big Japanese companies called zaibatsu. This policy and 
practice of supporting large companies left an indelible impact on the future path of Korean 
capitalism. The Japanese government used such means as subsidies, tax benefits and subsidized bank 
loans to support industries and enterprises considered to be of strategic interest to Japan such as 
chemical and heavy industries, mines and rice production.133 With such all-out support, these 
“zaibatsu emerged as virtual partners of the government.” The emergence of a Korean enterprise 
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named Kyongsong Spinning and Weaving company (hereinafter Kyongbang) is illustrative of how the 
state-business relationship was formulated under the colonial rule. The firm, owned by a Korean 
capitalist, began its business in 1919 with 250,000 Yen and 100 weaving machines and grew to 
become one of the largest enterprises with 11.5 million Yen, 1,120 weaving machines and 32,000 
spinning machines134 by the end of Japanese colonialism. In his analysis of the company and its 
owner family, Carter Eckert135 emphasizes the close cooperative ties between the company and the 
Japanese government-general as well as cooperative partnership with Japanese companies. 
According to Eckert, the Korean enterprise received support in the form of loans, provision of raw 
materials for production, technology and equipment, and even a market to sell its products. The 
Japanese government-general even mobilized the police force to protect the Korean firm when it 
had a labor conflict. Joo Ik-jong,136 in his analysis of the same company, disagrees with Eckert about 
the significance of the support of the Japanese colonial government in the company’s growth and 
put more focus on the capability and capacity of the managerial leadership of the founders. 
Nevertheless, both recognize that Kyongbang is a prime example and, in a sense, a precursor or a 
prototype for future Korean enterprises because it conformed to the state power and depended on 
world capitalism.  
In sum, although one will be hard pressed to challenge the view that Japanese colonial rule 
“initiated” capitalism in Korea, this view also must be balanced with the negative Japanese influence 
on the future Korean capitalist development, especially in the latter part of its colonial period. When 
the Sino-Japanese War broke out in the latter half of 1930, Japan mobilized all of Korea and put its 
industries on a war footing, channeling all production for war supplies, tightly regulating peacetime 
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industries.137 Also, with Japan’s business integration decree in 1942, Japanese businesses absorbed 
small and medium-sized Korean companies, and even small ironworks and mainly family operated 
machine repair shops were mobilized for wartime purposes.138 It also built the majority of its 
facilities for power generation, manufacturing and mining in northern Korea. As a result, after 
liberation, the South was left with no infrastructure to produce energy on its own, not even 
electricity. When electricity to the South was cut off after the peninsula was divided, even its 
remaining light industries became useless.139 
As a result, by the time of liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Korea was one of the 
poorest countries in the world. The Koreans were left with starvation and poverty on a land absent 
of resources, factories and even the most minimal of economic facilities. Moreover, because the 
Japanese colonial government took most resources back to its homeland, there were barely any 
resources needed for economic development remaining when Korea was left alone. Furthermore, 
virtually no production of commodities took place in Korea because of Japan’s Strategy to Use 
Korea as a Military Supply Base. With Japan’s mobilization of the Korean economy toward waging 
war, all factories and industries were designed, developed and institutionalized by Japan for this 
purpose. Therefore, the infrastructure left behind after liberation was practically useless for industrial 
development.  
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2.2.4. 1945-1961: America-influenced nation-building and Korean gold rush 
Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945 when the Japanese emperor officially 
acknowledged its defeat in World War II. The downside of the liberation was the division of the 
peninsula into two halves along the 38th parallel. The northern part would be occupied and ruled by 
the Soviet Union whereas the southern portion was taken up by the United States. The period between 
1945 and 1961, the year the 2nd Republic was toppled through the May 16 Coup140 orchestrated by 
Major-General Park Chung-hee, was a fateful moment for the future capitalist development in South 
Korea. 141 In this short span of sixteen years, the country underwent American military rule, the 
fratricidal Civil War known as the Korean War and the eventful nation-building process. Specifically, 
American military rule of 1945-1948 played a decisive role in setting the parameter of South Korea’s 
political and economic future. Among others, the United States, through the military government, 
provided the much-needed financial aid to the post-liberation Korea that had neither necessary 
financial means nor institutions to begin the untrodden process of nation-building. In particular, the 
American Military Government (AMG) from 1945 to 1948 shaped the contour of Korea’s future with 
its physical presence and ideological and material provision. As a result, the founding Constitution 
stipulated private land ownership and proclaimed the adoption of a capitalist economic system as well 
as a democratic polity.  
The claim of America’s dominant influence on capitalist development in South Korea has its own 
merits. Japan introduced capitalism to the “entire” Korean peninsula, not just the South. Moreover, 
in terms of industrial development, it was in the North that most of the major industrial resources 
were located. In 1948, the South, under Rhee Syng-man’s leadership and supported by the United States, 
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decided to take the path of liberal democracy and a capitalist free market economy, while the North, 
under Kim Il-sung sponsored by the Soviet Union, adopted a socialist political and economic system.   
After its national independence in 1945, the Korean economy was in deep trouble. First, the 
withdrawal of Japanese capital, which accounted for over ninety percent of the total paid-up capital in 
Korea during colonialization, 142  created serious shortage problems for raw materials and skilled 
workers and parts for the machinery. Second, many of the urban workers forcefully mobilized by the 
Japanese colonial government came back to their homelands, which caused local industries and 
manufacturing to revert to domestic handicraft. 143 A paralyzed production led to a shortage of 
commodities.144 Moreover, because of compulsory rice production during the Japanese colonial rule, a poor 
harvest and a massive influx of overseas Koreans led to a serious food shortage. Between 1945 and 1949, the 
AMG had to pump in more than US$500 million in economic aid through programs like Government and 
Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).145  
On the other hand, the practice of state-business collusion that began under the Japanese colonial 
era expanded and deepened under American military rule and during Rhee Syng-man’s presidency. 
After liberation, the Japanese property left in South Korea, including industrial facilities, farm lands 
and houses, were vested in the hands of the AMG, making it the largest owner of the means of 
production [see Table 2.1].  For a quick economic recovery, the AMG decided to sell these properties 
to a small number of entrepreneurs under very favorable conditions.  In what is called “the Korean 
Gold Rush” that lasted for a decade, many companies that received benefits from this way of property 
distribution soon grew to be conglomerates, or chaebol, by the end of the 1950s. 146  The newly 
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established first Republic continued to support a small group of capitalists, together with the 
distribution of America-aided raw materials after the Korean War.  What made these enterprises 
successful was not so much because they received physical properties.  Rather, they became successful 
because they “learned” to form the structurally collusive relationships with politicians and 
bureaucrats147 in the days to come.  This group of capitalists funded Rhee’s Liberal Party in 1951, 
which then returned their political funds with economic favors, including lucrative government 
projects.  As a result, this practice of state-business collusion not only became deeply rooted in the 
Korean economy, but also became the fertile soil for severely corrupt behaviors of Korean politicians, 
including all future presidents.   
Table 2. 1. Japanese Property Controlled by the American Military Government after Liberation148 
 The Property Items Amount/number 
1 Factories and mines 2,690 
2 Movable property 3,924 
3 Ships 225 
4 Storage facilities 2,818 
5 Shops 9,096 
6 Farmland 324,404 jeongbo (1 jeongbo = 2.45 acre) 
7 Land 150,827 jeongbo (1 jeongbo = 2.45 acre) 
8 Houses 48,456 
9 Forest fields 70,039 jeongbo (1 jeongbo = 2.45 acre) 
10 Unidentified land 1,366 
11 Orchards  2,386 
(Source: The Formation of Korean Chaebol)  
                                                          
147 Park, Hyung-joon. Chaebol, the Transnational Capital That Dominates Korea. (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2013).  
148 Lee Han-gu. Hankuk Jaebeol Hyungseongsa, 59 
 
57 
 
Another significant factor to the capitalist development in South Korea during this period was 
land reform. In 1945, Korea was still primarily an agricultural economy with a small number of 
landlords and a large number of tenant farmers who lived under slave-like status.149  At the time, the 
richest 2.7 percent of rural households owned two-thirds of all the cultivated lands, while 58 percent 
owned no land at all.150  North Korea had already completed land reform in 1946. Therefore, the 
discontent of the farming population in South Korea became intensified. Land reform in South Korea 
took place in two stages. First, the AMG began to sell agricultural lands formerly owned by Japanese 
to Korean tenants in the spring of 1948. The AMG distributed 240,000 hectares of former Japanese 
lands, which accounted for 11.7 percent of the total cultivated land.151 Farmlands were sold at prices 
expressed in measures of grain, not in monetary terms. Second, land reform took place in March of 
1950 by the Rhee government just prior to the Korean War breaking out in 1950.   
At first, the land reform program, initiated by the American Occupational Authorities, was not 
enthusiastically received by the Rhee government.152 C. Clyde Mitchell, observing the political and 
social circumstances of Korea in 1948-1949, cast his doubt about the willpower of the executive 
branch of the government “to implement” the Land Redistribution Law passed in June 1949. His 
doubt derived from the fact the government was more responsive to the land-owning classes.153 
However the Rhee regime believed land reform was not something that could be taken lightly. As 
mentioned above, communist North Korea implemented a land reform policy in 1946. During three 
weeks of land reform, ninety-eight percent of confiscated land was distributed to farmers. Suddenly, 
poor farmers became the landlord of up to 13,200 square meters of land. Thereafter, they tended to 
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farm hard and pledged their allegiance to the Communist Party.154 A clear evidence of this political 
success is the drastic increase in the number of communist members from 4,530 in December 1945 
to 366,000 in August 1946.155 As a result, Kim Il-sung’s communist regime became politically solidified. 
The North Korean land reform also resulted in the wiping out of the landed class in North Korea, 
some of which fled to the South.156 Furthermore, peasants in the South who suffered under the 
Japanese colonial rule were very unhappy about the status quo.157 When combined, these two factors 
might have caused severe social unrest unless addressed properly, challenging the very survival of the 
newly established Rhee’s regime. Politically, Rhee also needed the support of farmers who accounted for 
approximately seventy percent of the population. The American pressure for land reform also pushed the 
Rhee government to tackle this issue. President Rhee’s resolution to push ahead with land reform was 
reflected in his appointment of a former communist, Cho Bong-am, as the first minister of agriculture.   
Unlike North Korea that confiscated land for free distribution,158 the Rhee government finally 
offered a capitalist alternative to the landlords and tenants alike. It offered tenant farmers to buy the 
land with a condition that they would pay back later in the form of what they produced, while it 
encouraged the landlords’ opportunity to sell their lands to the government and encouraged them to 
convert the capital into financially lucrative industrial holdings.159 The analysis of the data on the land 
sale contracts between the national liberation in 1945 and June of 1950 reveals that approximately 80 
of contracts of land sale concentrated in two periods: one between January and May of 1946, which 
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coincided with the implantation of North Korean land reform in March 1946, and the other between 
November of 1947 and March of 1948 during which time the land reform bill was proceeding in the 
legislature.160  During these periods, land owners hurried to sell their farms for cheaper prices out of 
fear their lands might be confiscated.161  
 
Table 2.2. Land Reforms in South Korea162 
 1st land reform under AMG 2nd land reform under President Rhee 
Ownership Formerly owned by Japanese  Owned by Koreans 
Farm land size 291,000 ha (20% of the total land) 1,156,000 ha (80% of the total land) 
Land prices Three times the average annual 
produce 
1.5 times the average annual produce 
Payment  20% of the produce for 15 years 30% for five years 
Ceiling  2 ha 3 ha 
 
Large land-owners actually converted their land-sale capital into industrial capital or lucrative 
lending capital. For instance, the founder of LG Group Gu In-hoe sold their farmland and set up a 
trading company in Busan in November of 1945, and a chemical company in January of 1947.163 Land 
reform and successful prevention of communist campaigns before the war in 1950 not only prevented 
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serious social unrest but also supported the Rhee government after the war.164 As a result of this land 
reform measure, the richest six percent owned eighteen percent of land by the end of 1956. 
Furthermore, tenancy dropped from forty-nine percent in 1944 to seven percent by 1956 as 
landownership capped at three chongbo (approximately 7.5 acres) and large landlords disappeared in South 
Korea.165 In fact, farmers remained staunch supporters of President Rhee throughout his terms of office.  
The Korean War that lasted from June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953166 resulted in irrecoverable human 
casualties and physical damages. Approximately three million Koreans, both military and civilian, are 
said to have perished with over a million Chinese and 54,000 American soldiers. After the civil war, 
according to the Nathan Report,167 close to half of the industrial, power generating and mining facilities 
were destroyed, totaling approximately US $1.8 billion in damages including damage done to public 
facilities, ships, vehicles and houses. The land was in complete ruins and could not be farmed, and the 
food situation was bleak. On top of this, the evacuation of UN forces from North Korea prompted a 
flood of refugees into the South, filling it with even more starving, jobless people in the early 1950s.168  
It was under these dire circumstances that South Korea began its arduous nation-building process. 
With security threats from North Korea as a constant since the nation’s founding in 1948, the South 
Korean government and the United States signed the Korea-US Economic Agreement. Under this 
agreement, South Korea relied on the finances and industrial production of America’s grant aid until 
the beginning of the Development Decade in the 1960s.169 Also, the industrial organization was 
decided based on the raw materials brought in. Thus, the abnormal growth of the economy began. 
From the time the Korean War ended in 1953 to 1961, the Korean government depended on U.S. 
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grant aid to cover 49.5 percent, or approximately half, of its budget on average each year.170 American 
grant aid after 1953—the Counterpart Fund—which was in the form of proceeds of American surplus 
agricultural commodities sold to the South Korean market, was used to fund main areas in the budget 
such as national defense spending. The United States, under Public Law 480, stabilized grain prices in 
Korea by selling their farm surpluses to the Korean market at low prices and depositing the proceeds 
in the Counterpart Fund for the Korean government to use.171 
In this process of aid distribution, the following two methods were taken: (1) The Bank of Korea 
selected and allocated the aid funds to the end users, who used the funds to import goods and (2) aid 
agencies or the government sold aid goods directly on the Korean market. The United States used 
about ten to twenty percent of the proceeds from the sale of its agricultural surplus and the remainder 
went to the South Korean government.172 Using the American funds, the Korean government was 
able to restore key domestic infrastructures including mining facilities for increased coal production, 
telegraph and telephone lines, locomotives, thermal power and hydropower generation.173 Based on 
aid capital, it also imported industrial facilities for the gradual substitution of imports. One 
fundamental outcome of such unusual and emergent circumstances of the time was the reinforcement 
of the way the Korean economy would work in the future: the state’s heavy involvement in the 
economy. Also, the Korean bureaucracy began to play a major role in Korea’s economic development. 
As I further elaborate on in chapter three, the influence of the Korean bureaucracy was not only 
culturally well accepted because of traditional popularity of governmental jobs, it also distanced the 
Korean capitalist economy from a freedom-based liberal market economy.  
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2.2.5. 1962-1979: State-led industrial development   
The economic development of Korea during this period is so remarkable that a body of literature 
sprang up on this topic, especially between the 1970s and 1990s. Much of the debates were 
concerned with “whether the state intervention was market conforming or market distorting,” or 
“the extent to which the state led, rather than followed, the market.”174 Nevertheless, few deny the 
fact state-led, export-oriented industrialization has significantly led to Korea’s rapid growth. This 
period matches the reign of President Park Chung-hee who orchestrated South Korea’s economic 
development with an unswaying determination and resolve.  
During this period, the Park Chung-hee regime had to stand on its own amid complex, 
international dynamics including the change of the American-aid policy toward Korea and 
intensifying security threats from North Korea. The regime resorted to exercising the state apparatus 
to secure its legitimacy by fulfilling its pledges of rising from poverty and improving economic 
development. It was economic failure and political corruption that eventually led to the demise of 
the Rhee’s government and the subsequent Chang Myon government (the second Republic) through 
the military coup. Therefore, the Park Chung-hee regime resolved to push forward with its 
economic goals by adopting the already prepared Five-Year Economic Development Plan by the 
previous Democratic Party government.175 However, it had virtually no financial resources to pursue 
its economic development plans. With a poorly functioning domestic financial market and a heavy 
dependence on grant aid that accounted for more than half of the government budget, it was not 
feasible for South Korea to secure financial resources for its own investment and loan capital. At the 
same time, the United States was consistent in expressing its basic stance to slash grant aid and offer 
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loan aid instead. In addition, the newly launched John F. Kennedy administration was particularly 
wary of Park Chung-hee’s military government, which had ousted the popularly-elected Democratic 
Party government by force. Therefore, it was no surprise the U.S. government took an 
unsympathetic stance regarding the military government’s request for economic assistance.176  
Nevertheless, on January 13, 1962, the military regime released the revised text of the Dem-
ocratic Party government’s economic development plan in its entirety. On February 15, it declared 
its resolve to implement in earnest the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FY-EDP) to 
build the foundation for a self-sufficient Korean economy. Through the establishment of the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), the first FY-EDP (1962-1966) focused on fostering basic and 
import substitution industries by building manufacturing facilities for fertilizer, textiles and cement. 
The EPB failed to make much progress in its early days because of a lack of mutual understanding 
between the military government and the civilian public officials.177 It was in 1964, when the military 
government turned into a civilian one, when the EPB took its place as a bona fide key engine of 
economic development. President Park entrusted Deputy Prime Minister Chang Ki-yeong178 with 
informal authority over personnel in the economic ministries. This allowed the EPB to begin 
bulldozing its way through virtually all economic policies such as formulating development plans, 
enacting pertinent legislation, increasing the budget and winning foreign capital, mobilizing and 
operating domestic capital, and managing inflation. The EPB worked hard to raise investment 
resources overseas by scouting for commercial and long-term loans. It amended the Foreign Capital 
Inducement Act to allow the government to provide guarantees for commercial loans, which was 
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passed in August 1961. As a result, per capita income rose from a mere $82 in 1961 to $126 in early 
1966 and exports hit the $100 million mark in 1964.179  
It was during the second FY-EDP (1967~1971) when the Korean economy entered the trajectory 
of rapid growth. This was also the period when commercial loans from Japanese businesses started to 
increase after diplomatic relations normalized between the two nations in 1964. While the influx of 
foreign capital did accelerate industrialization, it also caused adverse side effects including the 
increasingly collusive ties between the state and business and the increasing concern that foreign loans 
might ruin the nation. The Park regime responded to these concerns by expanding and empowering 
the EPB, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Kim Hak-ryeol.180 During this period, the Park regime 
placed top priority on investments while simultaneously implementing aggressive austerity measures 
to support the economic development plan with limited financial resources. The Korean economy 
recorded 11.7 percent annual growth, far exceeding its goal of seven percent.  
President Park Chung-hee faced another major challenge in his economic drive in the early 
1970s. In November 1970, the American aid provided since 1954 in the form of Security Supporting 
Assistance (SSA) came to an end. The size of SSA for seventeen years amounted to $1.876 billion.181 
In addition, the international situations became less favorable to Korea: first, President Richard 
Nixon’s announced, as part of the Nixon Doctrine, that the United States would reduce its 
intervention in Asia. The news came at a time when North Korea intensified armed provocations 
against South Korea. In 1970, the United States, without prior consultation with South Korea, 
announced its intent to withdraw one-third of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. Second, in April 
1970, China announced the Four Basic Principles stipulating that the communist regime would not 
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engage in trade with any company that fit any of the following descriptions: (1) companies that 
supplied weapons to the United States that were used during the U.S. invasion of Southeast Asia 
countries, (2) subsidiaries of American companies, (3) companies that invested in South Korea or 
Taiwan and (4) companies that provided technical assistance to South Korea or Taiwan.  
As such, the Park regime began to pursue the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) as the top 
governmental agenda. HCIs were not only a key engine of economic development and exports, but 
also could be utilized in the defense industry when needed. Experts say the greatest feat during the 
implementation of the third FY-EDP (1972-1976) was the completion of the Seoul-Busan 
Expressway and the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO).182 The former facilitated 
distribution while the latter led to the construction of automobile, cement and petro-chemical plants. 
At the same time, the Korean economy suffered from chronic trade deficits and low foreign 
exchange earning rates. Businesses recklessly had taken out short-term commercial loans to build 
production facilities and high-interest private loans to run their companies. Eventually, prolonged 
global economic recession pushed these businesses to the brink of bankruptcy. In 1972, the 
government stepped in by liquidating insolvent enterprises and implemented what was later referred 
to as the August 3 Emergency Measure, which froze businesses’ curb market debt, extended grace 
periods and let debt be repaid long-term at a low interest rate. In the second half of 1974, the first 
oil shock left the domestic economy stagnate and facing the foreign exchange crisis. This prompted 
another governmental measure known as the December 3 Measure aimed at devaluing the Korean 
currency and raising domestic petroleum product prices. As one of the measures to overcome the 
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foreign exchange crisis, it also generously permitted the establishment of foreign banking institutions 
that would bring dollars into the country.  
Unlike previous three FY-EDPs, the fourth FY-EDP was changed to the Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development because its basic goal was to promote social development and 
advance innovation in technology and efficiency under the ideology of growth, efficiency and equality. 
In terms of the economy, this period saw the full operation of the HCIs, thanks to the national 
mobilization of banking and financing devoted to the cause. The construction sector saw a great boom 
in overseas markets. Oil-producing companies in the Middle East that raked in huge sums of dollars 
following the first oil shock entered economic development for themselves and emerged as significant 
markets for construction. Speculative investment in real estate was an adverse side effect that emerged 
during this period. A variety of factors gave rise to speculation in metropolitan-area land and property, 
including the construction boom in the Middle East, flourishing exports, waves of ensuing cash and 
an overheated economy. In addition, the population continued to move to the cities following the 
Development Decade. In 1978, the EPB responded by announcing a new policy, the Comprehensive 
Measures to Curb Real Estate Speculation and Stabilize Land Prices. That same year, the government 
took measures to liberalize imports with the aim of enhancing competitiveness through price 
stabilization and promotion of competition.  
Because of these policies, despite extreme financial difficulties and an underdeveloped financial 
market, South Korea was still able to achieve a legendary yearly average economic growth of 8.9 
percent from 1961 throughout the four FY-EDPs.183 Given the fact the First Republic of South 
Korea established in 1948 started with a governmental budget of a meager 30 million won, this 
record is definitely an amazing achievement. The answer to the puzzle of how Korea could achieve 
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such a rapid economic growth against all odds lies in its eagerness to secure foreign capital.184 The 
EPB, established in July 1961, was solely charged with raising domestic capital, stabilizing inflation 
for economic development and securing loans and foreign capital. The Park government, with its 
obsessive drive for economic development, lifted up the status of the EPB above all other ministries 
by making the head of the EPB the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. Starting with 
the fisheries loan agreement with a consortium of Italian and French businesses in 1963, the Korean 
government kept pushing the EPB and Korean businesses hard to earn foreign capital through 
various means: commercial loans with Germany, securing the reparation fund from Japan (against 
the public sentiment), business involvement during and after the Vietnam War through construction 
projects, and capitalizing on the construction boom in the Middle East after the first oil shock in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
It is also important to note that all these economic achievements were made possible by 
President Park Chung-hee’s military-trained leadership style and his personality. From January 1965 
to 1979, the EPB held Monthly Economic Trend Report Meetings; President Park attended all but 
one of the 147 sessions. President Park also committed himself to the Enlarged Export Promotion 
Conference, another briefing session to discuss export-related issues. He attended all but five out of 
the 152 meetings between 1965 and 1979. Members of the Cabinet and leading figures in the 
National Assembly and the Supreme Court were sure to participate in the first few sessions, but it 
gradually became a gathering for administrative officials, party affiliates, presidents of government-
run banks and leaders in academia and industry. Whenever conflict arose between the different 
economic ministries represented at the meetings, President Park would listen to the argument 
silently and, before it could drag out, mediated the differences and settled it then and there. This not 
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only made clear the thoughts of the final decision maker, but also relayed to other players in the 
economy how much importance the President placed on the topics at hand.185 
 
2.2.6. 1980-1997: Deepening of Korean capitalism 
On September 26, 1979, the eighteen-year, iron fisted rule of President Park Chung-hee was abruptly 
ended by his security chief, who shot him to death at a dinner. In the aftermath of Park’s unexpected 
death and the ending of his regime, political turmoil and social unrest ensued, including the May 18 
Kwangju Uprising, a grass-roots pro-democratization demonstration that was met with the state’s 
bloody crackdown and implementation of martial law. The military rule through the December 12 
coup by General Chun Doo-hwan continued authoritarian rule in Korea until 1987, when the Chun 
regime had no choice but to yield to the popular demand of constitutional change and the adoption 
of a single-term presidency. Regarding economic policymaking, the Chun Doo-hwan government 
changed its stance from growth-oriented economic policies. Among others, the government 
attempted to restructure the HCI, which had many problems including the overlapped investment 
under Park’s leadership. 
In the process, the Chun government coerced the businesses to provide large sums of political 
funds, intensifying the collusive ties between the state and business. The Roh Tae-woo government 
also inherited such practices from the Chun government. Both the Chun and Roh governments 
amassed an astronomical amount of slush funds through this, using the funds for their own power 
building efforts, as well as for personal wealth.   
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After 1987, the Korean government moved toward liberalization of the financial and commodity 
markets, also attempting to regulate labor by sustaining its authoritarian control over collective labor 
and supporting flexible labor management induced by individual capitals. 186  The increasing 
competitive pressure in the global market forced the state to move toward financial liberalization, 
which “marked the end of capital allocation by the state.”187 At the same time, with the financial 
liberalization and globalization, the chaebols became more reluctant to follow the industrial policy 
favored by the state, although they still maintained close collusive ties with the government and 
politicians. Also, individual firms were able to introduce new means of production through the 
massive expansion of short-term credit.188 The state-business relationship is like a two-edged sword. 
Because the chaebols had been fostered by governments, they understood very well what it would cost 
them if they did not provide political funds to the power-holders or follow their directions. On the 
other hand, the chaebols learned throughout those collusive years about the nature of the power-holders. 
By the early 1990s, it is estimated that the combined sales of the ten largest Korean chaebols accounted 
for three-quarters of the entire Korea’s GNP.189   
 
2.2.7. 1997 and afterward: The IMF crisis190 and the testing of Korean capitalism 
The financial crisis swept across Asian economies including South Korea. It started in Thailand with 
the financial collapse of the Thai Baht after the Thai government decided to float the baht because 
of the lack of foreign currency to support its fixed exchange rate, cutting its peg to the U.S. dollar. 
Thailand was already burdened with foreign debt, and its bankruptcy caused a domino-like crisis 
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throughout Asia. South Korea was one of the most hard-hit by this crisis. This crisis eventually led 
to the bailout fund from the International Monetary Fund, which came together with a series of 
measures including deregulation, further liberalization of the Korean financial and banking markets, 
restructuring of businesses, etc. Although Korea was able to repay the debt to the IMF sooner than 
expected, its side effects are still palpable throughout the country.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the way capitalist modernization progressed in Korea. It was the 
Japanese colonial government that introduced some basic elements of capitalism into Korea, such as 
industrial infrastructure and facilities, legal and financial systems, and private property ownership. 
The American influence in Korean capitalist modernization was indispensable. For this reason, the 
Korean economy under President Rhee Syng-man’s leadership is dubbed “aid-economy” because 
the very survival of the nation in post-liberation era, especially after the Korean War, was heavily 
dependent upon the provision of American grant aid. President Park’s prioritization on economic 
modernization led to the unprecedented economic development. However, capitalist economic 
modernization of Korea under Japanese colonial rule, American influence and the two regimes of 
Rhee and Park was achieved at the expense of democratic values and in violation of capitalist norms 
and practices. In the next chapter, I take up the issue of how these internal and external influences 
altered Western-type capitalism in a way that it could not become entrenched as a culture in Korean 
society.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE KOREAN MODIFIERS OF CAPTIALISM 
 
In chapter two, I provided the definition of capitalism for the purpose of this study.  However, the 
examination of the development path of Korean capitalist economy betrayed this definition with the 
emergence of a very different type of capitalism from that of the United States.  As I elaborated in 
the previous chapter, Korean capitalist economy is characterized by the state’s heavy involvement in 
the market, the hierarchical state-business collusion and the dominance of large and family-run 
companies known as chaebols in the economy.  These characteristics fit the description of altered 
capitalism in non-western societies provided by S.N.  Sangmpam.191 They clearly indicate a disunity 
between the capitalist economic system and society in a country. 
The overarching contention of this chapter is that Korea has a capitalist economy, but is not a 
fully established capitalist society.  There is a fundamental tension between, on the one hand, the 
supposedly democratic political system with a capitalist economy that is solidly based on the 
principle of liberal individualism and, on the other, Korean society that functions principally on 
what I call familist collectivism.  Specifically, this chapter aims to demonstrate Korean society’s failure 
to achieve an entrenched capitalist culture as found in most Western countries, notably the United 
States.  This investigation centers on the dynamic interplay between capitalism and Korean society, 
in terms of both the resistance against capitalist expansionism and mutual alteration between the two 
in the process.  For this investigation, two sets of variables are analyzed as main modifiers of 
capitalism in Korea: endogenous and exogenous.  The internal variables are associated with the 
tenacious survival of age-old traditional values and practices, both Confucian and non-Confucian.  
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These domestic factors are discussed to test hypothesis one to show that the persistence and 
prevalence of indigenous cultural characteristics of Korea, manifested in familist collectivism, 
hindered the full development of an entrenched capitalist culture in Korean society.  The external 
factors refer to Korea’s dependent nature of its political and economic relationships with Japan and 
the United States respectively.  These external factors are analyzed in the latter part of this chapter to 
show how Korea’s relationship with these two significant countries not only contributed to Korea’s 
capitalist economic modernization, but more importantly, further hindered the full entrenchment of 
a U.S.-type of capitalism in Korea as stated in hypothesis 2.  The following diagram encapsulates the 
main arguments of this chapter. 
 
Diagram 3.1. The Alteration Process of Korean Capitalism  
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3.1. Korean Society and Altered Capitalism  
It is true that Korea is a homogeneous nation, especially in terms of ethnicity and language.  
However, despite its cliché cultural label as Confucian, Korean society is more complicated than is 
widely understood.  On the other hand, the United States is known as a multi-cultural, racially mixed 
nation.  Nevertheless, American society is established and sustained on the ideological belief system 
grounded in Judeo-Christianity.  In his dissenting opinion on the ruling of the same sex marriage in 
June 2015, Justice Thomas wrote192: 
When the Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal” and 
“endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in which all 
humans are created in the image of God and therefore of inherent worth.  That vision is the foundation upon 
which this Nation was built. 
Even the cherished principle of the separation of church and state was originally aimed at 
protecting church from any potentially harmful state intervention, not the other way around.  By the 
20th century, the United States was instituted politically and socially on “a thoroughgoing creed of 
individualism” based on Christianity that could withstand “as the basis of democracy as a form of 
government, of private enterprise as an economic system, and of liberalism as an attitude toward life.”193   
While Christianity has been a dominant ideology and praxis for the American way of life, South 
Korea during the period of 1948 ~ 2009, the time frame of this study, had an extremely diverse 
religious culture.  Some even claim that Korea “is the very model of religious pluralism.”194 Unlike 
the United States that has a relatively short history, Korea as a nation has a longevity of many 
thousand years. Therefore, a proper understanding of the nature of Korean society between 1948 
                                                          
192 Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015) 
193 Ketcham, Ralph, 1927. Individualism and Public Life: A Modern Dilemma. (NY: B. Blackwell, 1987), 64 
194 Buswell, Robert E., Jr., 1953. Religions of Korea in Practice. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 31. 
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and 2009 requires an analysis of the impact on its people and society of the country’s long history.  
It is also important to take into account Korea’s turbulent modern history filled with tragic events of 
national magnitude in the 20th century such as Japanese military colonialism, enforced national 
division, the Korean War and rapid industrialization and urbanization. This section begins with an 
analysis of how the nation’s history left a legacy of blended culture of Shamanism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and most recently, Christianity.  I also provide evidence that some of these practices 
are still operational in Korean society, not to mention during the period of 1948-2009.  I then 
introduce the concept of familist collectivism as the most dominant operating principle and standard 
of conduct for most Koreans in the study period.  It stands squarely opposed to liberal 
individualism, the cornerstone of American democracy, capitalism, and society.  In so doing, I argue 
that notwithstanding capitalist expansionism and its attendant social changes, the tenacious Korean 
culture, expressed in familist collecvism, was not entirely replaced by a Western type of individual-
freedom based capitalist culture. 
 
3.1.1. Korean culture – A jumble of multi-religious ideas and practices  
Korea joined the international community as a sovereign nation-state in 1948, but its history did not 
begin at that point.195 As its long history unfolded over thousands of years, the people experienced 
several types of mainstay religions and philosophical constructs including Shamanism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and most recently, Christianity.196 Unlike the United States that purposefully 
separated politics from individual faith life, the overall religious history of Korea is of state 
                                                          
195 This study follows the traditional periodization of Korean history: Old Joseon (traditional dates 2333 B.C.E. – 194 B.C.E.), Three 
Kingdoms period (first century B.C.E. – 668), Baekje kingdom (traditional dates 18 B.C.E. – 661), Goryo kingdom (traditional dates 
37 B.C.E. – 668), Silla kingdom (57 B.C.E. – 668), United Silla dynasty (668 – 935), Goryo dynasty (918-1392), Joseon dynasty (1392 – 
1910), Japanese colonial period (1910 – 1945), American military rule (1945 – 1948), National division (1945 – present). 
196 There are other minor religions in Korea, but their membership, influence and history are not strong and noteworthy; therefore, 
they are not analyzed here. 
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endorsement of a series of distinct religions and of popular practice.197 If necessary, the state also 
suppressed and harshly persecuted those devoted to less preferred religions as in the cases of 
Buddhism and Catholicism during the early and late Joseon period.  Precisely because of such heavy 
political intervention in religion, the rise and fall of religions have often been in tandem with those 
of political powers throughout Korea’s history.   
Shamanism in Korea is as old as Korean history itself.  It is not only the most ancient of all 
religious traditions but also the most persistent and pervasive.  One perspective is that it probably 
began to dominate the religious life of Korea after the middle of the first century B.C., when the 
three kingdoms (first Century B.C.E.  ~ 668) combined several tribal states and emerged with a 
distinctively centralized government.198  By the beginning of Goryo (918 ~ 1392), Shamanism was 
the dominant indigenous religion in the land.  Shamanism was based on the belief that human beings 
as well as natural forces and inanimate objects all possess spirits.  It was also considered as a religion 
of women,199 which may explain in part its pervasiveness and prevalence for most of its history.    
Buddhism was first introduced from China in 372 A.D., and enjoyed its golden days during the 
Goryo period (918 ~ 1392).  For instance,  
[I]t was decreed in 1036 that if a man had four sons, one of these must be a Buddhist priest.  Later, this was 
changed to one son in three.  In 1136, thirty thousand priests were said to have been present at a single 
ceremony.  Monasteries and temples were numerous, usually set in some beautiful, retired spot in the 
mountains.200  
During the Goryo era, Confucianism was also in place, but its influence was much smaller than 
that of Buddhism because Buddhism was officially adopted and supported as the state religion and 
                                                          
197 Kim, Sebastian C. H., and Kirsteen Kim. A History of Korean Christianity. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015. 
198 Kang, Wi Jo. Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1987, p.2. 
199 Oh, Kyong-Geun. "Korean Shamanism – The Religion Of Women." International Journal of Korean Humanities and Social Sciences 2 
(2016), 71. Web. 
200 Clark, Allen D. History of the Korean Church. (Seoul: Christian Literature Society of Korea, 1961), p.24.   
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widely practiced.   Because Buddhism was not seen in much conflict with the shamanistic rites of 
nature worship, it naturally blended in with Shamanism.201 Thus, so many of the special mountains 
thought to be the residence of spirits in pre-Buddhist time soon became the sites of Buddhist 
temples.202 Even in the early 21st century, Korea still preserves many of these Buddhist practices and 
physical temples.203 What this entails is, despite the adoption of Buddhism as the official religion and 
ideology by Goryo, many of the Shamanistic practices and mindset remained operational in most 
ordinary people.  Thus, Shamanistic influence in Korean’s daily life persisted for a long time.  Such a 
blending inevitably produced a hybrid of the two religions.  As a result, it is almost impossible to 
distinguish which is of Buddhist origin and which is of a Shamanistic one.   
After the Yi family clan founded Joseon in 1392 in a military coup, it installed neo-Confucianism 
as the official state religion and governing ideology, moved the capital to the present Seoul and 
instituted the study of the Chinese classics as the basis for official appointments in government 
career.  Thereafter, the state examination based on Confucian teachings became the main pathway to 
officialdom and source of prestige and wealth.  In contrast to the Goryo era that accommodated the 
existing folk religion of Shamanism with its officially adopted Buddhism, the Yi Dynasty not only 
outlawed Buddhism but also oppressed it to a point where “no Buddhist priests were allowed in the 
city of Seoul” because of the alleged evil influences of Buddhism during the Goryo era.204  As a 
result, most Buddhist temples began to spread out to the outskirts of the capital city, and mostly 
found homes in remote mountains.  In her pioneering work on Korea’s pre-modern society, Martina 
Deuchler uncovers that the founders of the Joseon Dynasty tried to solve social problems that were 
increasingly manifest in the last days of Goryo (935-1392) by adopting neo-Confucianism.  This 
                                                          
201 Ibid, 24-25. 
202 Ibid. 
203 The exiled President Chun Doo-hwan found home in one of the old Buddhist temples after he offered to the nation a public 
apology for his wrongdoings while in office in 1988. 
204 Clark, Allen D. History of the Korean Church, 21. 
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newly adopted state ideology of Neo-Confucianism served “as a key to social legislation that eventually 
remade Korean society.”205 Consequently, throughout the five-century reign of the Yi family clan, neo-
Confucianism served as the overarching rules and principles that governed politics, hence 
governmental structure, socio-economic relations and interactions between and among people. 
In principle, neo-Confucian ideology assumes the harmonious relationship not only between the 
spiritual (the humans) and the material (the nature), but more importantly between humans.  
Confucian culture focused on the family as the place of cultivation of right behavior or virtue for the 
sake of peace and harmony in society through the Confucian tenet of 三綱五倫, The Three Bonds 
and the Five Moral Disciplines in Human Relations.  This principle governed and guided the proper 
interactions between members of society: the king and its subjects, the father and the son, the 
husband and the wife, siblings and friends.  The three underlying pillars of these relationships are 
loyalty, filial piety and sincerity (or integrity).  Because individual identity was fundamentally 
understood largely in connection with relationships and groups, Confucian view of harmony 
between human beings is highly and rigidly hierarchical in nature.  This focus on relationships 
inevitably led to a hierarchical social structure.   
For instance, the King is superior to all other subjects, the Father is to be revered, the wife is to 
be submissive to her husband, and so on.  Ideally, this social hierarchy is defined by both mutual 
responsibilities and differences in physical strengths, mental capacities and social status.  Also, men 
(fathers, husbands and eldest sons) are superior to women (mothers, wives and daughters).  As I 
mentioned in chapter two, this social hierarchy is also sustained by a lineage-based class system 
where the yangban class prevailed as the state elites.  Confucian Joseon society was divided not only 
                                                          
205 “An Interview with Martina Deuchler.” The Review of Korean Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2001): 173-195 
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by social status but also by gender.  Women were systematically disadvantaged, subordinate to male 
counterparts.  Confucian teaching valued a life of scholarship above all else.  Most yangbans despised 
physical labor and were disengaged from productive activities such as farming or manual labor.  
Confucian morality was community based, which meant personal profit was discouraged in favor of 
communal survival, stability and the standing of the lineage group.  As a result, the so-called sa 
(scholarship)-nong (farming)-gong (industry)-sang (commerce) attitude prevailed throughout Joseon society and 
its influence persisted in the minds of people.206  
Although neo-Confucianism was systematically instituted as the ideological basis for the polity 
and societal norms, it also was challenged greatly in the last days of the Joseon dynasty.  Late Joseon 
Korea was aristocratic and bureaucratic, dominated by kinship groups or clans that claimed their 
patrilineal descent from a distinguished common ancestor.  About ten percent of the population 
belonged to the yangban social class, who alone had access to education, public office, social status, 
economic privileges and political influence.  The power of the yangban class increased to the point 
where they “expanded their lands at the expense of farmers’ and turned many farmers into peasant 
or half-tenant farmers, decreasing the tax resources”207 for the state.  In turn, the government 
exploited the farmers to fill in the shortage of its finance.  In what is known as Gabo208 Reform from 
1894 to 1896, the state responded to ever-growing grievances of the farmers including Donghak 
Peasant Movement.  The state-backed hierarchical class system was officially abolished, eliminating 
social privileges of the yangban class.  Those with talent were to be allowed to study and appointed 
to government posts based on merit alone, regardless of social class.  The army was to be established 
through conscription, regardless of family backgrounds.  All official documents were to be written in 
                                                          
206 One prime example of the resilience of this discriminatory attitude toward social strata is reflected in Korean banknotes 
commemorating mostly scholar-officials of Joseon dynasty, whereas politicians such as presidents were depicted on American notes. 
207 Chang, Dae-oup, 1971. Capitalist Development in Korea: Labor, Capital and the Myth of the Developmental State, 74.  
208 The name Gabo (갑오, 甲午) comes from the name of the year 1894 in the traditional sexagenary cycle. 
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Hangul (the vernacular language invented by King Sejong in 1443), not hanja (Chinese characters).  
Leather working, acting and so on were no longer to be regarded as degrading work, and the people 
who do them would no longer be outcastes.  All forms of legal slavery ended.  However, the official 
and legal abolition of Confucian social practices did not get rid of such traditional values and beliefs 
in the minds of Koreans, deeply ingrained through political socialization and institutionalization for 
such a long time.   
It is tempting to claim that the influence of Confucianism in the life and mind of the Korean 
people and society is the greatest of all the traditional religions and ideologies because of the 
systematic institutionalization of neo-Confucianism by the state.  However, it is an impossible task 
to clearly discern the respective influence of Buddhism, Shamanism and Confucianism on the lives 
of the Korean people in the post-Joseon society.  Still, neo-Confucianism was the ideology of the 
ruling class that systematically worked mostly for the interests of the elites at the expense of the 
majority of the populace.  It was also the official ideology of the state.  Like the fate of Buddhism at 
the beginning of Joseon dynasty, Confucianism was often accused of many social ills since the latter 
days of Joseon and in most parts of the 20th century.209 Moreover, the inability of the Joseon 
government to protect its subjects from various external invasions and the corruption of the so-
called yangban officials was often attributed to neo-Confucian influence.   
This notwithstanding, the four decades of Japanese colonialism and the exposure of Koreans to 
the new religions such as Catholicism and Protestant Christianity all diluted the influence of 
Confucianism in post-liberation Korea.  Also, the 40-year Japanese colonial rule furthered the 
destruction of Confucian social order.  The American military rule and its economic assistance in the 
                                                          
209 Interestingly, the remarkable economic growth of East Asian countries, collectively known as NICs, sparked interest in the 
connection between Confucianism and economic success, or lack thereof.  
 
80 
 
1950s reorganized the social order.  Therefore, Korean social order during the 1948-2009 was 
neither a fully Confucian nor capitalist one.  Rather, it was a distorted or jumbled social order.   
Whatever it is called, it is NOT a social order based on liberal individualism.    
As stated, the traditional Korea was a very hierarchical, class-oriented society where the yangban 
ruling class abused and oppressed the poor and the women were subservient to men.  That is why 
Shamanism continued to operate, especially by women who needed external help to escape the many 
kinds of misfortunes.  There was hardly fair treatment, civil or individual rights, for most populace 
but it was harsher for women.  For instance, both in traditional and modern Korea, it is a common 
practice for a mother to pray in front of big trees and rocks to have a son.  There were so many 
disadvantages attached to not having a son.  For a long time, the daughters were not counted as 
family members and if she did not have a boy, the mother was no longer treated as a mother.   
Sometimes she was ousted from the family.  She was not supposed to show grievances toward the 
husband even if the husband had a second wife or a concubine for the sake of having a son.210 In 
1990, the ratio between boys and girls in Korea reached 116.5 to 100, the highest in the world.211 
Therefore, it would be more accurate to understand the influence of each religion upon the 
minds of the people was cumulative rather than replacement.  At the turn of the 20th century, the 
cumulative effect of such diverse religious practices and mindset was clearly observed by Western 
missionaries in Korea.   In the eyes of observers, Shamanism, Buddhism and Confucianism 
“coexisted side by side, or rather have overlapped and interpenetrated each other,” to the extent 
“they are held in the mind of the average Korean as a confused jumble.”212 Theoretically, as 
                                                          
210 In 1997, my sister-in-law cried in bitterness at the moment of her third daughter’s birth because she was married to the eldest son 
of an extended family. Her family-in-law was from a very traditional Confucian part of South Korea. The same year, I gave birth to a 
son, which greatly relieved my mother-in-law. My mother-in-law’s special treatment for my son was considered natural and acceptable 
by the entire family-in-law including the sisters-in-law..  
211http://www.koreatimes.com/article/20151202/956246. 
212 Jones, George Heber. “The Spirit Worship of the Koreans.” [online version], 39 
 (retrieved from www.raskb.com/transactions/VOL02Part1/VOL02Part1-2.docx) 
 
81 
 
Reverend George Heber Jones observed, the Korean was able to recognize the separate nature of 
the three ideologies, but practically, these “lie in his mind as a confused, undigested mass of teaching 
and belief, hopelessly intermixed and chaotic.” Contrary to his insinuation of pessimistic negativity 
of the Korean psyche as such, the overlapping and interpenetration of diverse religions were 
operational in such a way that, for most Koreans, such a tate was natural.  It was an order, not a 
chaos, in their own unique way.   
One century later, the same missionary may find the Korean society in a similar state.  The only 
difference would be the addition of Christian influence to the picture.  Before the liberation in 1945, 
although the Korean Christian church was small in organization terms vis-à-vis Korean society, it 
produced a number of individuals who were able to play a leading role in the national enlightenment 
and independence movements and in the modernization of Koran life.  Such influential national 
leaders included Philip Jaisohn213, Kim Kyu-sik and Rhee Syng-man, to name a few.  For the twenty-
year period following annexation, for instance, approximately 500 young Korean people went to the 
United Sates to study with the support of Western Christian missionaries.214 In addition, many 
politicians converted to Protestant Christianity and sixteen out of thirty-three leaders involved in the 
Independence Movement in 1919 were Christian.  The church also performed a great service by 
improving the position of women through opportunities in women’s education and church work.  
By accepting people from the lower levels of society, the church also contributed to the 
democratization of Korean society. 
Christianity gained momentum for phenomenal growth both in terms of size and influence in 
Korean society first during the American military rule of 1945-1948 and later under the Rhee Syng-
                                                          
213 Seo Jae-phil in Korean, who was well known in Korea for his involvement in national independence and journalism.  
214 Koh Byong-ik. A Century of Korean-American Relations. In Reflections on a Century of U.S.-Korean Relations by Academy of Korean 
Studies. The Wilson Center, 1983. Conference Papers, June 1982, University Press of America. 
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man regime. The military government understandably preferred hiring English-speaking Christians 
to work with, and mobilized local churches for relief efforts during and after the Korean War. The 
founding president Rhee Syng-man, a professed born-again Christian, not only held his inaugural 
service in a Christian manner, but also established a series of pro-Christian policies during his terms 
of office.215 During the 1960s and 1970s, Protestant Christianity had phenomenal growth from one 
million members in the early 1960s to seven million in 1980.216 In fact, a modern South Korea 
without Christianity is hardly conceivable.  At the end of the 20th century, more than 25 percent of 
South Koreans identified themselves as Protestants or Catholics, attesting to Christianity’s wide-
ranging influence.217 Out of nine Korean presidents, three were professed protestants (Rhee Syng-
man, Kim Young-sam and Lee Myung-bak), one Buddhist (Roh Tae-woo) and one Catholic (Kim 
Dae-jung).  Both Chun and Roh were considered Catholic but later leaned toward Buddhism, which 
indicated their faith was more or less nominal in nature.  Controversies abound as each president 
was accused of showing favoritism toward his own religion over the rest.    
Table 3.1. The State-supported Pro-Christian Policies vis-à-vis Other Religions  
 Protestant Christianity Buddhism Time 
Gap 
Designation as holidays Christmas in 1949 Birth of Buddha in 1975 26 years 
Mission in prisons Prison chaplain system in1945 Prison monk system in 1961 16 years 
Mission in the military Military chaplain system in 1951 Military monk system in 1969 18 years 
Mission in Police Police chaplain system in 1966 Police monk system in 1986 20 years 
Establishment of the 
broadcasting system 
Christian Broadcasting in 1954 Buddhist Broadcasting in 1990 36 years 
(Source: The President and Religion, p.48)  
                                                          
215 Baik Joong-hyun. The President and Religion. (Seoul: Inmulgwa Sasangsa, 2014), 48.  
216 Roh Chi-joon "Hankuk gyesingyowa kukka wwonryuk ganwui gwankye”, Kidoggyo sasang  (2012.4): 28-37 
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The afore-mentioned lamentation of an American missionary was echoed in 2009 when a well-
known Korean pastor at a Christian conference poignantly preached a sermon on the title “A 
shaman in a suit at the pulpit.” He was dismayed at the prevalence of superstitious views and 
practices embedded even in the professed Christians. Despite Korea’s advancement in science and 
technology, a frustrated Western journalist also writes that Korea’s “propensity for the superstitious, 
the supernatural, or the primeval has few equals in the world, and among the advanced nations, 
none.” As aforementioned, President Kim Dae-jung moved his family cemetery in 1995 as a 
supposedly auspicious site that would produce a better luck for his election. Ordinary Koreans also 
heavily rely on superstition on all kinds of occasions, ranging from setting wedding dates, naming a 
new-born baby, starting a new business to making a movie. Koreans “go through an elaborate ritual 
to appeal to the superstitious oracles, whether it be fortune-tellers, shamans, diviners.” 
Like the Korean of the early 20th century, a young Korean now goes to a Western-style 
university taking some classes in English with the sacrificial help and pressured guidance of his 
parents. When pressed, his mother is willing to engage in illegal activities to earn money for the 
child’s education.218 The youngster eats pizzas and drinks Starbucks coffee, casts a ballot on Election 
day, posts pictures taken with his cell phones on his Facebook page. The same young Korean then 
goes to a fortune-teller to find out his/her chance of getting a job and to know about the future. In 
a survey of 898 college students in 2010, 68 percent of respondents consulted a fortune-teller at least 
once in that year. Approximately 81 percent of those surveyed said they felt the urge to go to see a 
fortune-teller at least once a year. On Sundays, his parents would serve in one of the largest churches 
in the world as an elder and as a deaconess. On the eve of the nation-wide state examination for the 
                                                          
218 Both a former policeman and the wife of a policeman were arrested for their respective involvement in phishing. The woman 
confessed that she needed the money for her children’s private tutoring. Chosun Ilbo, December 19, 2016.  
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college entrance, some mothers would stay up at a church to pray for the best favor from God for 
the child, while some others would bow many times before the stone-carved Buddha statute for the 
same luck.   
Some of these Shamanistic, Buddhist, Confucian and Christian practices, often in a variety of 
combinations, were very much operational in Korean society between 1948 and 2009, and still are in 
the 21st century.  The former Prime Minister of Korea, Goh Kun, who also served as acting 
President while former President Roh Moo-hyun was suspended of his presidency during the 
impeachment trial in 2004, provides an anecdote in his recently published memoir.  In 1977, there 
was a severe drought in the province where he was the governor.  The elders of the region expressed 
their concerns, and demanded he observe a rainmaking ritual.  These same elders were concerned 
about the potential drought ten years back because the then governor’s name had a Chinese 
character that meant ‘fire’ in his name.  Because these elders were the opinion leaders of the 
Kwangju and Cheonnam regions under Governor Goh’s administrative jurisdiction, he could not 
ignore their suggestion.  Therefore, he announced to the local media he would observe the 
rainmaking ceremony in his own office, instead of doing it on the top of Mt.  Moodeung, known for 
its spiritual power.  Only then did he quench the anxiety of the local people.  In January 1970, 
President Park Chung-hee visited the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to tour the newly installed 
computerized system.  The system was a symbol of the modernization of the budgeting process in 
Korea.  Worried that something might go wrong, the Budget Bureau of the EPB in charge of this 
project decided to observe one of the most traditional practices: a gosa with the head of a pig in front 
of the computer.  In Korea, a gosa is an often-observed Shamanistic ritual in which food, including a 
steamed pig head, is offered to the spirits to bring good luck and avoid any misfortune by placating 
evil spirits.  It is typically performed at the beginning of an important endeavor, opening of a new 
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shop or company, or even when moving into a new house.  This kind of spirit worship practices are 
not uncommon even in the 21st Century Korea. 
Feng Shi (or geomancy) is also widely practiced. Major politicians, including President Rhee 
Syng-man, Park Chung-hee and Kim Dae-jung, are reported not only to have visited fortune-tellers 
to know their political fates but also changed the gravesites of their ancestors in the hope it would 
give them a better chance in seizing power. Businesspeople, of course, are not exempt from this 
widespread practice. Shamanistic influence in managing state affairs is nothing new to Korea. At the 
turn of the century, empress Myeongseong, the wife of Joseon’s last king and the first emperor of 
the Korean Empire, was allegedly dependent on a Shaman, causing so much grievances on the 
people. As of November 2016, the Koreans were experiencing déjà vu because the incumbent 
president Park Geun-hye was severely criticized for being influenced by a Shamanistic cultish family. 
The following diagram intends to highlight the cumulative nature of Korea’s diverse religions.  
 
Diagram 3.2. The Cumulative Nature of Korea’s Traditional Religions and Philosophical Constructs 
Compared to the U.S. Situation   
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3.1.2. Tenacious tradition – Familist Collectivism 
It should be obvious that when the capitalist economic system was introduced in Korea by Japan in 
the early 20th century, it was met with these time-honored traditional values and practices.  In other 
words, Korea was not like the United States “where many traditional restraints were absent.”219  In 
America, as Ralph Ketcham observed, “the new thought associated with a market economy 
articulated two startling innovations in how people viewed themselves and their place in society:”220 
First, wealth increase became the primary purpose of government.  Second, self-interest was 
increasingly validated as a motivation in human affairs.  These two points are inter-related in the 
sense of “private vices (selfishness) and public benefits (national wealth and power).”221  
In echoing what Weber and others noticed, Ketcham also argues that “when capitalism and the 
commercial spirit meshed with the also flourishing piety, evangelical Protestantism, moreover, a 
further, radicalized individualism resulted.”222 Thus, the United States, like other Western countries, 
“experienced a mixing of material and spiritual energies that resulted in the sort of many-faceted 
individualism.”223 As a matter of fact, the mechanism of a free market reflects and sums up all the 
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economic choices and decisions made by all the participants according to their own independent and 
un-coerced judgment.  Hofstede also points out that in the West capitalist market economy fosters 
individualism and in turn depends on it.224 Thus, it is no wonder that “America is the Canaan of 
capitalism, its promised land.”225 
Simply put, capitalism was brought to the fertile land of the American society where the new 
economic system was well blended with liberal individualism.   Liberalism, as a moral and political 
ideology that evolved in Western Europe and North America, represented a sharp break from the 
medieval social order.  It exalts individuals as being autonomous, rational and free to choose and 
control their determinate ends or purposes.  The role of the state vis-à-vis individuals is to protect 
individual liberty as much as it can.  As Hofstede defines, individualism “pertains to societies in 
which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself 
and his or her immediate family.”226 Accordingly, individualistic societies emphasize “I” 
consciousness, autonomy, emotional independency, individual initiative, right to privacy, pleasure-
seeking, financial security and universalism.227  The United States is well known for its individualist 
culture because it was founded by those who sought personal liberty for religious freedom at the risk 
of their own lives.  This focus on liberal individualism is clearly reflected in the U.S.  Declaration of 
Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed.” “All men” in this context refers to the 
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collective entity of autonomous individuals.  As Ketcham argues, it is this fundamental belief in 
individualism that made possible so many of the material advances in America.228     
However, American type of liberal individualism never took such a primary place in the 
institutions, psyche and behaviors of the Koreans for most of the country’s history.  Such notions as 
equality of men before God and government as the delegated authority from the consent of the 
governed were alien to pre-modern Koreans.   In the America’s Judeo-Christian tradition, salvation 
by God is a very personal business.   Everyone is accountable for his life before God.   From that 
notion of individuality before God comes the idea of the golden rule, “Do to others as you would 
have done to you.”229 In contrast, Korean society is traditionally characterized by Confucian 
collectivism as a conceptual counterpart to liberal individualism.230 As Hofstede defines, collectivism 
pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty.231 Collectivist societies stress “we” consciousness, collective identity, emotional dependence, 
group solidarity, sharing, duties and obligations, need for stable and predetermined friendship, group 
decision and particularism.232 These fundamental differences between liberal individualism and 
Confucian collectivism are embedded in almost every aspect of life for the peoples in both types of 
societies including the way they communicate and relate to each other.  As social psychologist 
Richard Nisbett shows,233 these core differences are clearly manifested even in the cognition process 
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of respective groups of people in the Western European and the Eastern Asian countries.  Their cognitive 
workings and social behaviors are as different from each other as the West is far from the East.234  
Against this backdrop, I contend that as a conceptual counterpart to the liberal individualism, 
familist collectivism is the operating principle and the standard of conduct for most Koreans during the 
period of 1948-2009.  As previously mentioned, many of the traditional social structures and 
institutions have been challenged by historical disruptions and its attendant political and social 
upheavals throughout the 20th Century.  Radical reform measures of the late Joseon dynasty, the 
Japanese colonial rule, and the Korean War demolished the Confucian social class system.  The U.S.  
Cold War agenda for spreading democratization and capitalist market economy in Korea introduced 
Western ideas and values of liberal individualism, challenging the prevalence of Korea’s traditional 
values and practices.  The Saemaul Undong (the New Village Movement) and urbanization through 
the vigorous industrialization drive during the Park Chung-hee era in the 1970s, the democratization 
movement in the 1980s, and globalization of the 1990s through trade liberalization all brought about 
drastic changes to the lifestyles of Koreans.  Korea’s remarkable economic development and major 
international sporting events, such as the 1986 Asian Games, the 1988 Summer Olympics, and the 
2002 FIFA World Cup, drew the attention of the international community.  In the eyes of the world, 
Seoul was seen as modernized as any other metropolitan cities, such as New York City or Paris.    
Notwithstanding all these challenges and changes the Korean people underwent, the most 
fundamental element of Korea’s traditional values and practices that emphasize collectivism through 
strong family ties not only survived but also strengthened.  Throughout the afore-mentioned 
eventful years and without a proper social safety net, the Korean people survived not by breaking up 
the family relations but by holding more strongly to family relationships.  In fact, aggressive 
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capitalist expansionism and its attendant social transformations in the later part of the 20th century 
reinforced the tendency to be more attached to strong family ties.  I call this particularly pronounced 
tendency to uphold family ties as familist collectivism.235  This concept is used to distance Korean ways 
of Confucian collectivist practices and the functioning of familism from those of other Confucian 
societies and to denote its own uniquely Korean features. 
The word familism is defined as “the subordination of the personal interests and prerogatives of 
an individual to the values and demands of the family.”236 It is true that family takes a very important 
position and role in every society.  However, the role and influence of family in Korean society is 
more pronounced than other countries including the United States.  It is not that Americans do not 
appreciate family; they merely put more emphasis on the pursuit of individual fulfilment more than 
their Korean counterparts.  It is assumed that social improvement would follow from their personal 
growth and fulfillment.  The word collectivism refers to the persistence of the Confucian and non-
Confucian values and norms still operative among Koreans.  It is encapsulated in the Korean family 
culture such characteristics as hierarchical/authoritarian inter-personal relations.  In general, it also 
puts emphasis on individual sacrifice for the betterment of the whole.  The persistence of 
Shamanistic and Buddhist practices was also more closely associated with family’s welfare than 
individual fulfilment.    
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Japanese colonialism also reinforced the strong familism in the minds of Koreans.  Unlike China 
and Japan, Korean society was characterized by the predominance of clan villages.  This clan-based 
rural community system prevailed even during the colonial period, which numbered 15,000 in 
1940.237 The extended family, ranging from six to more than twenty members, was an important 
component of these clan villages.  The extended family system rested on strictly patriarchal power 
and blood ties.  Clan villages were excellent self-governing entities with clear leadership, progressive 
education, facilitation of agricultural help and a rotating mutual help system known as Gye.238 In fact, 
despite the colonial government’s systematic efforts to assimilate Koreans into Japanese culture and 
colonialism-induced changes, “the Korean family system is a case of colonial non-change par 
excellence.”239 According to Ha Yong-chool240, the Japanese colonial authorities took advantage of 
the traditional authority structure and family relationships they encountered in Korea for their 
economic interests and control.  For the Koreans, maintaining family traditions was also considered 
as an act of passive resistance to the colonial authorities.241 The yangban landlords served on various 
advisory committees and associations and were leading members of financial institutions and myon242 
chiefs.  By their active involvement in local political, administrative and economic affairs, they 
utilized their positions to strengthen their status in class villages by promoting clan activities such as 
clan assembly and the publication of books on clan genealogy.243 Ordinary peasants, both those who 
went abroad and those who remained, relied on the extended family system for their survival.  The 
traditional emphasis on preferring sons to daughters also served as a factor.  Educational 
opportunities, if any, went almost exclusively to sons, especially the eldest sons.  The resulting 
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success of the education was regarded as that of the whole family, and the successful person was 
expected to support the family.244  
Kim Ui-chol reports that with increased influences from the West, three trends have appeared in 
modern Confucian societies and other collectivist cultures.245 First, the in-group and out-group 
boundary has become more differentiated and discrete.  With increased industrialization, 
urbanization and globalization, people in modern Confucian cultures have to interact with out-group 
members in greater numbers, frequency and degree.  In these situations, they have learned to 
separate in-group situations from out-group situations.  When interacting with out-group members, 
they adopt individualistic orientations, and with in-group members they maintain collectivistic 
orientations.  The spectacular economic growth of South Korea since the 1960s transformed the 
physical aspect of Korean society and the lifestyles of the people, blinding the eyes of the outsiders 
to the division between in-group and out-group boundaries.  Second, the coexistence mode reflects 
a dynamic interplay between individual and group loyalties.  In modern Confucian societies, the 
separation of the private self from the public self has become much more pronounced.  Finally, it 
has been observed that the role of the father in a family has become much more peripheral whereas 
the role of the mother has become indispensable.246   
During the period of 1948-2009, Koreans not only maintained a collectivist mindset but 
expanded its collectivist orientation.  As a result of transformative social changes, the traditional 
family ties were modified by the loosening of the traditional lineage relations and expanding to the 
broader social relations based on the three affinity connections: Hyulyeon—affinity among members 
of the same blood clan, Jeeyeon—affinity among people from the same region and Hakyeon—affinity 
                                                          
244 Ibid. 
245 Kim, Ui-chol. Individualism and Collectivism: A Psychological, Cultural and Ecological Analysis.  
246 Kim Dong-choon. “Kajok yigijooui.” Critical Review of History. (1999. 5): 309-319. Summer: 47. Special Feature.  
 
93 
 
among people from the same schools.247  This focus is uniquely Korean, and its influence is 
prevalent both in ordinary people’s lives and at the state level.  For instance, as recently as 2008, 
President Lee Myung-bak was heavily criticized for his first cabinet appointments.  His cabinet was 
notoriously called “Ko So Young cabinet” named after a famous Korean actress.  This term refers to 
the appointments of those who graduated from Korea University (President Lee’s alma mater), 
attended Somang (Hope) church (President Lee was an elder of this church) and came from the 
Youngnam region (President Lee’s hometown).  This is a modern version of the extended family 
relationship as it was the case for the lineage-based family relationship in traditional Korean society.   
The economic modernization of Korean society influenced the structure and function of the 
traditional family, ironically reinforcing familist collectivism, rather than weakening it.  Since the 1980s, 
separated families, living apart for the sake of their children’s education, have become a widespread 
phenomenon in Korea.  In these families, mostly mothers and children live overseas to support the 
children’s education while fathers stay in Korea to work and finance families’ living and educational 
expenses.  The father in this family is referred to as “Kirogi appa,” or wild goose father.  Kirogis (or 
geese) are iconic birds in Korea, known for their natural devotion to their spouses and offspring.  
And these families are prime examples of Korean parents’ absolute and unconditional devotion to 
their children, sacrificing themselves to give their children more advantages in life.    
Widespread corruption in Korean society also has much to do with familist collectivism including 
cheating and bribery for the illegal entrance to elite schools, illegitimate exemption from the military 
service for the sons of the rich and the powerful, and the like.  The national outrage against 
President Park Geun-hye in 2016 was invoked by the excessive and illegally conducted favoritism 
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toward the daughter of Park’s long-time confidant Choi Soon-sil.  Mrs. Choi not only capitalized on 
her personal connection to President Park Geun-hye for illegal financial gains, but also abused 
presidential power and her discretion for the sake of her daughter.248  It is true that as Korea 
industrialized and modernized, many symptoms of an individual and commercial society such as the 
United States have manifested.  However, this trend does not amount to the replacement of such a 
deep-rooted, family-centered mindset of Korean people with that of American liberal individualism.   
Even today, Korea cannot be described as a truly individualistic society where individual liberty is 
more valued than age-old understanding and practice of “the subordination of individual preference 
and choice to the collective obligation,”249 which is built in every level of society.   
Familist collectivism reflects the changes and continuity between traditional familism with 
patrilineal characteristics and its modern version with much more pronounced roles of women.  In 
traditional Korean society, a mother’s power was limited by the presence of extended family 
members, especially the mother in law.   With greater nuclearization and urbanization, the mother 
has become the single, most important socializing agent.”250 The rapid economic growth and its 
attendant socioeconomic transformations also reinforced the negative aspects of familism that put 
family before morality and loyalty to the state; it made Koreans increasingly selfish for their families.    
Some argue that “the most powerful religion in Korea is familism,” and the traditional community 
spirit of “I’d rather starve to death than steal” disappeared as Korean society skewed more toward 
capitalist materialism.251 As Choi Jae-sok poignantly observes, many Koreans are confused between 
individualism and egoism.252 Although people have acquired egoistic and selfish lifestyles, influenced 
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by consumerism and materialism through capitalist expansionism in Korean society, they react 
negatively to individualism that emphasizes self-reliance and autonomy.     
 
 3.1.3. Familist collectivism and altered capitalism 
As I discussed in chapter two, the dominant features of Korean capitalism include the state-led 
planned economy, the hierarchical state-business collusion and the dominance of Korean chaebols in 
the economy.   In fact, these characteristics betray an altered form of capitalism that defies some of 
the main tenets of Smithian capitalism: free and competitive market system, rule of law and 
individual liberty including private property ownership rights.   In the remainder of this section, I discuss 
the actual manifestations of familist collectivism to show how this altered Korean capitalism in Korea.    
Both in traditional and modern Korea, the family is the basic unit of society and the most 
important of all other social organizations, including the state.   Society and the state are seen just as 
an extension of the family.253  As I previously mentioned, the president (in place of a king) is 
understood as the father figure of a large extended family called a state.   Following this traditional 
legacy, Korean state bureaucracy is also characterized by centralized and elitist administration.   In 
the words of Gregory Henderson, Korean politics is characterized by “politics of the vortex,” 
referring to the concentration of all political energy at the highest level.   In an authoritarian 
hierarchical social order, government is not viewed as a contractual arrangement between the rulers 
and the ruled.   According to Yoo Moon-jee, Korean state structure is most outstandingly 
characterized by the patrimonial social order based on traditional Confucian culture.   According to 
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her, the Japanese colonial rule reconsolidated Confucian-rooted patrimonial power into a new 
arrangement, rather than bringing about any fundamental change into other forms of political organization.254  
President Rhee Syng-man, with his outstanding academic background, reputation as the 
independent movement leader and his royal family lineage line, ruled liberated Korea like a monarch 
where he ruled like a king and the people were his “subjects.  ” He was “a personal ruler” and his 
regime was “a personal authoritarianism based on an astute manipulation of political factions as well 
as suppression of the opposition.”255  Rhee changed the constitution in 1958 to make himself 
president virtually for life and that gave him the power to appoint provincial governors and the chief 
officials of major cities.”256 In this sense, all the succeeding presidents of the authoritarian era (Park 
Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo) followed in Rhee’s steps.   Each president 
monopolized state resources and opportunities.   Each president “parceled out the economy to his 
loyal cliental followers and disciplined his clientelist followers through credit control and tax 
incentives, and the state provided subsidies and monopolistic and oligopolistic economic 
opportunities in exchange for loyal support.”257   
As I discussed in detail in chapter two, President Park’s strong resolve to pursue economic 
development through the four Five-Year Economic Development Plans further necessitated the 
centralization of state power.   The Park regime granted preferential access to raw materials and 
credit on highly favorable terms to a few companies.   This economic promotional policy required 
closer collaboration between the state and business.   The prolonged and authoritarian rule of the 
Park regime institutionalized the collusion between the state and business.   Only those with 
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connections to the powerful political circles could receive favors of all kinds; this structured, 
collusive dynamic caused constant struggle for special favors.    
The following diagram shows the structure of politics-business collusive ties that are so 
widespread and prevalent in Korean society.  It appears to bear some similarity to the concept and 
practice of “iron-triangle” that characterizes the relationship between the bureaucracy, interest 
groups, and Congress in making public policies in the United States.  However, these two 
fundamentally differ because interest groups are incorporated into legitimate political process and 
institutionalized in the United States, whereas the Korean version of iron-triangle does not allow 
such incorporation.258 Also, most of these collusive ties, though reciprocal in nature, are often top-
down and informed through familist collectivism.  
 Diagram 3.3. Structure of politics-business collusive corruption259 
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The structure of  collusion is four-tiered.  The Blue House monopolized all political and 
economic resources, including much coveted job opportunities.  Politicians and high-ranking 
bureaucrats, as the medium between the blue house and the potential seekers for special favors, offer 
critical information in return for bribery.  Although this structure of  collusion between the state and 
business may resemble on the surface any other capitalist state, in Korea it rests on familist collectivism.   
The connection in the four-tier structure is often made through the three affinity connections 
described previously.    
Based on the logic of  pursuing collective national goals, the authoritarian Park regime launched 
off  his vigorous economic development projects in the 1960s and 1970s.   Although it is benignly 
called “the developmental state” or “the state-led development,” the entire process, from the 
planning, financing, to actual implementation, attests to the nature of  a planned economy, not a free 
market economic system.    President Park, acting as the father figure who took the responsibility to 
feed the family, i.e. the nation as an extension of that ideology, made businessmen to dedicate their 
resources and talents to the country.   As an illustration, Korea’s representative chaebol, Samsung 
founder Lee Byung-chul, believed if a company “fails to train its people as a valuable part of human 
resources who are capable of serving the society and the nation, the company is neglecting its social 
duty, and this is equivalent to committing a crime equal to corporate insolvency.”260  Lee believed it 
is an entrepreneurs’ mission to devote themselves to creating an everlasting company that will serve 
as the foundation for the nation’s wealth and power.     
After his successful coup, Park Chung-hee laid out his revolutionary philosophy as follows:261 
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The society we aim to build following the revolution should be one in which all the people stand equal and 
responsible before the state [italics added for emphasis], enjoy freedom and lead a peaceful social life in 
cooperation with others in every field – political, economic and cultural.   Justice and freedom should therefore 
be the fundamental condition of the life of the people…Even in a democratic country the people must 
acknowledge the authority of the state.   Yet all the power of a democratic country is subject to public control.   
Benefit for the whole must come before the interest of any p articular group [italics added for emphasis].   A state will fall 
and its people be ruined, if the personal interests of any particular group surpass those of the state.   
In 1968, President Park proclaimed the Charter for National Education.   It starts with this 
mandate for the people: We have been born into this land, charged with the historic mission of 
regenerating the nation.   Based on this nationalistic and collectivist ideology, the Park Chung-hee 
regime mobilized the state apparatus against individual capital and labor to promote capital 
investment in specific industrial sectors that could satisfy economic development strategies designed 
by the Park administration.262 It used the state power not only to crack down on the grass-roots 
struggles of the working class, but also hindered union activities by founding the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions under the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), making it nothing but 
a pro-government organization.263  In addition, the regime put the capitalist class under the control 
of the state through nationalized banks and financial institutions by confiscating the privately held 
shares of domestic banks from individual capitals.264  Through a series of legislations, it also 
dominated the management of the commercial banks to prevent large private shareholders from 
exercising their voting rights in managerial boards.   The Korean state’s dedication to capitalist 
development and its control over labor and individual capital, and more importantly, its tangible 
economic achievements earned it the name of a developmental state.  
Despite neoliberal attacks and disparagement against the role of the developmental state, the 
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Korean state played greater and more positive functions and roles than assumed by neoliberals; its 
functions included coordinating for large-scale changes, the provision of entrepreneurial vision, 
institution building and conflict management, many of which cannot be easily accommodated within 
the narrow confines of mainstream economics.265 The downsides to this developmental state were 
also obvious.   The Korean state was at the center of the struggle and actively intervened in crises, 
suppressing labor and exercising its leadership against private capitals by its well-developed 
institutional channels and forces. 266  The specificity of Korean capitalism, including chaebols, the 
militant trade union and the government’s heavy involvement in economic development became more 
entrenched throughout this period.    
Interestingly, although Korea, Japan and China/Taiwan share the Confucian collectivist culture, 
including the centrality of the family in their societies, they have witnessed the emergence of different 
forms and characteristics of businesses.   John Gray267 distinguishes these three types of businesses: 
Chinese and Taiwanese companies are mostly small, family businesses.   They tend to rely on quanxi, 
or connection based on reciprocal obligations and long-term negotiation for their supplies and support.   
In this model, trust rarely extends beyond kin in weighty matters.   The Japanese businesses are 
characterized by a strong corporate culture that values loyalty and prefer life-long employment.   
Unlike Chinese and Taiwanese counterparts, both Japanese and Korean businesses tend to be large 
business groups.   The Japanese zaibatsu and the Korean chaebol respectively imply the unique nature 
of the formation, operation and culture of their businesses.   The Japanese zaibatsu are vast 
transnational corporations that are open to government guidance, but they exhibit a high degree of 
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autonomy in their strategies, whereas Korean chaebols are paternalistic institutions with founding 
families remaining in decision-making positions.268   
Indeed, one of the outstanding features of a capitalist market economy around the world is the 
prevalence of large business groups, or conglomerates.   The equivalent word for a conglomerate in 
Chinese character is 財閥, which Korea, China and Japan all share with differences only in the way 
this word is pronounced.   The literal translation of the word itself is “wealth clan” or “money faction.” 
However, in the Japanese family-owned conglomerates, “family” means those with whom you form 
close bonds rather than strictly referring to blood relations.   The zaibatsu disbanded after World War 
II, and their successors today are loose federations of companies, rather than centralized 
conglomerates like the Korean chaebols. 269  Lee Han-gu 270  in his analysis of the history of the 
development of Korean chaebols, identifies the three fundamental qualifications for a conglomerate to 
be called a chaebol: it should be (1) family-owned, (2) have businesses in at least two disparate areas or 
diversification of businesses and (3) cross-ownership of its subsidiaries. Therefore, “[i]t is very difficult 
to find similar counterparts abroad to South Korea’s chaebols today.”271  In actual practice, loans are 
made between these subsidiaries to protect ownership and maintain control by the ruling family.  
Although the influence of Korean chaebols is palpable around the world, they are deeply rooted in 
this operational principle of familist collectivism.  In fact, a chaebol in Korea is more than a capitalist 
company; they function like clan-based dynasties.  In some sense, they can be said to be a modern 
form of lineage-based kinship system.  Traditionally, lineages are based on blood kinships. However, 
in the modern version of lineages, they are based not only on blood kindship but also on the extensive 
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networks of personal connections through marriages, schools and regional bases.  As John Gray 
observes, in the Korean chaebol model, cooperation, often aiming at monopolistic or oligopolistic 
domination of markets, extends far beyond families.  In actual operation, each business group, because 
of the complexity of modern technological development, “created departments that specialized in 
areas that could help the core team–the founder and his family.”272  Key managerial posts within a 
chaebol are almost always given to the relatives of the chairman, the patriarch.  Chaebols now exert 
enormous power in Korean politics and society with their accumulated wealth and protection from 
the politicians through connections in the form of marriages, schools and regional ties.  These are part 
of the familist collectivism in operation.  Therefore, “conventions often regarded as antithetical to 
capitalism [are] among the more significant features of Korea’s political economy.”273 
The familist collectivism was also deeply implanted in the consciousness of Korean people’s minds 
and social practices and institutions. Kim Seung-kyung, in her analysis of how female workers 
accommodated and resisted the forces of global capitalism and patriarchy, shows that female factory 
workers defined themselves “in terms of their roles in families” and regarded themselves “as little 
more than temporary workers,” and thus, “willing to provide the low-paid, unskilled labor needed 
for light industry. Furthermore, their focus on family diverts their attention from labor issues and 
makes them more difficult to organize.”274 T hese female workers sacrificed their lives mostly for the 
sake of their entire family.  Typically, the eldest son is educated at the expense of other siblings, 
mostly sisters. The sons also bear the burden of building the family up with their education and 
social success.  
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Two of the most dominant sources of corruption for Korean elites involve bribery and illegality 
in favor of their children. These are also connected to the practice of familist collectivism. Parents are 
willing to engage in illegal activities if their children could be exempt from mandatory military 
service, giving birth in American to secure American citizenship, and to send their children to 
prestigious and competitive schools, etc. In a recent incident in early 2015, the vice president of  the 
Korean Airline, the national flagship airliner, caused a national uproar after she ordered the already 
moving airplane to turn back because she was not satisfied by the way a complimentary nut package 
was served to her. Her father, the chairman of  the Korean Air, had to appear at a nationally aired 
press conference to make a public apology. The main point of  his apology was “I am sorry because 
I did a poor job of  raising my own child. It is my fault, so please show mercy to my daughter 
[translated].” As I elaborate more in chapters four and five, the presidents are not exempt from this 
social ill related to familist collectivism. In fact, all the supposedly democratic presidents since 1987, not 
to mention their authoritarian counterparts, fell to disgraceful endings because of  corruption 
scandals involving their own children and family members.  
American values, such as personal liberty and equality, and beliefs, such as individualism and 
Judeo-Christian ethics, formed the political culture of  the United States.   These values and beliefs 
have been institutionalized and sustained through education, forming the bedrock of  American 
political culture.   The constitution was written in this spirit and the political system was created to 
protect these values and beliefs.   Political socialization is the process by which these beliefs and 
values are transmitted to immigrants and young generations.    
Although these American values and beliefs were introduced to Korea through legalization and 
institutional contacts, these values and beliefs were not practiced in two of  the most important 
sources of  political socialization: the family and the educational system.   In Korean families, 
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individual liberty is not only untaught but, more importantly, it is discouraged.   In addition to the 
sacrifice of  parents in the hope of  being cared for by their children in their old age, children were 
also expected to live for the betterment of  the family.   During the period of  1948-2009, many 
young adults in Korea did not have individual liberty to choose their mates and careers.   Parents 
would threaten the sons or daughters to choose between severing the family ties and the preferred 
life partners.  275 In the education system, the American values of  liberal individualism are taught but 
not in a way they can be internalized.   An analogy to the situation is the English language.   Indeed, 
English is most effectively learned in an environment where the language is taught in English and 
not in the vernacular Korean.   The rigid, militaristic, hierarchical and uniformed education in 
Korean schools from elementary throughout high school produces students who have formal and 
abstract knowledge in their head but do not know how to practice the knowledge in real life. The 
mandatory military service for all adult men in Korea further prevents liberal values, such as liberty 
and equality, from being fully internalized.  
In sum, the social characteristics of  Korean society in the period of  1948-2009 not only resisted 
the formation of  the Western-type of  capitalism, but they modified individual-freedom-based 
capitalism in favor of  a uniquely Korean type of  capitalism.  
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3.2. Korea’s External Relations and Dependent Capitalism 
At the turn of the 20th century, Korea became the focus of imperialist expansionism by major 
superpowers including China, Japan, Russia and Western countries like the United States. Unable to 
defend itself against domestic unrest and foreign influences, the Confucian Joseon dynasty finally 
collapsed, followed by the Japanese colonial rule and its attendant exploitation for almost forty years. 
With liberation in 1945, the three-year American military rule came as a by-product of international 
power politics, as well as the uncertain and arduous nation-building process that included a three-
year long civil war. The impact of Japan and the United States on the Koreans is immense. The 
legacies of Japanese colonial rule literally changed the course of development for the Koreans. 
Furthermore, American intervention in Korean affairs in the post-liberation era literally divided the 
unified nation into North and South Koreas.  
As I explained in chapter two, Japan introduced some of the most crucial elements of capitalism 
into Korea during its colonial period.  With the legalization of private property rights, the 
traditionally dominant class system was officially demolished as well.  Also, Korean enterprises could 
develop entrepreneurial capabilities and adaptability, business skills and management leadership.276 
However, Japan’s main colonial interests were economic exploitation for the Japanese and the 
mobilization of resources and people for its war ambitions.  Therefore, its colonial policies were 
mainly geared toward making Korea a cost-efficient production base for food supply as well as a 
strategic provision center for military supply.  In the following analysis, I show how the form of 
capitalism Japan-introduced was distorted, which left a legacy that prevented a full entrenchment of 
capitalism even in post-liberation Korea.  
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The national liberation from Japanese colonialism and the territorial division along the 38th 
parallel in 1945 were as unexpected, arbitrary and foreboding as was the bloody fratricidal civil war 
that ravaged the entire country from 1950 to 1953.  The United States was the main author of this 
co-authorship that rewrote Korea’s modern history.  The arbitrary decision to split the nation by 
consulting the map was a farce for outsiders, but the consequences were a tragedy for the very 
people who had to live with that reality in the days to come.  The decision, originated and cemented 
by the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, was also path-dependent. 
The two Koreas are indeed of the same origin, sharing for thousands of years the uniquely mono-
ethnic and Confucian cultural background.  However, nothing can be more illustrative of the 
American influence in Korea than the stark contrast between the capitalist, democratic and 
internationalized South Korea and the socialist, totalitarian and isolated North Korea.277  The 
decision set in motion a downward spiral into deep confusion and confrontations in the liberated 
Korea.  In the following analysis, I argue that the United States compromised its championed 
democratic values in favor of political stability during the Rhee Syng-man regime and in favor of 
economic development during the Park Chung-hee’s rule.  In turn, this compromise reinforced the 
authoritarian rule that provided the political means to alter the Western type of capitalism in Korea. 
This alteration eventually prevented freedom-based capitalism from being fully entrenched in 
Korean society.  
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3.2.1. Korea-Japan bilateral relations and altered capitalism  
One of the first things the Japanese colonial government did was to survey the colonized Korean 
peninsula.  It implemented a decade-long Land Survey Project in 1910.  Indigenous farmers were 
required to register to secure their private land ownership.  However, legal property ownership was 
an alien concept to most Koreans.   Therefore, many illiterate farmers failed to report ownership of 
their land as required.  This unreported land was confiscated together with land belonging to the 
loyal family and land whose ownership was not well established.278  Worse yet, the Oriental 
Development Company, the main agent of the land management on behalf of the Colonial 
government, made a fortune by granting loans to Korean landowners and petty farmers who used 
their land as collateral.  Land was loaned to tenant farmers at rates exceeding fifty percent, while 
grains were loaned to petty farmers at twenty percent interest or higher.279 By the time the Land 
Survey Project was over, one-third of all arable land in Korea ended up in the hands of the Japanese 
enterprises.280  Japanese private ownership of the land skyrocketed as some of the land was sold to 
Japanese individuals.  As a result, the number of Japanese land managers rose ten-fold, Japanese land 
investments rose more than five-fold and Japanese-owned land rose approximately four-fold281. 
When severe rice shortages in mainland Japan sparked riots in the early 1920s, Japan implemented 
another agricultural policy, the Campaign to Increase Rice Production. The policy aimed to 
appropriate rice through the Oriental Development Company. This also served the interests of 
Japanese capital and Japanese landowners while Korean peasants were hit again with overwhelming 
irrigation project expenses.282  Ultimately, the small and medium-scale land owners and petty farmers 
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who had managed to keep their land were reduced to tenant farming because they could not afford to 
pay the heavy irrigation union dues. The Food Shortage of 1939 that swept Korea made matters even 
worse.  Unprecedented harvest failures cut yields by 46 percent from the previous year.283  The Food 
Shortage was a disaster waiting to happen.284  Because of Japan’s colonial agricultural policy of using 
Korean farmlands to supply rice to mainland Japan, Korean farmers were not allowed to produce any 
other grain that could make up for the poor rice harvest.  
The Japanese colonial government also brought in commercial and industrial capital to develop 
mining, forestry and fishing resources in colonized Korea; however, Japan took a vast amount of  
resources back to their homeland after their defeat in 1945.  After liberation, virtually no production 
of  commodities was possible as a result of  Japan’s strategy that used all factories and industries in 
Korea as production bases for war supplies.285 As previously outlined, when the Sino-Japanese War 
broke out in the latter half  of  1930, Japan mobilized the entire Korean nation, channeling all 
production for war supplies. As a result, the southern part of  the peninsula was left without 
infrastructure or resources after liberation for any substantive capitalist development.  
The Japanese policies to support large companies, known as zaibatsu also severely deformed the 
American type of capitalism in Korea.  Japan is not exceptional in that the state supports some target 
industries, nurturing big companies. The United States and Germany also adopted policies that 
supported fledgling companies in target industries, protected their interests and secured markets for 
them for their national interests.286  However, the state-business relations and practices during the 
Japanese colonial era left an indelible impact on the future state-business relations in Korea. The 
Japanese government used such means as subsidies, tax benefits and subsidized bank loans to support 
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industries and enterprises considered to be of strategic interest to Japan, such as chemical and heavy 
industries, mines, and rice production.287 With such all-out support, these zaibatsu emerged as virtual 
partners of the government.  This not only set the prototype of Korea’s future state-business collusion 
but institutionalized such collusive ties.288 This practice was also followed by the American military 
government who had to resort to the Japanese collaborators for the execution of administrative affairs 
in the aftermath of the liberation, and continued well into the authoritarian era. Especially, the Rhee 
Syng-man regime not only failed to purge Japanese collaborators properly but worked closely with 
them through employment at government or political alliance. This sowed the seed for highly 
contentious politics in the future.   
In sum, as I argued in chapter two, during this period, the capitalist development set a paradigm 
for the state-business relations in Korea characterized by: (1) the limited scope of capitalist social 
relations in the country, (2) the state’s coercive role in support of business and in channeling of capital 
to target industries, and (3) the dominant influence of big companies, later called chaebol in Korean.289 
Japanese colonial rule broke down the traditional social class structure in which the yangban class 
monopolized bureaucratic careers and social status and privileges. However, colonial rule in itself  
entailed the subjugation of  the Korean people “as the second-rate subjects of  the Japanese emperor,” 
with neither suffrage nor any meaningful political participation.290 Also, it was the Japanese who 
formed the middle and upper classes in colonized Korea, whereas the majority of  Koreans constituted 
the lowest class. After the Manchurian incident of  1931, the colonial government enhanced its 
attempts to Japanize the Koreans through various measures of  political assimilation and indoctrination 
that stressed the importance of  loyalty, self-sacrifice and dedication to the Japanese emperor.  These 
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measures included changing Korean names into Japanese and banning the use of  the Korean language 
in schools, etc. Consequently, the colonial government “did little to inculcate Western liberal values or 
liberty, equality, and justice based on law” through its exploitative colonial rule for four decades. 291   
Japan introduced a German-originated legal system with new laws and regulations devised to 
change radically the traditional Korean society and to establish capitalistic institutions for exploitative 
purposes. However, as Yoo Moon Jee argues, Japanese colonial government reconsolidated traditional 
patrimonial power into a new arrangement “rather than bringing about any fundamental change from 
patrimonial to other forms of  political organization.” 292  In this governmental organization, the 
governor-general was “virtually an absolute monarch” with enormous power in his hands, ruling 
Korea as “a government of  men” in which the ruler was the source of  all moral and political 
authority.293 This tradition of  a government of  men who rule over law became path-dependent for 
the succeeding presidential regimes even in post-liberation Korea. All the authoritarian presidents in 
post-liberation era resorted to governing by the rule of  men, subordinating the individuals and even 
businesses to the prerogatives of  the state at the expense of  democratic principles and capitalist norms. 
In sum, the characteristics of  Korean capitalism can trace their roots to colonial Japan: state-led and 
coercion-based economic development, institutionalized business-state collusion practices and the 
dominance of  chaebols in the economy. 
 
3.2.2. Korea-U.S. bilateral relationship and capitalist alteration  
In the 20th century, the U.S. foreign policy was concerned with advancing its two main national 
agendas: implanting democratic political ideals and capitalist market economies throughout the 
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world.  Especially during the Cold War era, the United States considered “capturing the loyalties of 
the vast regions of the globe emerging from colonialism as crucial to the struggle against 
Communism.”294  The American government’s growing trend toward giving priority to Cold War 
considerations led to an “emphasis on political conservatism, social order and military force in 
being.”295  As a result, “the common fallacy that freedoms must be sacrificed to safeguard a free 
society from the threat of an external tyranny found ample expression in U.S. policy in Korea.”296  In 
fact, the national division along the 38th parallel and its associated security dilemma with North 
Korea afterward served more often than not as an instrument with which the authoritarian Korean 
regimes used to strengthen their power over the civil and political rights of the people. In other 
words, the American government’s main concern about political stability and economic 
development in a divided South Korea provided a rationale for the Rhee Syng-man and Park Chung-
hee regimes to pursue their political agenda at the expense of democratic values and main tenets of 
the Western type of liberal market economy.  
 
3.2.2.1. Rhee Syng-man’s nation building backed by the United States  
The period of American military rule, the official establishment of the Republic of Korea, and the 
Korean War was understandably marked by uncertainty and chaos. The situation was complicated 
by several crucial factors: the lack of a clearly formulated American blueprint for governing the 
liberated Korea, the intensification of ideological confrontation between the left and right in the 
critical moments of nation-building regarding the state format of the liberated Korea, and a poverty-
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stricken population in a destitute economic situation.  In 1949, even after the exodus of 900,000 
Japanese, the South Korean population reached more than twenty million, twice that of North 
Korea.  About a million North Korean capitalists, land owners and merchants fled to South Korea 
in the wake of the forced land reform in North Korea in 1946.  Also, approximately 2.2 million 
Koreans living overseas returned to their country. This aggravated the already-difficult post-
liberation situation.  At this historical juncture, the influence of the United States in determining the 
political and economic future of Korea was the most critical and path-dependent.  
The United States created political turmoil in Korea by its arbitrary division of the Korean 
peninsula and its decision to rule by its military government for three years.  By the time Korea was 
liberated from the grip of  Japan, the dominant political and ideological orientation throughout the 
peninsula was leftist.  Understandably, the leftist forces had the upper hand over the rightist forces. 
In a survey conducted by the American military government in August 1946, fourteen percent of  
the respondents agreed with capitalism, seventy percent with socialism, seven percent with 
communism and eight percent were not sure.297 Communists in the South had an ideology, networks 
of  organization, well-developed propaganda and the control of  labor unions; they dominated both 
farmers’ organizations and student and intellectual groups.298 “No group rivaled the Communists in 
discipline and hierarchy.”299  However, the American military government’s decision not to recognize 
any government created by Koreans as the official Korean government pitted the rightist forces 
against the leftist forces.300  Because the most important agenda for the United States was to prevent 
                                                          
297 Yang dong-ahn. “Rhee Syng-man’s anti-communism and Korea’s liberal democracy” (retrived: 
http://bbs1.agora.media.daum.net/gaia/do/debate/read?bbsId=D101&articleId=3986592) 
298 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2007. Print.  
299 Ibid.  
300 KBS documentary. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xbEQllSud8 
 
113 
 
any communist or socialist force to take power in Korea, the cooperation between the American 
military government and the rightist forces was a natural outcome.301  
The Harry S. Truman administration’s decision to abandon an international trusteeship for the 
Korean people in late 1947 led the United States to submit the Korean matter to the United 
Nations. Thus, the United States found an avenue for the withdrawal of its occupation troops from 
the Korean peninsula.302 From June 1946, Rhee urged separate elections for establishing a 
provisional government in southern Korea alone, arguing it would be the most realistic and desirable 
device to secure South Korea’s independence and democracy.303 On February 26, 1948, the UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution recognizing Korea’s urgent and rightful claims to 
independence and called for nation-wide general elections for a national assembly.  In response, a nation-
wide conference was held in Pyongyang from April 18 to 30, 1948.  A total of  396 participants 
representing forty-one political parties and various social organizations from the South attended the 
conference.304  The conclusion of  the conference was to push for the establishment of  a unified Korean 
government and the withdrawal of  the U.S. and the Soviet Union forces from the peninsula.   
However, because the Soviets in the North did not allow the entrance of  the UN commission, 
general elections were held in the South alone on May 10, 1048.  The leftist forces both in the South 
and the North vehemently opposed the UN-supervised elections and demanded a unified Korean 
government.  Before, during and after the establishment of  the South Korean government, major 
political figures representing the leftist ideology and those who called for a unified government were 
either assassinated or fled to North Korea.  In one notorious incident known as the April 3 uprising 
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of  1948 staged by labor party leaders including the communist Workers Party, tens of  thousands of  
Jeju people were killed by South Korean officials and right wings, and about 30,000 houses were 
destroyed.305 After the massacre, the South Korean government covered up the Jeju Uprising and 
Massacre, outlawing the Workers Party of South Korea and intimidating any who dared to mention 
the Jeju Massacre with beatings, torture and prison sentences.306  
Therefore, the first general elections were only competition for the rightist forces, excluding 
most leftist forces. On May 31, 1948, the National Assembly held its first session, electing Rhee 
Syng-man as chairman by a vote of  189 to 8. A constitution was drawn up in a mere forty-two days 
under circumstances of  minimal reflection, authorizing the powers of  presidential and cabinet 
systems.  On July 30, 1948, the seventy-three year-old Rhee was elected president by a vote of  180. 
Thus, the Republic of  Korea was officially established on August 15, 1948 with the constitutional 
stipulation of  liberal democracy and a capitalist market economy.  In September 1948 the 
Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea was founded. During this formative period, the two Koreas 
took separate paths; their difference only grew in the days to come.  
There was an obvious conflict of  interest between the American military government and the 
Koreans.  Because the United States’ main interest was to prevent Korea from becoming 
communist, the American military government failed to implement a policy to properly address the 
Japanese legacy, including pro-Japanese collaborators.  Instead, the military government turned to 
them for post-liberation administrative purposes. For instance, as much as eighty percent of the 
police manpower was filled with those who worked under the Japanese colonial government.307 This 
worsened the situation when these policemen were mobilized under the rightist Rhee regime to 
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crack down on any opposition forces against the regime. American policymakers were also reluctant 
to authorize decisive action in key areas where conditions demanded bold initiatives such as land-
reform.308 This “failure to comprehensively address so glaring an inequity as a tenancy rate perhaps 
as high as eighty percent made credible to Koreans the assumption that the U.S. position in fact 
supported the rights of the landlord class.”309 Only through the land reform in 1950 did rural 
farmers turn conservative and become staunch supporters for Rhee. This neglect gave immunity to 
those who accumulated wealth under the Japanese colonial government. These colonial rule-favored 
businessmen were able to move ahead in the post-liberation era, emerging as chaebol in later years. 
This period also saw the seed of a black market economy as the military government was taken 
advantage of by those Koreans who had access to U.S.-provided materials and resources. This 
opened a door for future state-business collusive ties. American foreign aid functioned as “a crucial 
resource for the corrupt state elite.”310 
The inability of U.S. occupation personnel to communicate in Korean, or even in Japanese, led 
to the oft-remarked creation of “a government by interpreters,” driving a further wedge between the 
Korean people as a whole and their American governors.311 The “government by interpreters” refers 
to the reliance of English-speaking Korean interpreters to whom the military government officials 
frequently asked opinions about policymaking.  As a result, many America-educated Korean 
intellectuals had unique opportunities to gain access to political and economic power sources as 
interpreters for the American military government.  Also, many of the Korean converts to 
Protestant Christianity educated through mission schools or in the United States dominated Korean 
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politics. For instance, six out of nine vice-presidential candidates were Protestant Christians when 
Protestant Christians accounted for less than one percent of the Korean population.  During the 
American military rule, thirty-seven (seventy percent) out of 50 high-ranking Korean officials in the 
American military government were held by Protestant Christians.312 The American military 
government also provided to the Korean Presbyterian Church a total of ninety-one properties 
belonging to the American military government, including buildings and schools left by the 
Japanese. This supply of properties to Korean churches helped the rapid growth of Korean 
Christianity as well. All these developments cemented the ideological orientation of the pro-
American, anti-communist, conservative forces in post-liberation Korean society. 
The outbreak of  the Korean War made the Korean economy more dependent on American 
grant aid. According to the Nathan Report,313 almost half  of  the industrial, power generating and 
mining facilities were destroyed during the three-year war, totaling approximately US $1.8 billion in 
damages including damage done to public facilities, ships, vehicles and houses. This amount is 
equivalent to Korea's gross national product (GNP) in 1949. The U.S.-backed Rhee regime was 
sustained mainly by U.S. aid to the point where the economy of  the 1950s was called an aid 
economy. Rhee’s Liberal Party was financed by illicit means; in the process of  distributing U.S. aid 
dollars and the provision of  access to import licensing and foreign exchange, it accumulated much 
“illicit” wealth.314  
A typical form of  U.S. grant aid after 1953 was the proceeds of  American surplus agricultural 
commodities sold to the South Korean market. As we saw in the previous chapter, the United States, 
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deposited the proceeds from selling farm surpluses into the Counterpart Fund for the Korean 
government to use, which was a typical form of  U.S. military-economic aid. The aid money was 
managed and allocated by the United States Operations Mission (USOM). The massive inflow of 
American assistance before and during the Korean War was essential to the survival of South Korea 
as an independent country.  At the same time, American advisors were present throughout the South 
Korean military, and over five hundred officials at the USOM oversaw and shaped South Korea’s 
major social and economic policies.315  Because the United States shouldered much of the financial 
burden for Korea’s national security against North Korean communist threats, President Rhee was 
able to focus on maximizing his political power. The United States “did little more than keep the 
economy afloat” because its focus was predominantly on maintaining very substantial Korean military 
forces during this period.  In fact, McGeorge Bundy recognized that “the risk of the ROK being 
attacked again is far less than that of its being subverted because of internal weakness.”316 This anti-
communist ideology and the American influence in Korean affairs dominated throughout the 
authoritarian era until 1987, and the effect has not waned even in the post-democratic consolidation.  
As I show in chapter four, preserving national security against North Korean communist threat served 
as a convenient excuse for all oppressive measures of  authoritarian regimes. Throughout his tenure, 
Rhee also resorted to illegitimate means to oppress his opponents under the pretense of  national security.   
As a result, the Rhee Syng-man regime was undoubtedly an authoritarian government with the 
monopoly of  political and economic resources.  His authoritarian rule was reinforced by the Korean 
War, the American economic aid and the constitutional change in 1958 that made him president for 
life.  The Rhee’s regime left a political legacy that lasted throughout the authoritarian era: the 
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centralization of  power at the presidency, elitist and conservative patrimonial state bureaucracy, and 
legitimization of  using state coercive power to oppress political and ideological opposition under the 
pretext of  national security.  The United States, according to its Cold War foreign policy platform, 
endorsed all these political developments explicitly or implicitly.  The monopolization of  political 
and economic power in the hands of  the strong president paved the foundation for the subsequent 
state-led development, associated with widespread state-business collusive practices and the 
dominance of  chaebol in the Korean economy during the Park Chung-hee era. 
 
3.2.2.2. The Park Chung-hee Regime and State-led Industrialization   
On May 16, 1961, Park Chung Hee led a swift and bloodless military coup to topple the 
incapacitated parliamentary government.  Park justified his coup by criticizing the Chang Myon 
government’s pervasive corruption, its inability to defend the nation from communist threats and 
the absence of  a viable plan for a social and economic development.317 Therefore, his political 
survival entirely hinged on growing the failed economy.  Disappointed with the Rhee Syng-man 
regime’s inability to make a viable economy coupled with the short-lived Chang Myon government’s 
failed democratic governance, Washington was also ready to recognize “the need for a strong 
government that could make the difficult decisions required for economic reform without excessive 
interference from the civilian population.”318 In November 1961, the Kennedy administration invited 
Park Chung Hee to the White House, which officially endorsed Park Chung-hee junta’s coup, after 
which, the United States often “encouraged the South Korean state to strengthen itself  at the 
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expense of  civil society.”319 This meant the very foundation of  a Western type of  capitalism would 
not take root in Korea during the Park Chung-hee era.  
However, in the 1960s, the United States was able to intervene in Korea’s macroeconomic affairs 
in return for its economic assistance, if and when there was a glaring deviation from capitalism. 
When the military junta realized it would be difficult to obtain financial aid from the United States 
for economic development,320the Park Chung-hee junta tried to implement a clandestine currency 
reform policy to raise its own capital in 1962. Park Chung-hee wanted to divert illegally accumulated 
capital into long-term savings and use it for investment while simultaneously preventing inflation. 
Through the currency reform measure, the military government hoped that hidden capital would 
pour out to be converted to new currency.  
However, the USOM director, James Killen, expressed his objection to the currency reform: “The 
way in which South Korea is carrying out the currency reform is close to nationalization and a 
command economy. The United States is deeply concerned about the currency reform that is 
headed toward state capitalism. We clearly oppose the currency reform of your country.”321 Later, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Edward Rice, who had ordered the halt on the aid supplies, called 
Ambassador Chung Il-kwon again. “If the second phase of the currency reform is not scrapped 
completely, the United States will cut off aid completely.” That was a de facto ultimatum. By using the 
carrot and stick strategy, the United States offered an alternative: “If the Korean government 
unfreezes the deposits, we will provide $40 million in funds to build the Industrial Development 
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Corporation.”322 After this, the Korean government showed its full compliance to the wishes of the 
United States and consulted with the United States on all matters related to the economy. 323 
By the late 1960s, the Park regime moved toward greater authoritarianism. Security threats from 
North Korea intensified when a group of  North Korean agents infiltrated near the Blue House to 
assassinate President Park in January 1968. In January 1969, President Nixon declared that the 
United States would assist in the defense and developments of allies and friends, “but would not 
undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world” (the Nixon Doctrine); this alarmed the 
Park Regime. This doctrine meant each ally should bear the burden of its own security. 
Consequently, the United State government ordered the withdrawal of approximately 20,000 troops 
from South Korea.   
As the influence of the United States waned in the 1970s and the economic spurt was intensified 
under the Park regime, South Korea moved toward greater authoritarianism. The adoption of the 
Yushin constitution gave President Park sweeping powers to rule the country by emergency decrees 
and the nation’s fate was at his discretion. The process leading up to the adoption is illustrative of 
how the United States compromised its proclaimed democratic values, the basic foundation for 
freedom-based free and competitive market based capitalism.  
On October 17, 1972, the Park Chung-hee regime declared martial law. Only on the evening of 
the day before the announcement, did the Korean government, through Prime Minister Kim Jong-
phil, inform the American Embassy in Seoul of the regime’s plan to declare a national martial law 
and to introduce the Yushin (restoration) system. In their meeting, Prime Minister Kim told the then 
Ambassador Philip C. Habib that “effective 1900 hours October 17 the following actions would be 
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taken: (a) The National Assembly will be dissolved, (b) All political activities will be suspended, (c) 
Martial law will be declared throughout the land.”324 Ambassador Phillip C. Habib notified the State 
Department of the United States of this decision around 10:49 pm on the night of October 16. He 
made it clear to the State Department that the declaration of martial law was unnecessary, given 
both domestic and external circumstances.  His opinion was accepted by the U.S. state department, 
and the official position of the United States was “[w]e are obviously not associated with the 
occasion.”325 The U.S. government only negotiated with the Korean government to change some of 
the contents in the Presidential Proclamation regarding the American policy. However, it did not 
take any measures to address the martial law, the dissolution of the National Assembly and the 
adoption of the new constitution, although the U.S. government was well aware of its illegality as 
well as its potential danger of violating the political and civil rights of the Korean people.  
Consequently, the authoritarian rule under the Yushin System clocked back much of what the 
Korean democracy had achieved until that time, while the civil and political rights of the Korean 
people were severely violated, not to mention the distortion of liberal capitalist economic system. 
The Yushin system allowed the Park regime to push for state-led heavy and chemical industrialization 
by controlling labor and favoring chaebols. In particular, the state provided various financial 
incentives for individual capitalists, including direct funding, allocation of  foreign loans, low interest 
rates and tax-cuts. Although chaebols benefitted from such skewed industrialization policies, labor was 
greatly discriminated.  
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As rapid industrialization progressed, the proportion of wage and salary workers in the 
workplace increased from 31.5 percent in 1963 to 54.2 percent in 1985.326 The industrial workforce 
alone rose from ten to twenty-three percent in 1983.327 This increased workforce began to build a 
new labor movement in the early 1970s. When a series of labor protests broke out, the Park regime 
responded to them in a brutal and repressive manner, provoking sympathy from workers across the 
country and from radical students and anti-government forces including the Catholic Church. From 
the early 1970s, the state began to reveal its class characteristic by deploying more and more coercive 
means of controlling labor.328 However, as Chang Dae-op argues, political regulation of  labor and 
individual capitalists created an image that the state, despite its extreme class characteristics, was a 
protector of  the national interest, not a class apparatus.329 This “politicized regulation of labor was 
legitimized by anti-communist propaganda” that penetrated every aspect of life for Koreans.330  
President Park was influenced by his military background under the Japanese government; he 
inherited the Rhee regime’s patrimonial bureaucracy and strengthened his almost dictatorial power 
under the pretext of  national security and economic development. These factors severely distorted 
the entrenchment of  capitalism in Korean society. The bloody oppression of  the democratization 
movement and labor protests continued well into the 1980s under the Chun Doo-hwan regime. 
With the American endorsement of  the Chun regime, even after the demise of  Park Chung-hee, the 
authoritarian rule continued in Korean society, preventing the full entrenchment of  liberal capitalism 
in Korea.  
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Conclusion 
Although capitalism was implanted in a fertile soil for manifold harvest in the United States where 
liberal individualism is not only guaranteed but also institutionalized, Korean societal characteristics 
were alien to those concepts and practices in the formative years. This chapter identified some of the 
factors that contributed to alteration of the imported capitalism in Korea during the 20th century. 
Domestically, I introduced the concept of familist collectivism as the overarching operational principle 
and standard of conduct for most Koreans during the period of 1948 and 2009. Externally, I 
analyzed Korea’s bilateral relations with Japan and the United States to explain how they set the 
foundation for the alteration of capitalism. All these are contributory factors to Korea’s rapid 
industrialization and resultant economic growth, but they also prevented Korean capitalism from 
being fully entrenched as a culture in Korean society.  The data in this chapter are generally 
supportive of my hypotheses one and two.  In any case, I will come back to this point in the general 
conclusion of the study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STAGGERING FALL OF THE MIGHTY -  
PRESIDENCIES OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
When that day come, you will cry out for relief  from the king you have chosen331 
 
In the previous two chapters, I discussed Korea’s unique path of  a capitalist economic development 
(chapter 2), and the failure of  capitalist culture to be fully entrenched in Korean society (chapter 3) 
respectively. In chapter three, I contended that the Korean society of  1948-2009 operated 
fundamentally on the basis of  what I call familist collectivism as the operating principle and the standard 
of  conduct for most Koreans. This principle stood as squarely opposed to liberal individualism, the 
cornerstone of  American democracy, capitalism and society.  As a result, notwithstanding capitalist 
expansionism and its attendant social changes, the tenacious Korean culture, manifested in familist 
collectivism, was not entirely replaced by the Western type of  individual-freedom based capitalist 
culture. I also argued that Korea’s historically dependent relationships with Japan and the United States 
altered capitalism to the extent that it could not replace the non-capitalist Korean culture with 
individual freedom-based capitalist culture of  Western societies. Simply put, the combined effect of  
Korea’s dependent external relationships and internal cultural dynamics prevented Korean society 
from being fully capitalized as is the case in the United States.   
In this and the following chapter (four and five), I test my third hypothesis that Korean politics is 
characterized by overpoliticization, or tenuous liberal compromise in politics, because of  the intrinsic 
disunity between the capitalist economic system and the non-capitalist culture in Korean society. In 
so doing, I argue that the Korean culture of  familist collectivism combines with the Japanese- and 
American-influenced and coercion-dependent Korean presidency to produce overpoliticized 
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behaviors in politics. Its direct outcome is the patterned downfalls of  all South Korean Presidents 
between 1948 and 2009. 
Given the historic transition of  Korea into consolidated democracy in 1987, it is appropriate to 
distinguish the authoritarian era (1948-1987) from the democratic one (1988-2009). It is now an 
accepted fact that Korea had been under the authoritarian rule since the nation’s founding in 1948 and 
transitioned to democracy in 1987 as an outcome of  the democratization movement.  Therefore, this 
chapter focuses on how the overpoliticized behaviors in Korean politics led to the patterned downfalls 
of  authoritarian presidents: Rhee Syng-man, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Chapter five 
covers the presidencies of  Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun in the 
post-1987 democratic period. This division will allow for a clearer understanding of  the thesis of  this 
study. Because Korea represents the incongruence between non-Western society and Western capitalist 
society, it is characterized by overpoliticization regardless of  whether it is under electoral democratic 
regimes or authoritarian ones.   
I begin this chapter with a brief  explanation of  Sangmpam’s analytical framework of  
overpoliticization to lay the groundwork to discuss the study’s main thesis. I then analyze some of  the 
most salient cases that directly caused the personal demise of  the authoritarian presidents: the electoral 
fraud of  the Rhee Syng-man government in 1961 that led to the April 19 Student Revolution of  the 
same year, which pushed President Rhee to step down; the oppressive response to the popular protests 
known as the Bu-Ma (Busan – Masan) Protests by the Park Chung-hee government in 1979 that led 
to his assassination by his own security chief; and the December 12 military coup by Chun Doo-hwan 
and his illegal amassment of  slush funds during his term of  office that eventually sent him and his own 
family to jail in 1996. I conclude this chapter by summarizing overpoliticized politics and its determinants 
for this authoritarian presidencies.  
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The following diagram shows the gist of  the arguments to be made in this chapter and in chapter five. 
 
Diagram 4.1. The Mechanism of  Patterned Downfalls of  South Korean Presidents (1948-2009)
 
 
4.1. Sangmpam’s Analytical Framework of  Liberal Compromise vs. Overpoliticization: A Reprise  
Sangmpam, as already mentioned, differentiates Western liberal democracies from non-democratic 
societies. Regional variations notwithstanding, all Western countries are characterized by liberal 
compromise in politics. On the other hand, tenuous or lack of  liberal compromise, or 
overpoliticization, marks all non-Western countries. Political regimes in Western capitalist societies 
abide by the three cardinal democratic “rules of  the game,”332 whereas these rules are often not 
respected in non-Western countries. The first rule is that, when political competition takes place, 
capitalist core relations are not contested or modified through coercive means or state power. The 
second rule is that the competition over the claimable social product takes place through institutional 
means of  compromise. The final rule dictates that participants respect the compromise. These three 
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rules allow built-in concessions about liberal values, competition through institutional means of  
compromise and the resolution of  political conflicts within institutional arrangements. When observed, 
these rules lead to democratic stability. Most of  the time—if  not always—this democratic stability is the 
norm in most Western capitalist democratic societies.   
However, most of  the time—if  not always—these democratic rules are not respected in non-
Western countries, leading to overpoliticzation. Hence, overpoliticization is the norm, rather than the 
exception, in most non-Western societies. Overpoliticization is defined as “a pattern of  political 
features, institutional behaviors and settings, and state formats that denotes the absence of  
compromise or tenuous compromise in politics.”333 In this framework, politics is defined as a society-
rooted competition among individuals, groups or classes over the social product. It is “a competition 
over property, goods, services and values.”334 The competition has a corollary, the competition over 
political/state power. Politics in developing countries is characterized by overpoliticization because of  
two outstanding facts. First, most developing countries face a situation of  extreme scarcity of  
resources over which the competition takes place. Second, regardless of  today’s emphasis on the “civil 
society,” almost all developing countries depend more heavily on the state than in the West for 
determining the outcomes of  the competition over resources and value in favor of  the competing 
groups. Sangmpam subordinates these two facts to deeper causes in society, i.e., altered capitalism. 
This accounts for why there is usually a cutthroat struggle over control of  the state power. As a result, 
politics in developing countries becomes a zero-sum game, a Hobbesian and highly contentious affair.335 
More specifically, according to Sangmpam, politics in non-Western countries is played out in six 
basic ways: (1) the competition takes place through overt compulsion by state power holders who 
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organize political competition and participation, (2) political power is fluid, and constant insecurity 
characterizes state power holders in their relations to other social actors, (3) political competition and 
participation take place outside established institutions and procedures, (4) there is general use of  open 
violence and confrontation in the competition, often expressed in the form of  tribal, regional, religious 
or class conflicts, (5) in the absence of  a compromise over the outcome of  the competition, there is 
a higher intensity and lower resolution of  political crises and (6) these five features take the form of  
either a pure or semi-authoritarian/dictatorial regime or a democratic (“electoralist”) regime that 
maintains democratic trappings through elections, however regular, while sharing many of  these 
features with authoritarian regimes. As it will become clearer in the rest of  this chapter and also in 
chapter five, Korean politics from the national founding in 1948 to the suicide of  Roh Moo-hyun in 
2009 fits well in this categorical description. Especially, the period of  1948 to 1987, characterized by 
authoritarianism, betrays almost all aspects of  overpoliticized behaviors, the lack of  democratic 
compromise and, hence, of  democratic stability.   
Sangmpam defines eighty specific manifestations in three major types of  overpoliticized behaviors: 
electoralist, authoritarian and shared. 336  Electoralist behaviors comprise thirty-four specific 
manifestations under four sub-categories: electoral fraud, electoral monopoly, electoral coup and 
electoral violence. There are ten authoritarian behaviors: military rule, one-man rule, one-party rule, 
absent or curtailed democratic expressions, dictatorial or absolute power, removal of  legislative powers, 
physical/legal elimination of  opposition, preeminence of  the President, excessive centralization of  
territorial administration and electoral façade. Shared overpoliticized behaviors refer to those 
behaviors shared by both electoralist/democratic and authoritarian regimes. Shared behaviors are 
manifested in thirty-six ways under four sub-categories: illicit state coercion, state dictatorial powers, 
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illicit acts by opposition and violence by opposition. These include acts initiated by power holders and 
those by the opposition or the people at large.  Actions by the power holders include illicit use of  state 
coercion and dictatorial powers and various forms of  electoral fraud, electoral coup and electoral monopoly. 
Actions by the opposition include illicit, but not necessarily violent, acts and violent actions. Illicit opposition 
differs from violent opposition in that the latter can be taken by a legally sanctioned organization, such as 
political parties, whereas illicit opposition is illegal or sometimes forced by power holders. 
Sangmpam correlates overpoliticizaton to altered capitalism. In this chapter and the next, I attempt 
to establish this relationship between the overpoliticized behaviors of  South Korean Presidents and 
Korea’s traits of  altered capitalism.  
 
4.2. Rhee Syng-man’s Presidency: The National Founder Who Floundered  
Rhee Syng-man was born in Pyungsan in the province of  Hwanghae in today’s North Korea on March 
26, 1875. His parents were poor but devout Buddhists with an aristocratic background.  His early 
education was in the Chinese classics, but he later studied at Baejae Methodist School established by 
an American missionary. In his youth, he was actively involved in the Independence Club, founded by 
Philip Jaisohn in 1896, to spearhead a sociopolitical reform movement and prevent foreign 
intervention into Korean affairs. In 1899, he led a group of  8,000 men in a sit-down demonstration 
to protest against foreign dominance and to demand governmental and social reforms.337 He was 
arrested for his involvement in a plot to remove King Kojong from power, subjected to seven months 
of  brutal torture and sentenced to life imprisonment. While in prison, he wrote “The Spirit of  
Independence,” which became “the bible” of  the Korean independence movement. 338 After the 
                                                          
337 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation building, 34   
338 Ibid 
 
130 
 
outbreak of  the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, he was paroled after seven years of  imprisonment during 
which time he converted to Protestant Christianity. With the help of  his American friends, Rhee went 
to America to meet Secretary of  State John Hay and President Theodore Roosevelt to ask for 
American intervention to prevent the Japanese annexation of  Korea. His hope did not materialize. 
Instead, he stayed in America for six years to study at such prestigious universities as Harvard and 
Princeton. At Princeton, Rhee became personally associated with Woodrow Wilson, then president 
of  Princeton University and later the President of  the United States. Rhee was evaluated by Wilson as 
“a man of  strong patriotic feeling and of  great enthusiasm for his people.”339 Later, Rhee often cited 
Wilson’s thoughts on national self-determination.    
In 1919, Rhee became the first President of  the Korean provisional government located in Shanghai, 
China. However, he found it hard to work with the first cabinet members of  the provisional 
government because of  diverse political beliefs. The cabinet members came from Hawaii, the United 
States, mainland China, Manchuria, Korea and Russia. Those patriots living in exile in Manchuria, 
Russia and China had become communists, which was not congruent with the democratically 
informed Rhee’s political thoughts. In 1932, he visited Geneva to appeal to the League of  Nations for 
Korea’s independence, where he met his Austrian wife, Francesca Donner.  He also appealed to the 
United States that an independent Korea could serve as a bulwark against Communism in Asia. On 
October 16, 1945, two months after liberation, Rhee returned to Korea after more than four decades 
of  life overseas. Not only was he welcomed as a national hero by many Koreans for his public image 
of  a life-long dedication to national independence, but his popularity and prestige were so high that 
almost all political parties, both left and right, wished to have him as their leader. At first, Rhee himself  
did not object to communism in favor of  national unity. He appealed for the unity of  the Korean 
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people by saying “united we live, divided we die.” From the brief  biographical description, it is clear the first 
South Korean President was a national hero at the beginning, considering his life-long struggle for national 
independence and later his staunch position against the “communization” of  the Korean peninsula.   
Rhee was elected President by the National Assembly in 1948 at the age of  73 with the backing of  
the United States. He ruled for twelve years during the formative years of  nation building.  Shortly 
after he pushed the legislature to pass a constitutional amendment that exempted the incumbent 
President–himself–from the three-term limit, Rhee Syng-man won a third term in 1956. Legally 
unrestrained, the eighty- five year old Rhee could run for a fourth term and he announced his 
candidacy. The elections were originally scheduled to take place in May 1960, but Rhee suddenly 
changed the election dates to the middle of  March. The elections at the time were to elect the President 
and Vice President. However, the public was frustrated with the prolonged dictatorial rule and the 
widespread corruption in the Rhee government. The public hope for a change in the presidency faded 
when the Democratic Party opponent Cho Pyong-ok suddenly died of  heart failure in Washington D.C. 
Unopposed, Rhee was left as the only candidate, and he won easily with a voter turnout of  97 percent.   
The public focus then shifted to the vice-presidential contest between Rhee’s Liberal Party 
candidate Lee Ki-bung and the Democratic Party candidate Chang Myon. Lee Ki-bung, the political 
heir to President Rhee, gave his own son for adoption to Rhee Syng-man. Therefore, their relationship 
was strongly connected through political and personal ties. However, Lee Ki-bung was viewed as 
incompetent for the job. In fact, Lee had unsuccessfully run in the prior election four years earlier 
against the same opposition candidate. However, the election of  Lee was crucial for Rhee’s Liberal 
Party because of  Rhee’s old age.    
To assure Lee’s election to the vice presidency, there was a systematic and structural attempt to rig 
the election in his favor. The Rhee Syng-man administration and the Liberal Party mobilized 
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government employees and the police in particular to carry out the most blatant acts of  election fraud. 
There were many irregularities and police interference in the opposition Democratic rallies and in the 
election itself.340 According to the Korean Report341: 
Democratic rallies were prohibited throughout the nation.  Specific instructions were sent by the Home Ministry 
to police chiefs throughout the nation specifying the exact plurality by which Dr. Rhee and Mr.  Lee were to be 
elected.  Hundreds of  thousands of  pre-marked ballots accompanied these instructions, and these were dutifully 
stuffed into the ballot boxes on election day.  Hoodlums smashed up Democratic Party offices and beat up 
Democratic election workers and sympathizers.  In the country areas, voters were compelled by the police to go 
to the ballots in groups of  three, one of  whom was an arm-banded "Supervisor" whose duty was to check 
supposedly secret ballots before they were cast. 
As a result, the elections were heavily rigged in Lee’s favor. The administration resorted to all sorts 
of  devices to force the voters to vote for the Liberal Party’s weakling candidate: requiring open 
marking of  ballots by voters in groups of  three and four, stuffing of  ballot boxes, ballot switching, 
obstruction of  opposition party election campaigning and use of  violent means. Marshall Green’s eye 
witness account indicates:  
I was, by the way, chargé d’affaires at the time when the elections were held.  There was a United Nations 
Commission for Korea, UNCRK, that was supposed to supervise the elections, but they didn’t have enough 
people. They couldn’t get around. The elections were obviously rigged, and the results were clear in that regard, 
because Rhee seemed to have won just about all the votes in the country, and we knew perfectly well there was 
overwhelming opposition to him in the cities, but not in the rural areas. In those days, the great majority lived 
in the rural areas.342 
The irregularities and interference committed by the police in the city of  Masan, Kyungsangbuk-
do Province, angered its citizens. On election day, they waged demonstrations.343 Police suppressed 
the demonstrators by firing upon the citizens, causing deaths and injuries.  Then, on April 11, a 
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fisherman in Masan Harbor picked up the mutilated body of  a high school boy with part of  a police 
teargas grenade driven into his skull. The Rhee regime tried to censor the news of  the incident. But 
when the news leaked out with the picture of  the body, it triggered a nation-wide movement against 
electoral corruption. Students, particularly college and university students, the carriers of  
modernization in a repressive traditional oligarchical society of  Korea, became the center of  these 
demonstrations. College and university professors also joined in the march. In Seoul, more than one 
hundred people died. This oppressive response and illegality of  the Rhee government led to the April 
Revolution, causing the annulment of  the election, the resignation and exile of  Rhee, and the eventual 
collapse of  the First Republic.   
On April 19, 1960, students at Korea University called for new elections in a protest. A violent 
suppression led to a demonstration before the Blue House by thousands of  students.  By April 25, the 
protests had grown even larger as professors and other citizens began to join the students, nearly 
throwing the country into complete anarchy. At last, with no support from either the United States or 
the South Korean military, Rhee had no choice but to resign. Rhee stepped down on April 26 on the 
counsel of  the American ambassador to Korea344 and was flown out of  South Korea with the help of  
the CIA.  He died while exiled in Honolulu in 1965.345 Two days after Rhee’s fall on April 28, 1960, 
the vice presidential candidate, Lee Ki-bung was shot to death, together with his family, by his own 
biological son,346 Lee Kang-suk, whom Rhee adopted as his son on the day of  his 83rd birthday. 
One of  President Rhee’s greatest contributions to the development of  Korea was the establishment 
of  a universal education system. Since the early 1910s, Rhee emphasized the importance of  education, 
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believing that a lack of  education was one of  the main causes for the loss of  Korean sovereignty. 
During the 1950s, when almost half  of  the government budget was spent for national defense, 
President Rhee set aside approximately 20 percent for education.  Within ten years of  implementing 
a compulsory education policy, college students increased from 8,000 to 100,000. The illiteracy rate 
for those above thirteen years of  age decreased from 80 percent in 1945 to 15-20 percent in 1959. 
Ironically, it is the educated who protested against his overpoliticized behaviors, causing his regime to 
be toppled, ending his political career and leading to his personal demise. He died in Hawaii with only 
his wife present. 
 
4.3. Park Chung-hee: The Economic Savior Who Salvaged Democracy  
Park Chung-hee was born in a tiny farming village in Gumi, Kyungsangbuk-do Province (South Korea) 
on November 14, 1917.  He was the youngest of  five boys and two girls of  an impoverished family. 
Throughout his childhood, he was shorter and slighter than most kids his age.  He was quiet and self-
possessed, but excelled in studies. After teaching at an elementary school for about two years, he went 
to the military academy in Manchukuo, the puppet state imperial Japan had set up in Northeast China 
(Manchuria) in the 1930s. At the time, “training at a military academy was, for some ambitious young 
Koreans, a sure path to success.”347 He continued to receive military training at the Japanese military 
academy in 1942 and served as a first lieutenant in Manchuria until the day of  national liberation in 
1945. After returning to Korea in 1946, he finished an 80-day long training program at the South 
Korean constabulary and commissioned with the rank of  captain thanks to his previous military career. 
On November 11, 1948, Park was arrested on charges of  engaging in Communist activities in the 
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army, including involvement in the Yeosu-Sooncheon Military Rebellion. A court martial sentenced 
him to death. Reportedly, he shared intelligence about Communist cells in the Korean army to save 
his life. He kept serving in the military up until his coup in 1960. Park was known “as a thrifty, clean, 
and unusually able officer,” and as “an indefatigable and talented organizer with a reputation for 
integrity.”348 In addition, he was “a man of  few words,”349 and “the kind of  officer that many Korean 
military officers aspired to be.”350 These traits made him a natural leader for those who staged the May 
16 coup of  1961.  
After the demise of  the Rhee regime, the new ruling party had “neither the experience nor the 
capability to lead the nation.”351 The constitution was hastily revised to change the presidential system 
to a parliamentary one, giving decisive powers to a new bicameral National Assembly. In the general 
election of  June 29, 1960, the former opposition Democratic Party won control of  both houses of  
the National Assembly. The Chang Myon government, a fragile coalition government, was staffed by 
men with the same background, attitudes and programs as their predecessors in the Rhee 
administration. 352  Disappointed with a government that was appallingly weak and incompetent, 
students and citizens took to the streets to express their discontent and frustration. Economically, the 
nation was on the verge of  collapse. In April 1960, more than four million city residents, some thirty-
five percent of  the total labor force, were unemployed or partially employed.353 The hopelessness and 
gloomy circumstances are well captured in the following newspaper editorial on May 3:  
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The streets are filled with the unemployed and beggars, while the farmers and laborers are suffering from starvation 
and privation….Robbery and thievery run rampant everywhere, while the efficiency of  law enforcement is 
vitiated….everyone is complaining and bemoaning.  Life has certainly become more unbearable than before. 
For a nine-month period, there were some 2,000 demonstrations with about 900,000 participants. 
The Chang Myon government was pressured by the demonstrators to discharge 17,000 policemen, 
including eighty-one police chiefs, and punish those who supported the Rhee regime. Because the 
police force was so discredited and demoralized, the country was once again in chaos and uncertainty, 
giving rise to fear of  communist attacks. Worse, the Chang Myon government promised to reduce the 
military by 200,000 men, or one-third of  the army. This decreased the morale of  the military at a time 
when North Korean communists and their sympathizers in South Korea were making every attempt 
to foment chaos.354  
Against this socio-political backdrop, on May 16, 1961, Park Chung-hee led a swift and bloodless 
military coup to topple the incapacitated parliamentary government. Park justified his coup by 
criticizing the Chang Myon government’s pervasive corruption, its inability to defend the nation from 
communist threats and the absence of  a viable plan for social and economic development.355 The 
military government announced a six-point pledge: (1) Anti-communism will be national policy 
priority number one and anticommunist measures will be reorganized and strengthened, (2) 
Solidarities with allied nations, including the United States, will be strengthened (3) All political 
corruption and old evils will be eradicated and a spirit of  integrity will be instilled (4) Hardships of  
the public will be urgently resolved and an all-out effort will be made to reconstruct the national 
economy, (5) National capacities will be reinforced to confront communism in North Korea for 
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national reunification (6) Political power will be transferred to conscientious politicians and the 
military will return to its original duties.  
On May 19,1961, the Military Revolutionary Committee changed its name to the Supreme Council 
for National Reconstruction composed of  thirty-two military officers. The Supreme Council dissolved 
the National Assembly and all political parties. Soon, Park Chung-hee became chairman of  the 
Supreme Council. For Park, the military coup was a revolution, much like a surgical operation to cure 
malignant social, political and economic cancers. In his own words, the revolution “was staged with 
the compassion of  a benevolent surgeon who sometimes must cause pain in order to preserve life and 
restore health.”356 In fact, some people were so dispirited by the political and social confusion of  the 
Democratic Party era that they had been inwardly hoping for someone to take strong control.357 Those 
who had grown weary of  political misconducts experienced a momentary catharsis when the military 
government, in line with its pledge to eradicate corruption and old evils, arrested some 10,000 gang 
members and dismissed more than 40,000 public officials affiliated with corruption from their posts.358 
During the period of  May 16 to December 31, 1961, the military junta effectively took advantage of  
anti-communist public sentiment, and arrested some 3,300 pro-Communists and their sympathizers, 
while rounding up more than 4,000 hoodlums, smugglers, black marketers and usurers.359  
Park, who took power in a military coup, desperately needed to legitimize his regime. Unlike Rhee 
Syng-man who “had an aura of  having been a patriot,” Park was considered a traitor because of  his 
background as a former Japanese military officer. Therefore, the only way for him to mollify the 
popular disapproval, justify his regime and keep him in power, given his Japanese background and his 
ascendency into power through a military coup, was to successfully fulfill his pledges to bring the 
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Korean people out of  poverty and achieve economic development. His regime’s success in terms of  
Korea’s economic growth is so legendary, both home and abroad, that he is always ranked top in 
almost every public survey for presidential evaluations. President Park is recognized and respected as 
the nation’s most effective leader.  
However, given his pre-Presidential background including Japanese education, Confucian heritage 
and his military career, there was nothing to suggest “fealty to democracy American-style, which he 
considered an inconvenient and unproductive practice.360” When he seized power in 1961, he was 
virtually unknown to American officials. Trained in the Japanese Army and later suspected of  leftist 
connections, he was not the man the United States would have chosen to lead the new Korea.361 Also, 
the United States never found it easy to deal with Park, whose agenda was shaped by his country’s 
immediate needs, not broader issues such as human rights or free trade.362 Throughout his authoritarian 
rule, Park heavily relied on overpoliticization to achieve his policy goals and to maintain his power.  
For instance, as his regime was pursuing the ambitious Five Year Economic Development Plan, he 
was pressed for capital because the United States switched from economic aid to loans. Partly because 
of  the American pressure and partly out of  practical needs for capital acquisition, the Park regime 
began to negotiate with Japan for war reparation funds. The reconciliation attempts with the former 
colonial Japan triggered public discontent and protests. Faced with protests, the Park government 
declared emergency martial law and the four army divisions stationed in Seoul were ordered to 
suppress the protest by force. All schools were ordered to close, while indoor and outdoor protests 
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and rallies of  all sorts were forbidden. Searches and seizures, arrests and imprisonments took place 
without warrants.  
Political fund-raising from chaebol was a highly organized state operation managed mostly by the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the chief  of  staff  at the Presidential Secretariat. Park 
established a four-member committee of  political and party elites, known as “the Gang of  Four,” who 
were in charge of  fund-raising for the ruling party: Deputy Prime Minister Chang Ki-young, KCIA 
head Kim Hyong-uk, Presidential Chief  of  Staff  Yi Hu-rak and ruling Democratic Republican Party’s 
Finance Committee, Chairman Kim Song-gon. Chang Ki-young, deputy prime minister and the head 
of  the Economic Planning Board, approved foreign loans in return for “contributions” from 
borrowers, mainly chaebols. During his rule, “state-guaranteed foreign loans to chaebol were widely 
seen as synonymous to political-economic collusion.”363  
On October 17, 1972, there were no street protests, no military provocation. Yet that same evening, 
President Park Chung-hee abruptly declared an emergency. He proclaimed martial law across the 
country, dissolved the National Assembly, banned political activities and said a new Constitution 
would be promulgated within ten days. Censorship of the press, publishing and broadcasting went 
into effect. In short, constitutional rule was suspended. The October Yushin (revitalizing) reform, 
making Park effectively President for life, had been his own idea.364 At the strong protest and demand 
of the American government, the phrase, “[a] cause of the measure was approaches by the U.S. and 
China” was deleted from the prepared statement on the morning of its announcement.365 Only after 
the Park regime consulted and received tacit approval, or turning a blind eye, the Yushin system was 
announced to the Koreans. For many Koreans, the term Yushin recalled Japan’s Meiji Restoration in 
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the 19th century. Yet, the Yushin Constitution was promulgated on October 27 and finalized in a 
national referendum on November 21 under martial law. 
Under the Yushin system, President Park was given absolute powers: the right to proclaim 
emergencies, dissolve the legislature and nominate one-third of the lawmakers and justices, but the 
legislature was banned from impeaching a president.  On December 15, an election was held to form 
the National Conference for Unification (NCU) that would elect the president. Some 2,359 NCU 
members, carefully vetted by the government through the registration process, elected Park president 
at the Jangchung Stadium in Seoul on December 23. It was the start of the so-called stadium elections. 
Park, the sole candidate, was elected president for a six-year term with the support of 2,357 NCU 
members. With absolute power vested in his hands, any institution of the state or organizations of 
society could not check the exercise of the presidential powers. It is under this political environment 
that Park started to push ahead with his plan to foster new growth industries in the 1970s.  
The Yushin system tolerated very little individual activity without surveillance by the five-pronged 
intelligence agencies: the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the Military Security Command, 
the police, the Blue House Security and the Counter Espionage Operations Command–this watchdog 
system was undemocratic and cruel. During this period, the role of  the National Assembly was 
nothing but a rubber stamp. With all power concentrated in his hands, Park suppressed his opponents 
harshly. For instance, KCIA agents abducted Kim Dae-jung, Park’s political opponent in the 1971 
presidential election, from a hotel in Tokyo in August 1973, precipitating a major crisis in South 
Korean-Japanese relations. The fierce fighter for democracy, Kim Dae-jung was spared his life only at 
the help of  the Central Intelligence Agency of  the United States.  
The Yushin Regime was soon challenged by activists from groups such as college students, artists, 
religious leaders and the opposition. Park suppressed these protests by force. In the People’s 
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Revolutionary Party Incident, on April 9, 1975, eight people were executed for treason. The only 
evidence, their confessions, were extracted by torture, and those executed are now generally cleared 
of their alleged crimes. Nevertheless, the resistance to the Yushin Regime continued and caused 
serious social unrest. The Yushin Regime also was criticized internationally for human rights abuse. 
The American Carter Administration warned that United States military forces might be withdrawn 
from South Korea unless Park eased off his dictatorship.  
Amid this political climate, there was an incident that triggered a domino-like sequence of events 
that eventually ended Park’s notorious Yushin regime and his own life. On August 9, 1979, a group 
of female workers of the Y.H. Industrial Company, a textile-apparel manufacturing plant, began a 
sit-in-hunger strike at the New Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters office in protest against the 
closure of the factory. The reason the protesting female workers chose the NDP headquarters was 
that “they believed that the NDP would be able to help and willing to support them” considering 
the leadership change within the party and “its pledge to amplify its anti-Park campaign.”366 Also, 
the protestors reasoned that the opposition party’s headquarters “would be a proper asylum against 
suppression by the authoritarian regime.”367As it turned out, the female workers earned the 
sympathy and support from the opposition party legislators. Frustrated with the opposition against 
his dictatorial ruling by the public and the opposing politicians, but yet complacent with his own 
sense of prowess as the imperial president, President Park Chung-hee reacted brutally to the strikers. 
On the third night of the sit-in, about one thousand riot policemen stormed the NDP headquarters 
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and arrested the protesters, killing one female protestor and injured almost 100 people, including 
NDP legislators and reporters.368 
Kim Young-sam, a NDP member who strongly criticized Park Chung-hee for his dictatorial 
leadership declared a total war against the Park regime and launched a massive popular movement to 
bring down the Yushin system.369 Making matters worse, President Park Chung-hee was furious at 
Kim Young-sam because he severely criticized his regime in an interview with the New York Times 
on September 16, 1979. On December 4, the Park’s ruling party and pro-government legislators held 
a secret meeting to vote Kim Young-sam out of the National Assembly on the grounds that he had 
“committed a series of impudent acts such as condemning Park’s regime as dictatorial.”370  
In Busan, the hometown of Kim Young-sam, a full scale antigovernment protest erupted and 
spread to other cities. It started with students from Busan University calling for the abolition of the 
Yushin regime and the protests grew to include citizens and spread to Masan (the current 
Changwon) between October 16 and 20, 1979. President Park Chung-hee declared martial law on 
October 18 and referred 66 people to military court. On October 20, Park invoked the Garrison 
Act. The army was mobilized, and 59 civilians were brought to military court.  
Inside the Blue House, there was a cutthroat power struggle over the issue of  how to respond to 
the popular protests against the oppression of  an opposition political leader Kim Young-sam. 
Especially, the relationship between Kim Jae-gyu, his security chief  and the Director of  the KCIA, as 
well as Cha Ji-cheol, the chief  body guard was extremely bad. Cha Ji-cheol became a thorn in Kim’s 
side. With his privileged position, Cha began to use his intimate access to the lonely President to inflate 
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his role.371 He built up his command to equal that of  an army division with its own tanks, helicopters 
and troops. On one occasion, after a provincial governor surprised the President by lighting Park’s 
cigarette, with his lighter accidentally turned to high-flame, Cha stayed behind and physically assaulted 
the hapless official.372 Out of  his loyalty, Cha equated the President to the state by saying “Sir, you are 
the state.” He is also notorious for his screening of  all documents before they were presented before 
the President on the grounds that the paper may be contained with poison. In his last year, Cha began 
to step more boldly onto Kim’s territory. When he started to control the presidential schedule, he 
pushed the KCIA briefing, normally the first item on the daily agenda, to the afternoon. Cha allegedly 
interfered in KCIA attempts to block Kim Young-sam’s election and then blamed Kim Jae-gyu for its 
failure. Cha also argued for Kim Young-sam’s expulsion from the parliament, a move the KCIA 
director opposed and which led to the Busan-Masan uprising. Cha blamed the deterioration of  events 
on Kim Jae-gyu’s weak leadership.373 
The killing of  Park Chung-hee took place around 7:40 pm on Friday, October 26, 1979 during a 
private dinner with his closest aides at a KCIA clandestine safe-house inside the Blue House 
presidential compound in Seoul (hereinafter 10.26 incident). Also killed were four presidential 
bodyguards and the President’s chauffeur. Regarding the motive of  the killing, the chief  investigator, 
Yi Hak-bong famously concluded it was too careless for a deliberate act and yet too elaborate for an 
impulsive act. The assassin, Kim Jae-kyu, claimed during the trial that his killing was an act of  
revolution aimed at the recovery of  democracy in Korea. Kim Jong-phil, who knew both President 
Park Chung-hee and the assassin, also concluded it was an act of  impulse rather than a planned 
revolution.374  
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Since his assassination, Park Chung-hee has been transformed from a dead President into a cultural 
icon that incites wide-ranging and often polarized reactions from the public.375 Especially when the 
economy is in trouble, the Koreans are nostalgic about his leadership and his era. Thus, collective 
memories of  him have shifted from the image of  an antinational, fascist dictator to that of  a 
superhuman hero and national savior.376 In April 1997, to commemorate its 77th anniversary, Dong-
A Daily conducted a survey on the most competent President in Korean history. The result showed 
that 75.9 percent of  the respondents chose Park, whereas Kim Young-sam, the President at the time, 
received the support of  only 3.7 percent of  the respondents. In late 1997, the government’s Public 
Relations Office conducted a national survey on public consciousness and values and found that Park 
Chung-hee had become “the most respected historical figure,” ahead of  the Great King Sejong (who 
invented the Korean alphabet and has been lauded as the paragon of  a sage Korean ruler) and Admiral 
Yi Sun-sin (whom Park had elevated to the position of  “sacred hero” for his defense of  the Korean 
nation from Japanese invasion during the late 16th century).377  
 
4.4. Chun Doo-hwan: The Ambitious Ruler Who Was Politically Amputated  
Chun Doo-hwan was born on January 18, 1931 into a poor family as the fifth son of  seven siblings in 
a little farming village located thirty miles southwest of  Daegu, South Korea. His father was a farmer 
but fled to Manchuria to escape retaliation for killing a Japanese policeman. He became one of  the 
first–ever graduates of  the four-year program at the Korean Military Academy. One of  his classmates 
was Roh Tae-woo, who became his life-long friend and political protégé. He commanded a South 
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Korean division in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, which made him rise rapidly through the 
ranks. 378 With his excellent athletic abilities, Chun was always the leader among his friends and 
colleagues. Chun had favor in Park’s eyes because he proposed to organize the military academic cadets 
to demonstrate his support of  the May 16 coup. Chun served as civil service secretary for Park Chung-
hee’s military junta from 1961 to 1962, after which he became the chief  personnel of  the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Chun was appointed commander of  the Military Intelligence Command 
on March 5, 1979.  
The assassination of  President Park not only created a power vacuum but also caused a serious 
national crisis because the combined effect of  such problems as economic downturn, social unrest, 
political uncertainty and renewed tension with North Korea. Right after the assassination, it was Chun, 
then the chief  of  army security command, who took charge of  the investigation of  his death, arresting 
several suspects including his rival, the army chief  of  staff  General Chung Seung-hwa. Although 
Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah officially took over the presidential position, Chun emerged as the real 
holder of  power. In the spring of  1980, Chun became the Defense Security Commander and 
persuaded the interim President Choi Kyu-hah to name him chief  of  the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency. This meant the military and the intelligence were under the control of  Chun. While labor 
unrest flared up and student protest intensified against the government, the Choi government imposed 
a nationwide martial law. The situation soon escalated into a series of  violent, nationwide protests 
against the military rule, which were led by labor activists, college students and opposition leaders.  
With the death of  Park Chung-hee, the citizens of  Kwangju, the then provincial capital of  South 
Cholla in southwestern Korea, became the center of  the pro-democracy movement. The Cholla region 
had a long history of  political opposition and grievances toward the Park regime because the 
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development was skewed more toward the rival region that was home to President Park. On May 18, 
approximately 600 college students gathered at Chonnam National University to protest against the 
suppression of  academic freedom, but they were severely beaten. With the approval of  the United 
States, which had maintained operational control over combined U.S. and Korean forces since the 
end of the Korean War, Chun’s government sent elite paratroopers from the Special Forces to 
Kwangju to contain the unrest. When the soldiers arrived, they began beating the demonstrators. 
Rather than squelch the protest, the brutal tactics had the opposite effect, inciting more citizens to 
join in.379 A total of 18,000 riot police and 3,000 paratroopers brutally suppressed the demonstrators, 
making the Kwangju incident the worst crisis since the Korean War.  
On May 31, President Choi formed the Special Committee for National Security Affairs, putting 
Chun Doo-hwan in charge of the standing committee composed of eighteen field-level officers and 
twelve high-level government officials. For all practical purposes, the standing committee took over 
political and economic administration, weakening the cabinet and martial law authorities. 380 The 
standing committee, through fourteen functional subcommittees, carried out a sweeping purge in the 
name of social purification. By the end of July approximately 3,000 public employees had been 
dismissed or held for trial on the grounds of corruption, inefficiency, or irregularities.381 Kim Dae-
jung and 23 of his followers were indicted in July on sedition and other charges, put on trial by court-
martial, found guilty and on September 17, sentenced to death. Civilians also became targets of the 
purification campaign, with some 30,000 troublemakers being arrested.382 
On August 27, 1980, Chun Doo-hwan was elected at the National Conference for Unification 
(NCU) gathered in Jangchoong Gynasium in Seoul with 2,524 votes out of 2,525. It is highly suspected 
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that the one vote against his election was purposefully rigged to differentiate him from the North 
Korean dictator Kim Il-sung, who claimed one hundred percent in his favor. On September 1, 1980, 
Chun sworn in as President of  the Fifth Republic of  Korea. Unlike Park Chung-hee who had carefully 
studied and prepared how to lead the nation, Chun had no such plans because his sudden ascension 
to power was not the result of  a coup but of  what President Kim Young-sam would later call “a coup-
like incident.”383 Not only did Chun come to power in a two-stage coup or coup-like incident, but he 
came to power without any experience in government. His competency to run the nation in the 
footsteps of  the charismatic Park Chung-hee raised doubts and concerns among the general public.384  
However, his legitimacy as the President was strengthened by the Korea-U.S. summit in February 
2, 1981. The newly inaugurated Reagan administration in 1981 not only supported the new Chun 
regime but assured the Koreans that the United States had no plans to withdraw its ground combat 
forces from Korea and promised full diplomatic, military and economic cooperation.385 It is no doubt 
that the official welcome by the American government extended to the newly elected Chun reinforced 
his position as the President of  Korea, both domestically and in the United States. 
Although the Chun regime had attained considerable results in economy and diplomacy, his 
government failed to win public trust or support. The public basically regarded Chun as a usurper of  
power who had deprived South Korea of  its opportunity to restore democracy. Chun lacked political 
credentials; his access to power derived from his position as the head of  the Defense Security 
Command—the army’s nerve center of  political intelligence—and his ability to bring together his 
generals on the front lines. His promise for a ‘just society’ was not met, worsened by the two major 
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financial scandals in Korea involving Chun’s in-laws. In 1985, in the National Assembly elections, 
opposition parties together won more votes than the ruling party.  
President Chun copied Park’s authoritarian developmentalist regime. He resorted to a mix of  
systemic embezzlement, nepotism and cronyism through the members of  his own family, including 
his wife. He became the first President to make a public apology to the people for his family members’ 
misconduct.386 His brother, Chun Kyung-hwan served two years and ten months in prison for charges 
of  embezzling and misappropriating over one billion won in revenues from the state-led rural 
development program, the New Village Movement, as well as for tax evasion of  a similar amount.  
Chun took political and personal funds from chaebol—$1.24 billion at the then prevailing exchange 
rate.387 The owner of  the Kukje group (the seventh largest at the time) refused to offer an appropriate 
political donation, known officially as “quasi-taxes.” Between 1979 and 1987, over fourteen major 
corruption scandals, including illicit fund raising through Chun’s Ilhae (Sun and Sea) Foundation, Sae 
Sedae Simjang (New Generation Heart) Foundation headed by his wife, revealed a complex web of  
political corruption among his family members, Cabinet ministers and military generals, for private, 
pecuniary profit, especially through political-economic collusion. In 1996, he was convicted of  bribery, 
mutiny and treason, and sentenced to death for his role in the Gwangju Massacre, only later to be 
pardoned by President Kim Young-sam with the advice of  then President-elect Kim Dae-jung. The 
historic irony was that the Chun administration sentenced Kim Dae-jung to death some twenty years 
earlier.  
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4.5. Overpoliticization and its Determinants (1948 ~ 1987)   
In this study, I define politics as a “competition among individuals, groups and classes who make up 
society over the social product and political power.”388 From this perspective, it follows that politics 
holds a preeminent position because it determines the institutions, political behaviors and the state 
format. 389  Politics is also a function of  the social context. Thus, Korean politics reflects the 
characteristics of  Korean society. As I argued in chapter three, Korean society is characterized by 
familist collectivism and dependent capitalism, which caused overpoliticized behaviors in politics.  
The political culture of  the period of  1948-1987 was authoritarianism. By definition, authoritarian 
rule is more prone to illicit use of  state coercive power, dictatorial power, illicit opposition and violent 
opposition than democratic rule. 390 The three authoritarian regimes this chapter covers share in 
common overpoliticized behaviors. Korean politics during the authoritarian era exhibits almost all 
overpoliticization behaviors, especially dictatorial powers. Because the three regimes lacked political 
legitimacy, they resorted to overpoliticized behaviors in the form of  dictatorial powers. The resistance 
from forces within and without the authoritarian regimes eventually led to the personal and political 
demise of  all authoritarian regimes.   
Rhee Syng-man became President in a divided South Korean government, mainly backed by the 
United States. Both Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan took power through military coups. Given 
the dependent nature of  Korea upon the United States during this period, the military coups were 
implicitly, if  not overtly, legitimized by the American government. Domestically, all three Presidents 
ruled above the law, wielded enormous power by privatizing the state power and imposed emergency 
martial law to oppress the opposition. Rhee Syng-man rewrote the constitution to make him President 
                                                          
388 Sangmpam, S. N. Comparing Apples and Mangoes: The Overpoliticized State in Developing Countries. 
389 Ibid.   
390 Ibid. 
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for life. To this end, his regime relied on various types of  overpoliticized behaviors. Park Chung-hee 
adopted the infamous Yushin system,391 which gave him unlimited access to dictatorial powers, violating 
numerous democratic rules. Chun Doo-hwan literally privatized his presidency to keep his power base 
and accumulated illicit wealth to maintain his influence and retain loyal followers. During this period, 
the Presidential blue house had been the center for collecting and distributing political funds, closely 
associated with hierarchical state-business collusive ties. Also, the involvement of  the United States in 
Korean affairs changed over time in accordance with American national interests.  
In this period, the political culture of  Korea was characterized by the presidential power above the 
law. All three authoritarian presidents, once in office with enormous state power and material and 
human resources at their discretion and reinforced by the societal culture of  familist collectivism, fell 
down. The Korean presidency of  this authoritarian period was well summed up in the words of  David 
Steinberg:392 The President was “half  king, half  chief  executive. The cabinet has been his plaything, 
changeable at his whim; the legislature to date at most a modest thorn in his side. His phalanx of  staff  
in the Blue House (the Presidential residence) rarely questions his decisions. In his society, he is far 
more powerful than the President of  the United States.”393 Table 4.1 contains the summary of  all three 
authoritarian regimes.    
 
 
                                                          
391 Yushin literally means “revitalizing,” a term after the Meiji Restoration of Japan.    
392 Steinberg, David. Presidential Elections and the Rooting of Democracy. International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. (Fall/Winter, 
1998). 
393 In fact, this lack of meaningful communication is not exclusive to the relationship between the President and his staff. In the 
hierarchical culture of Korea, all relationships are subject to this type of top-down, unilateral communication. The recent demise of 
the current President, Park Geun-hye was attributed to her lack of transparency as well as lack of communication between her and the 
rest of the government. 
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Table 4.1. Profiles of  Authoritarian Presidents394  
 Rhee Syng-man Park Chung-hee Chun Doo-hwan 
Birth 1875 1917 1931 
Term of  office  1948-1960 1962-1979 1980-1988 
Education Harvard University 
Princeton University  
Manchukuo military academy 
Trained at Imperial Japanese 
Army Academy 
Korea military academy  
Trained in American military  
Major career 
Before 
presidency 
- Independent Movement 
- First President of  
Provisional Government 
- Elementary School Teacher 
- Career military officer  
- Career military officer 
Major political 
accomplishments 
- First President of  South 
Korea 
- Anti-communist political 
system in South Korea 
- Korea-U.S.  alliance 
- Economic modernization 
- Industrialization  
- Economic growth 
- Promoting Korea’s external 
image through International 
sports events like Olympics 
Direct triggers 
for demise  
Popular protests against 
electoral frauds 
Dictatorial ruling and 
oppression of  opposition  
Widespread corruption 
 
Thus, the three authoritarian presidents all exhibited manifestations of  various overpoliticized 
behaviors throughout their rules. Because all three presidents lacked political legitimacy in their path 
to presidency, they had to resort to illicit use of  state coercion to maintain their power base and to 
oppress the opposition. Their respective demise is clearly the effect of  their overpoliticized behaviors: 
Rhee Syng-man regime’s systematic electoral fraud, Park Chung-hee’s assassination by his chief  
security guard over President Park’s repressive and brutal treatment of  the protests against the Yushin 
government, and Chun’s imprisonment for his illicit use of  state coercion not only to repress 
opponents but also to amass wealth to maintain his influence.  
                                                          
394 Otherwise mentioned, all biological information is taken from the Presidential Archive at http://www.pa.go.kr. 
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In the Korean context, overpoliticization was caused by two internal and external causal variables: 
familist collectivism and altered capitalism. As I argued in chapter three, Korean society during the period 
of  1948-1987 was characterized by familist collectivism as the dominant operational principle and code 
of  behavior for most people. Because politics is a function of  social context, it is obvious that Korean 
society was ripe for overpoliticization in politics. On the one hand, the Korean populace did not have 
a chance to develop any significant practical skills and knowledge to live as civic-minded citizens in 
the post-liberation Korea. As Choi, Jang-jip aptly put it, liberalism in Korean society “was outside of  
the people’s collective experiences.”395  Presidents themselves also were not trained to rule the country 
in a democratic way. All three authoritarian presidents were born either before or during the colonial 
period: Rhee Syng-man in 1875, Park Chung-hee in 1917 and Chun Doo-hwan in 1931. Therefore, all 
were strongly influenced by both Korean familist collectivism, Japanese authoritarian, coercion-based 
colonial rule and American Cold War-driven hold on Korean society.  
Rhee Syng-man’s formative years were characterized by the mixture of  diverse ideologies and 
influences. His parents were devout Buddhists, he was penned in Confucian classics, later converted 
to Christianity, educated in American universities and lived for decades in the United States. Like most 
Koreans of  the day, he had a strong attachment to Confucian-marked family ties. Throughout his life, 
he lamented the fact that he did not have a biological heir, and he even adopted the son of  Lee Ki-
bung, his vice president. One episode concerning the adopted son, Lee King-suk, speaks volumes 
about the culture of  Korea characterized by familist collectivism. Several months after Lee Kang-suk 
was adopted, a young man pretending to be Lee Kang-suk made a series of  visits to local government 
offices and police stations, collecting money and receiving generous entertainment and hospitality. 
Wherever the younger man went, regardless of  their rank, people showed high respect and the best 
                                                          
395 Choi, Jang-jip. “The Fragility of Liberalism and Its Political Consequences in Democratized Korea.” Asea Research. 52:3 (2009): 
252-284 
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treatment only because he said he was “the adopted son of  the President.” When he was caught, the 
police did not want to expose the incident to the public “because it may taint the images of  the 
President and the Vice President.”396  
As I described in chapter two, Park Chung-hee ruled the country like the head of  a Korean 
Confucian-shaped household. His assassination is also related to the influence of  Korea’s familist 
collectivism. Park Chung-hee was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, his chief  security guard. President Park 
had a special bond with Kim Jae-kyu for a long time because they had Jee-yon (ties through hometown). 
According to Kim Jong-phil,397 the assassin Kim Jae-kyu was frustrated by the harsh criticism against 
him for his mishandling of  the anti-governmental protests triggered by the repressive measures against 
anti-Park opposition forces398. Although Kim Jae-kyu claimed he killed Park in an revolutionary 
attempt to recover democracy, Kim Jong-phil believes he did it out of  personal frustration.399 Indeed, 
Kim Jae-kyu, as the director of  the KCIA, was also very frustrated when he found out about the 
suspicious personal “spiritual” relations between Park Geun-hye and Choi Tae-min, a cultish leader. 
Park Geun-hye is President Park’s daughter, the recently impeached and disgraced president. She was 
serving as the first lady after the assassination of  her mother in 1974. Although President Park Chung-
hee knew about the abuse of  power by Choi Tae-min, who was taking advantage of  his relationship 
with his daughter Park Geun-hye, President Park was soft on his daughter.  
Although it may take more time and reliable sources to know the truth, there is some evidence that 
the family dynamics between President Park Chung-hee, his daughter Geun-hye, and her “spiritual 
                                                          
396https://namu.wiki/w/%EA%B0%80%EC%A7%9C%20%EC%9D%B4%EA%B0%95%EC%84%9D%20%EC%82%AC%EA
%B1%B4).   
397 Kim Jong-phil was married to the daughter of Park Chung-hee’s older brother. Therefore, the two are related through marriage.  
Kim Jong-phil is also one of the three major politicians in Korean politics, commonly known as the Three Kims, together with Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. 
398 This is better known in Korea as “Bu-Ma incident.” t refers to the protests against President Park Chung-hee’s prolonged 
dictatorial rule under the Yushin system. Bu represents Busan and Ma refers to Masan, both of which are the names of cities in 
Kyungsang province of Korea.   
399 http://news.joins.com/article/18524364. 
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mentor” Choi Tae-min was a major determinant of  the decision by the director of  the KCIA to 
assassinate President Park Chung-hee. Hence, the seed of  disaster was sewn for later harvest of  
disaster about three decades later. Indeed, President Park Geun-hye was impeached, convicted and 
expelled from her office by the Constitution Court on March 10, 2017 because of  the power abuse 
scandal involving the daughter of  Choi Tae-min. 
Chun Doo-hwan’s demise is directly connected to his illicit use of  state’s coercive power to amass 
a large sum of  slush funds both for personal and political purposes as well as to his own family 
members, including his younger brother. Like Park, he also managed the national affairs like a father 
would do for his extended family. He collected money from chaebols, distributed at his whim to 
maintain his own influence and support base. 
For the authoritarian presidents, overpoliticization was also in large part a result of  Korea’s 
dependent relationship with the United States and Japan. In the case of  Rhee Syng-man, his presidency 
from the beginning to end was backed by the United States. He was picked by the United States to 
become the founding President, and his presidency was sustained by the political and economic 
assistance. Interestingly, his exit was also orchestrated by the American government. In some sense, it 
is symbolic that the CIA helicopter took him to Hawaii, and he could not return to the country despite 
his desperate wishes to do so. Although his own mother land did not receive him, the United States 
took care of  him until his death.  
Unlike Rhee Syng-man, whose presidency was much influenced by his ties with the United States, 
President Park Chung-hee maintained a bitter-sweet relationship with the United States throughout 
his reign. As I explained in chapter two, his economic policies were heavily influenced by the dictates 
of  the United States. Unable to gain political and financial support in the 1960s, President Park had 
to push for normalization with Japan against strong opposition from the public. When President Park 
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planned the Yushin system, he had to compromise with the United States about the content of  the 
statement. President Park Chung-hee also implemented the Japanese style leadership as he was trained 
in the Japanese military academy and developed leadership skills in Japanese army as officer. In Asia, 
Africa, and South America, colonial repressive habits have been often repeated by the postcolonial 
successor states. Park and Rhee, before him, did not escape this reality.  
Korea and the United States celebrated their 100th anniversary of  diplomatic relations in 1982. 
Despite the official rhetoric that the bilateral relationship between the countries would be more of  a 
partnership, Korea was still dependent. The official visit of  the newly inaugurated Chun Doo-hwan 
to the United States was conditioned by several important issues, including the release of  the well-
known opposition leader and democratic advocate Kim Dae-jung. The Chun Doo-hwan regime 
reciprocated by buying up one million tons of  American rice and defense weapons.400 His visit was a 
politically calculated move on the part of  the United States;401 it highlighted this dependence.  
In short, all three presidents of  authoritarian era were under the dictates of  the United States 
externally and under the culture of  familist collectivism, which provided a fertile soil for various 
overpoliticized behaviors in politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
400 http://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=backtopast&logNo=80001970418. 
401 A declassified document on Alexander Haig, 1981 memorandum to Reagan. 
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.: HIGH JUMP INTO THE DEEPER PIT  
PRESIDENCIES OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 
The strength of  a nation derives from the integrity of  the Home – Confucius 
“I had ambition. So I prepared and disciplined myself  for it. But they (his own direct family members, relatives 
and those who are closely related to him) have been pushed to get into the world of  power because of  me without 
any preparation” – LATE PRESIDENT ROH MOO HYUN402 
 
In chapter four, I analyzed some of the most outstanding over-politicized behaviors that led to the 
tragic endings of authoritarian presidents.  I showed that Korean politics, as a function of social 
context, was characterized by over-politicization, or tenuous liberal compromise.  The social context 
was determined by two causal variables: internally, the tenacious Korean cultural trait of familist 
collectivism and externally, Korea’s dependent relationships with the United States and Japan.  As a 
result, all three authoritarian presidents displayed various manifestations of over-politicized 
behaviors, whose effect was their demise.  In the same vein, this chapter covers the presidencies in 
the post-1987 democratic transition: Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-
hyun.  The following analysis aims to show that even after the democratic transition in 1987, Korea’s 
altered capitalism invariably led to over-politicized politics, which in turn caused presidential 
downfalls. 
More specifically, I take as a point of reference some of the most salient cases of overpoliticized 
behaviors related to their disgraceful downfalls: Roh Tae-woo’s illicit accumulation of slush funds 
that cost him imprisonment, both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung’s tarnished image caused by 
corruption scandals involving their own children, and Roh Moo-hyun’s suicide in the aftermath of 
aggressive investigations into corruption charges involving his own family.  The analysis will clarify 
                                                          
402 President Roh Moo-hyun committed suicide on May 23, 2009. This note [unofficial translation] was written by him. 
 
157 
 
that the nature of overpoliticization in Korean politics for democratic presidencies is qualitatively 
different from that of the pre-1987 authoritarian regimes.  The presidents of the democratic era are 
more constrained by democratic institutions, whereas those of the pre-1987 period ruled more often 
outside legal and institutional arrangements.  Unlike their authoritarian predecessors, democratic 
presidents enjoyed political legitimacy because they were duly elected and ruled generally within 
institutional and constitutional boundaries.  Relatively speaking, post-1987 Korea is institutionally a 
stabilized presidential democracy.  There has been no serious threat to the political system itself, no 
blatant above-the law attempts to rewrite the Constitution against the public’s sentiment as was 
often the case during the authoritarian era, no illegal attempts to extend presidential terms and no 
recourse to military coups to topple down existing regimes.  Theoretically, these democratic 
presidencies did not have compelling reasons for resorting to illegitimate means to defend their 
political legitimacy as their authoritarian counterparts did.  
Nevertheless, post-1987 presidents also fell victim to personal disgrace and downfalls.  In a sense, 
their demise is not “despite” but “because of” their sense of political legitimacy and relatively 
superior sense of morality vis-à-vis their undemocratic counterparts.  Their sense of moral 
superiority and political efficacy emboldened all of them to push ahead with ambitious policy 
agendas, including drastic measures to correct the wrongdoings of the past and well-intentioned 
anti-corruption drives.  However, these policy goals ensnared them in the end, partly because of 
their complacency as the nation’s most powerful leaders reinforced by the culture of familist 
collectivism in Korean society.  In particular, all democratic presidents invariably failed because of 
the negative effects of what I call “the politics of family cabinet.”403  I define the family cabinet as an 
                                                          
403 This term was inspired by the “kitchen cabinet” of President Andrew Jackson.  When President Andrew Jackson (the seventh 
president, 1829-1837) was frustrated by factional disputes within the official cabinet, he relied on an unofficial group of trusted friends 
and advisors.  This practice was mocked in the rival press as the “Kitchen Cabinet” because the meeting was often held in the kitchen. 
(http://www.blairhouse.org/history/historical-events/jackson-and-the-kitchen-cabinet). In Korean media, the term ‘biseonsilse’ 
(shadowy rulers or powers) is used to refer to those who are close to the president and wield influence and powers behind the 
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informal, often unofficial, group of individuals who are close to the President by personal 
connections formed mainly through, but not exclusively, such ties as blood, school and hometown. 
Assuming the mantle of authority in shadow without the due process, the family cabinet was deeply 
involved in major policy-making and appointment processes, disrupting the democratic rules of the 
game.  The politics of family cabinet is nothing new in developing countries, but it served a more 
pronounced form of familist collectivism in Korean society since the 1987 democratic transition.  As 
a result, the demises of democratic presidents are all the more disappointing because of the high 
expectations placed upon their presidencies.  The following table shows the fluctuations of popular 
support for the presidents in post-1987 presidencies.  
 
Table 5.1. The Fluctuations of Approval Ratings in the Post-1987 Democratic Presidents404 
Election 
Year 
President Turnout Votes 
Gained  
The highest 
approval rate 
The lowest 
approval rate 
1987 Roh Tae-woo405 89.2% 36.6% 57.1% 7.8% 
1992 Kim Young-sam 81.9% 42% 83% 6% 
1997 Kim Dae-jung 80.7% 40.3% 71% 24% 
2002 Roh Moo-hyun 70.8% 48.9% 60% 12% 
 
 
 
                                                          
curtains.  I prefer the term ‘family cabinet’ to the Jacksonian type to illustrate the influence and prevalence of familist collectivism in 
Korean society and politics.  Not a single president is exempt from the negative effect of their family members’ involvement in 
corruption scandals that discredited their presidencies in the post-1987 democratic era.  
404 http://100.daum.net/encyclopedia/view/47XXXXXd1377; [Issuemore Zoom] Yeokdeadeatongryung Jijiyul. 2016. 11.3. (retrieved 
from http://v.media.daum.net/v/20161103082403969); http://kiss7.tistory.com/674 
405 Roh Tae-woo’s approval rating is taken from Kim Choong-nam. The Korean Presidents, 255. 
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5.1. Transitional Presidency from Authoritarianism to Democracy – Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) 
The Roh Tae-woo presidency stood at a crossroad of  Korea’s presidential history.  His regime was 
neither authoritarian nor democratic in its purest terms.  Rather, his presidency was transitional and 
dual-natured.  On the one hand, he rose to power by the political and financial backing of  his 
predecessor Chun Doo-hwan.  On the other hand, the army general-turned politician was popularly 
elected in a free and fair election in accordance with the revised Constitution in 1987.  On February 
25, 1988, the Koreans witnessed the peaceful and orderly transfer of  power from an authoritarian 
government to a civilian one, the first of  its kind in forty years. Unlike his political and life 
mentor/friend President Chun who had neither political nor governmental experiences prior to his 
presidency, Roh Tae-woo had served in various governmental posts before he took office.  His 
candidacy was also well regarded by the international media.  He was described as the one who does 
not “fit the caricature of  a third world general.”406  To an uninformed outsider, Kim Dae-jung would 
be labeled as “the power-seeking general,” Kim Young-sam as “a slick and shallow politician” and Roh 
Tae-woo as “an earnest and intelligent alternative to the present leadership.”407 This benign labeling is 
ironic because his image as such was backfiring in Korea’s cultural context. He was often ridiculed by 
the public as “mul-Tae-woo (Water Tae-woo),” insinuating his lack of  decisiveness and authoritarian 
authority.408  
Unlike his authoritarian predecessors, President Roh Tae-woo did not use state coercion to threaten 
or suppress opposition parties.  Historically, it can be said the Roh Tae-woo administration operated 
within the confines of the constitution. 409 In fact, he made efforts to have a dialogue with the 
                                                          
406 Kim, Choong-nam. The Korean presidents: leadership for nation-building, 217 
407 Ibid. 
408 This attitude of the public also seems to reveal how Koreans prefer a powerful and strong leader. For instance, President Park 
Chung-hee who was considered a brutal dictator, especially under the Yushin system, is always rated as the best and the most 
respected president of all time in almost every opinion poll.  
409 Strnad, Grażyna. The Sixth Rebublic Under Roh Tae-woo: The Genesis of South Korean Democracy. Polish Political Science, Vol. 
XXXIX, 2010, PL ISSN 0208-7375. 
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opposition and compromised when necessary.410 When he found himself  politically incapacitated in a 
divided government as a result of  the 1988 general election, where his own ruling party lost its majority 
standing, he merged his own party with the two opposition parties to create a majority ruling party in 
1990. One of  the two opposition parties was that of  Kim Young-sam’s who strongly opposed and 
criticized previous authoritarian regimes.   
Most notable of  President Roh Tae-woo’s achievements as president was his administration’s 
northern policy that led to the establishment of  diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, 
strategically and economically significant countries for Korea. Within a decade since the diplomatic 
normalization in 1992, China became the second largest trading partner to Korea. 411  Also, the 
isolationist North Korea was brought to the negotiation table, eventually signing a basic framework 
to improve inter-Korean relations.412 The Soviet Union stopped arms provision to North Korea after 
the establishment of  diplomatic ties with South Korea. 413  Roh Tae-woo is very proud of  his 
achievements as president, including the democratization of  1987 through June 29 declaration, 
building up the largest middle class, and positioning Korea as one of  the core countries in the world 
through northern policy.414 
However, President Roh Tae-woo echoed his predecessor Chun Doo-hwan when it came to 
privatizing state power. Like Chun who used his presidential power to collect private gains, Roh 
collected a $650 million political slush fund in systemic and structural ways, involving the three most 
powerful institutions in Korean: the Presidential Blue House, the banks and chaebols. 415  As he 
admitted in his own memoire, his slush fund scandal almost canceled out all his achievements.416 He 
                                                          
410 Kim, Choong Nam. The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building, 256. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Roh, Tae-woo. Roh Tae-woo’s Memoire. (Chusun News Press. 2001), 498 
415 Kim, Hyung-A. 2003. Political corruption in South Korea.   
416 Roh, Tae-woo. Roh Tae-woo’s Memoire,.498 
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managed the government as if  it was his own household. He doled out collected money like a 
patrimonial father figure would do with his own family’s finances. In other words, what Roh Tae-woo 
did was the duplicate of  what Chun did. Both Chun and Roh ran the government as a father would 
do for his own family.  However, President Roh Tae-woo justified his slush fund by saying that;  
If  we think of  the state as a machine, it needed oil in all parts so the machine can function smoothly. The 
governing fund played a role as such…social order was disrupted in the process of  democratization due to labor 
disputes and student protests. It was costly to maintain order. There were only two choices for us to choose to 
solve this problem unless we resorted to military force: one was to call upon the people to maintain order on their 
own autonomous account, and the other is to reinforce the police force…it was a common practice at the time 
to dole out gift money on national holidays to encourage or compliment to hundreds of  organizations from the 
political party to street cleaners… Those who receive such congratulations and encouragement from the president 
will never forget the sense of  gratitude and tend to act exemplary for those around them for the rest of  their lives. 
I did not think that such a practice was irregular. Rather, isn’t it part of  our society, culture, tradition and common 
practice?”417  
 
The slush fund scandal involved some of  biggest conglomerates including the Dae Woo group in 
return for a major submarine depot and a total of  three hundred million dollars from some thirty 
companies.418 For Roh, however, he was innocent because it was part of  Korean politics at the time:  
I apologize deeply to the people of  Korea. I will take full responsibility for this scandal and I am ready to accept 
any punishment. I am very sad that because of  this scandal many businessmen have been through many difficulties. 
I would like to ask the Korean people to make sure that the businesses do not fall behind economically or 
internationally by looking after them and giving them strength and support. I'd like to tell the politicians one thing 
I will bear all the mistrust and conflict. I will take these with me. I will take any punishment. Please let this be a 
lesson to you. Do away with the distrust and conflict. Create a new political culture through understanding and 
cooperation. Let's leave this for the next generation.419  
                                                          
417 Ibid. [unofficial translation by the author], 506. 
418 AP Archive. South Korea: Roh Tae-woo arrested on corruption charges. November, 16, 1995. 
 
419 The tone of his apology implies he acts as if he serves the country by taking up responsibility, not necessarily being remorseful or 
apologetic per se. Even when he was convicted of such wrongdoings, he presented the image of a scapegoat or an instructive message 
to the country.  
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His indictment was the first time a Korean president faced legal action for deeds committed while 
in office. As he was trying to differentiate himself  from Chun Doo-hwan; unfortunately, there was 
moral hazard in the bureaucracy, which caused in part one of the largest corruption scandals in 
democratized Korea during his rule. The scandal was exposed when an opposition legislator disclosed 
one of Roh’s secret bank accounts. Nine top politicians and public officials were arrested for taking 
bribes in return for altering the classification of land designated for a greenbelt zone to enable an 
apartment complex to be built on it. The scandal, widely known as the “Suso scandal,” revealed “how 
public officials, politicians and business executives work together to promote their private interests to 
the detriment of the general public interest.”420 Roh Tae-woo was also the first Korean president who 
witnessed his own daughter and her spouse, SK Group Chairman Choi Tae-won, questioned for taking 
$200,000 out of  the country in 1994. Park Cheol-eon served a jail term for his involvement in a 
gambling machine scandal.  
Roh Tae-woo’s family cabinet politics was done through a private group called “wolgeysoohoe” 
(meaning the group of  laurel tree). The group was formed and led by Park Cheol-eon, the cousin of  
Roh’s wife Kim Ok-suk. For Roh, he is the nephew-in-law. The private group grew to have a 
membership of  two million. The core leadership of  the group grew from eleven to sixty members. As 
the group name indicates, the group’s founding goal was to push Roh Tae-woo to the presidency. In 
other words, they wanted to put the crown of  laurel branches on the head of  Roh Tae-woo. 
Throughout Roh Tae-woo’s term of  office, the influence of  Park Cheon-eon was so great that he was 
nicknamed “the crown heir of  the 6th Republic.” Park served not only on the official cabinet of  the 
Roh government but more importantly as a close confidant for Roh Tae-woo. Park Cheol-eon was 
                                                          
420 Gerald E. Caiden, and Jung H. Kim. A New Anti-Corruption Strategy for Korea. Asian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 1 (June, 1993). 
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arrested and sentenced to imprisonment on charges of  bribery on a slot machine licensing decision. 
 
5.2. The Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung Presidencies–Democratic Fighters’ Defeat in 
Authoritarian Way  
President Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) had been widely known as the staunch fighter for democracy. 
He was also the first elected civilian president since 1960. Kim Young-sam rose to the presidency in a 
political deal that merged his political party with Roh Tae-woo’s ruling party and a minor opposition 
party led by Kim Jong-phil, a relative and close associate of Park Chung-hee. The Kim Jong-phil’s 
merge with Roh Tae-woo’s military backed governing party was widely condemned as a betrayal of  
pro-democracy forces.421 In fact, the merger was a political marriage of  convenience because what 
Roh Tae-woo wanted was a parliamentary majority, while Kim Young-sam wanted to win the 
election.422 This shows that even political parties existed not so much for representing diverse interests 
of  the public, but for the personal gains to the power-seekers.  
Nevertheless, the Kim Young-sam presidency started with high expectations from the public. 
Before Kim’s presidency, the presidential office had been the center for collecting and distributing 
Korea’s largest political funds under regimes of  the past. But Kim vigorously advocated for a “New 
Korea,” primarily aimed at uprooting political corruption and many other “Korean diseases” of  the 
past—Korea’s institutionalized corruption. One of  the first things he did once in office was to declare 
he would not receive any illegal political funds from chaebols. He introduced a series of  anti-
corruption laws, including the Public Servants’ Ethics Law. Of  all his accomplishments, Kim issued 
                                                          
421 CNBC-Asia Pacific News (http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/21/new-york-times-digital-kim-young-sam-former-president-of-
south-korea-dies-at-87.html). 
422 Ibid.  
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an emergency decree banning anonymous bank accounts and requiring the mandatory use of  real 
names. He also introduced a compulsory rule for registering and declaring the property and assets of  
every official in his efforts to wipe out corruption in government. 
Once elected, President Kim was under pressure to correct the wrongdoings of  the past regimes. 
To end any chance of  the military’s interference with politics, he purged a group of  politically 
ambitious army officers who went by the name of  “Hanahoe,” which roughly meant “an association 
of  one-for-all, all-for-one.” His military purge culminated in the arrest and conviction of  Chun and 
Roh on mutiny and corruption charges for their roles in the 1979 coup and a bloody crackdown on a 
pro-democracy uprising in 1980 as well as their enormous slush fund. Convicted of  these charges in 
1996, Chun was sentenced to death, and later reduced to life imprisonment, while Roh was sentenced 
to an imprisonment of  22 and a half  years, later reduced to seventeen years. Both were released from 
prison in December 1997 by President Kim Young-sam’s pardon. Nevertheless, the lesson—that 
dictators may eventually be punished for their brutality—reverberated across Asia423. However, in his 
rush and ambitious initiative to rectify history or to build a new Korea, he disrespected and disregarded 
the past presidencies as well as his own political ally whose political party was one of  the tripartite deal 
that pushed him to the presidency. Therefore, his act damaged rather than strengthened Korea’s 
presidency.  
Kim Young-sam’s presidency also manifested deeply-rooted, over-politicized behaviors in the way 
he appointed staff  for his government. Given his lack of  practical experience in government, he 
needed a well-balanced staff  for his presidency, but he relied on recommendations of  his informal 
aides; thus his appointments “heavily skewed toward his long-term followers, irrespective of  their 
professional backgrounds.”424 As a result, the presidential staff  consisted of  inexperienced outsiders, 
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not able to prepare practical politics for his major policy agendas and of  monitoring and coordinating 
these policies.425 This nepotistic and crony appointment practice “compromised the competence and 
efficiency of  his government, undermined the expansion of  his power base, and bred favoritism and 
corruption. 426 Although Kim Young-sam declared he would not receive any political fund from 
chaebols, he understood the significance of  the cooperation from the business circles. Therefore, he 
invited them to the Blue House for a luncheon meeting, which was considered a turning point in tilting 
the balance toward chaebols in their bilateral relationship427.  
His anti-corruption measures were “unfortunately too much of  a mixture of  the old and the 
new.” 428  Despite his anti-corruption legislation, he did not reform many of  the restrictive rules 
inherited from the past. Thus, laws that prohibited unions from associating with funding, or from 
supporting political parties or candidates for political office, remained unchanged in spite of  
boisterous complaints.429  Through privatizing the state power, his sons and his long-standing personal 
clique who, with no apparent expertise other than their personal record of  service to him, managed 
almost all his affairs. The so-called Sangdo-dong kasin (retainers) from his private residence on Sangdo 
Street, Seoul, and his son Hyun-cheol were particularly influential in managing Kim’s political affairs, 
including the 1992 election campaign in which his party spent nearly 13 billion won, more than three 
and a half  times the legal limit for campaign expenses.430 The alleged involvement of  his son’s illicit 
activities and retainers turned out true in 1997 when he was sentenced for receiving bribes in 
connection with the bankruptcy of  the Hanbo group, which was “a major factor in the 1997 financial 
crisis.”  
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President Kim Young-sam’s ending was quite the opposite of  his heroic beginning. His approval 
rating plummeted to 14 percent by the time he neared his term of  office after the financial fiasco that 
put Korea under the management of  the International Monetary fund. His much publicized anti-
corruption drive ended in shame as his own son, Hyun-cheol, was charged with tax evasion in May 
1997. His son was notorious for his exercise of unearned authority. People called him “Sotongryung” 
(meaning the little President).  In October 1997, a South Korean court found him guilty of accepting 
bribes and evading taxes and sentenced him to three years in prison. The junior Kim was ordered to pay 
a fine of more than $1.5 million, and the court confiscated more than $500,000 in illegally amassed assets. 
Kim Dae-jung’s presidency (1998-2003) is no different from Kim Young-sam’s fate. He started 
with high expectations and ended tragically. When he became President, he was considered as “one 
of the few Korean politicians with special interests in, and visions for, the South Korean economy 
and national unification.”431 His significant achievements as President include the economic recovery 
from the 1997 financial crisis. He followed the terms of the IMF bailout including the restructuring 
of the financial sector, pushing the big conglomerates to focus on core businesses, and passing laws 
encouraging transparency and competitiveness.432 By the time he finished his term of office, foreign 
exchange reserves reached more than $120 billion, the fifth largest holder of foreign exchange holdings 
in the world.433 With this accomplishment, he was praised as “one of the few leaders in Asia to take 
an active and personal leadership role in restructuring the economy,” and to launch “one of the most 
ambitious economic makeovers any country has ever attempted.”434 The IMF Survey stated,435 “A key 
lesson from the recovery is the importance of political leadership. Kim Dae-jung was able to unify the 
country to overcome the crisis.” 
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Throughout his political career, he endured a suspected assassination attempt, a kidnapping, 
repeated arrests, beatings, exile and a death sentence. His life-long democratic advocacy earned him 
the nickname as “Asia’s Nelson Mandela.”436 “President Kim Dae-jung’s vision for the Korean people 
led him to pursue a policy of  engagement toward North Korea. He and North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-il worked together on a joint declaration they signed on June 15, 2000 “paving the way for a 
brighter future for all Koreans and other peace-loving peoples of  the world.”437 But his honorable 
reception of the Nobel Peace Prize was tarnished by the controversy surrounding the alleged bribery 
for his first Summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.  
Once in office, Kim Dae-jung repeated almost identical bribery and influence-peddling scandals, 
orchestrated by his two sons, while a string of  the President’s associates and officials at the highest 
levels were charged with various forms of  corruption. Like his immediate predecessor Kim Young-
sam, he also filled key governmental positions with people from his own hometown, Cholla region, 
or his close friends and aides. But, “his hometown buddies” got involved in a series of bribery scandals, 
tarnishing his hard earned moral legitimacy.438 Worse, two of his own sons were charged with graft 
and bribery.  Although Kim Dae-jung also made efforts to eradicate corruption, the average amount 
of bribery per case is much higher than that of the Kim Young-sam government439. He confessed in 
2009 that “I thought democracy is founded on the rock, but I was mistaken.”440 Kim Dae-jung has 
three sons —nicknamed “Hongsam Trio”—(Hongsam refers to red ginseng as Hong referring to their 
family name and sam referring to three sons) and one daughter.  All three sons were convicted and 
imprisoned for their influence-peddling corruption scandals.  
Some may argue that the reason for the corruption fiasco for both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
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jung was not so much that these governments were more corrupt than the previous authoritarian 
regimes as that, because of their strong anti-corruption drive, more corruption involving the political-
business collusion had been exposed and uncovered.441 But, the involvement of their own children, 
not to mention their associates and aides, in a series of corruption scandals and influence peddling, 
robbed them of the public trust in their leadership and the presidential institution.  
 
5.3. A Dwarfed Giant - Roh Moo-hyun  
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) was the ninth president of South Korea. His ascent to the presidency 
signaled the end of the so-called “the 3 Kim Politics,”442 and the beginning of the generational change 
in Korean politics. As a son of a poor family, a graduate of a vocational high school, and a self-taught 
labor and human rights lawyer, he was considered “a principled underdog who challenged the 
powerful.”443His main support base was the younger segment of the populace, especially those known 
as the “386 generation.” This generation refers to those who reached their 30s in the 1990s, who 
attended college in the 1980s, and who were born in the 1960s. Two-thirds of young voters voted for 
him during his presidential election. This generation also categorically represents the student 
movements for democratization and against the authoritarian military regimes and their labor 
repressive policies in the 1980s. In a sense, Roh’s election victory was the triumph for the 386 
generation, implying the authoritarian and conservative era was finally over. Furthermore, triggered 
by the deaths of two high school girls by a United States Army armored vehicle in June 2002 in a city 
nearby Seoul, “massive anti-American demonstrations turned the presidential election into a 
referendum on Korea’s relationship with the United States.”444 
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During his tenure, however, President Roh contributed to the strong and vital relationship 
between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Roh hoped to leave a legacy of improved 
relations with North Korea. Just before he left the presidency, Roh became the first South Korean 
leader to cross the demilitarized zone and meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Roh believed 
in the “sunshine policy” of his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, who sought to engage the north, and 
Roh also promised aid.  
Nevertheless, his anti-establishment mindset and his often provocative communication style 
backfired on him during his presidency. Most notably, he inherited a political dilemma of the ruling 
party being a minority (Our Open Party) and the opposition party being a majority in the National 
Assembly. Confronted with the political reality that his administration’s policy proposals were likely 
to be blocked by the two opposition parties, on October 10, 2003 the radical Roh Moo-hyun took a 
bold step to call for a confidence vote to get the people’s mandate. In an attempt to mobilize people’s 
support, President Roh Moo-hyun vowed to tackle with the chronic corruption issues of the political 
establishment, including the political parties that had raised a large amount of illegal campaign funds 
for the 2002 presidential election.445 In a newspaper interview, he admitted his party indeed received 
illegal campaign funding during the 2012 presidential election, but said he would resign if the amount 
of his campaign funds were more than one-tenth of those of his primary opponent, Lee Hoi-chang.446 
Later, it was revealed that he received more than one-tenth of the opposition party’s illegal campaign 
funds. On March 12, 2004, the National Assembly passed the motion to impeach President Roh Moo-
hyun by a vote of 193-2 with his ruling Our Open Party members absent in protest. It was a coalition 
of opposition parties. The ruling Our Open Party members attempted to physically block the passage 
of the motion but failed to do so. The National Assembly security guards were called in to literally 
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drag members of the ruling party away from the speaker’s platform.  
The motion to impeach President Roh Moo-hyun was based on three factors. First, his public 
confession that his party received illegal campaign funds during his 2012 presidential election. The 
prosecution reported that Roh’s campaign collected about $9.4 million from large corporations, while 
the GNP took about $72 million. Second, he openly supported his own political party, arguing that it 
would be a waste of vote if people would vote for the MDP in the April 15th General Election and “it 
would only help the GNP to maintain the majority in the National Assembly.”447 Third, the MDP and 
GNP claimed he neglected his constitutional duties to protect the rights of the people to pursue their 
happiness and welfare by his mishandling of the national economy.448 
In the April 15, 2004 general election, the progressive Our Open Party won a majority status in the 
National Assembly for the first time since the early 1960s in Korea. It is believed that the backlash 
after the impeachment attempt by a coalition of opposition parties on March 12, 2004. 449  The 
opposition coalition pushed ahead with their plan to impeach the President despite the clear 
opposition from the public. After the motion was passed on March 12, tens of  thousands of  South 
Koreans poured into the streets in support of  President Roh Moo-hyun, chanting “save our 
democracy” and decrying the National Assembly’s vote to impeach him. With polls showing the public 
opposing the impeachment by a lopsided margin of more than 3 to 1, the Constitutional Court later 
overturned the impeachment motion. Despite such a public outcry and the claims of the President’s 
own party, some may argue that the impeachment process indicates the South Korean democratic institution 
is in full operation. In the past, sitting presidents may have been removed from power at the hands of the 
military, but not by the democratically elected legislature.450 But, the violent protest of the ruling party 
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members in the National Assembly to block the passage of the motion was a clear manifestation of the over-
politicized behaviors even in this democratically consolidated Korean democracy.  
The 386 generation and those who were close to him, not by merit but by proximity through 
personal relations, not only contributed to his rise to the presidency but unfortunately, to his fall as 
well. Like his predecessors, Roh Moo-hyun also heavily relied on those who were close to him, but 
not according to their professionalism. Once they were in power, they ceased to serve as student 
fighters for democracy with high ethical standards and a sense of  social justice. Rather, they became 
part of  the privileged, power-holding class. A series of  corruption scandals involving his own staff  in 
the Blue House while in office greatly disappointed the general public. The 386 politicians could not 
properly control their new political power and privileged access to the resources resulting from their 
political success.451 Like Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, these young politicians and 
presidential staff  of  the 386 generation were good at fighting against the establishment and their 
corruption but poor at how to turn those principles into practice. They had high ethical standards 
when they criticized the politicians and the haves of  society, but they failed to practice what they 
preached. Overall, as Kim Tae-sung points out, these 386 generation policy makers failed to provide 
a common goal or a new political direction in post-Roh Moo-hyun era.452  
The corruption scandals concerning the Roh Moo-hyun presidency is comparably trivial in terms 
of  its scale, but the ripple effects were gigantic. Worse, soon after his tenure, the Lee Myung-bak 
government hunted down the Roh family and exposed the bribery cases involving his family and 
relatives. Roh admitted that his wife had received $1 million from a business owner. Allegations 
concerning his family members had been leaked to the press almost every day involving his own 
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brother, his daughter, his wife, his closest friend-turned-chief  of  staff  in addition to his 386 politicians 
and supporters. He was pushed to the edge with no way out.   
He ended his life on May 14, 2009 by jumping to his death from a hill known as “Owl Rock” behind 
his hometown house. He left a suicide note for his family on his personal computer and reads: 
I am in debt to so many people. Many people suffered because of me. I cannot fathom how great sufferings they 
must go through in the days ahead. The rest of my life would only be a burden for others. I cannot do anything 
because of my poor health. I cannot read. I cannot write. Do not be too sad. Isn’t life and death a piece of nature? 
Do not feel too sorry. Do not resent anyone. It is fate. Cremate me. And just leave a small tombstone near my 
home. I’ve thought on this for a long time.  
As President Roh Moo-hyun confessed, those involved in corruption charges might not be prepared 
for what power would bring to their life. They have not disciplined themselves as much as the 
presidents themselves have done. Roh’s death came amid an investigation into a bribery scandal that 
tarnished his reputation. Prosecutors were investigating Roh for allegedly receiving $6 million in bribes 
from a South Korean businessman while in office. In addition, Roh’s wife was scheduled to be 
questioned by prosecutors that very week, and Roh was planning to answer a second round of 
questions the following week. Now that Roh was dead, prosecutors said the case against him was 
suspended. Roh said he was ashamed about the scandal. In the first round of questioning, he said he 
was losing face and was disappointing his supporters. The former President said he learned about the 
payments only after he left office and that some of them were legitimate investments. Although Roh 
had not made a formal guilty plea, many were disappointed that a man who came to power vowing an 
end to corruption would face such allegations. His death was all the more tragic because he resorted 
to such drastic means amid a barrage of  charges of  family and associate related corruption. His wife, 
his children, his older brother, not to mention his close associates, were all alleged to be involved in 
corruption scandals. 
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5.4. Change and Continuity in Overpoliticization and Its Determinants in the Post-1987 
Democratic Era453 
The year 1987 marks a milestone in Korea’s modern political history. After almost four decades of  
authoritarian and dictatorial rule above the law, the constitution finally granted its citizens the right 
to elect their head of  state by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot.454 “From massive protests in 
the spring to government capitulation in June, from the negotiations for a new constitution to its 
adoption in October, the world watched as developments culminated in December in the first 
election of a president by direct popular vote in 26 years.”455 Hence, the election of President Roh 
Tae-woo was the outcome of a legitimate presidential election, at least in legal and procedural sense, 
as stipulated in a revised Constitution, which was negotiated and approved both by the ruling and 
opposition political parties. Korean democracy finally began to be consolidated.  
Since the democratic election of  President Roh Tae-woo and peaceful transfer of  power from the 
authoritarian President Chun Doo-hwan in1988, six presidents have been elected under this revised 
Constitution that required a direct election by the people. After the prolonged and arbitrary power 
wielding of  authoritarian reign under Rhee Syng-man, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the 
Koreans witnessed the peaceful transfer of  power: from the military to the civilian (Kim Young-
sam, 1993-1998); from the ruling party to the opposition party (Kim Dae-jung, 1998-2003); and 
from the right wing to the left wing (Roh Moo-hyun, 2003-2008). For almost four decades since 
1987, Korean presidential democracy has not broken down. The country has not only become 
democratically consolidated, but also economically maneuvered to survive and prosper in the face of  
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several major economic crises to become the tenth economic powerhouse. The world has been 
impressed with Korea’s ability to host the 1988 Summer Olympics under the presidency of  Roh Tae-
woo, the joining of  OECD during the presidency of  Kim Young-sam, the recovery from the 
financial crisis of  1997 under the presidency of  Kim Dae-jung and the radical reform efforts of  the 
establishments by the Roh Moo-hyun presidency.   
The revised constitution also allowed a greatly enhanced role in providing checks and balances 
vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches.456 For instance, the once imperial presidents were 
subject to legal punishments for their wrongdoings: imprisonment of  Presidents Chun Doo-hwan 
and Roh Tae-woo in 2005; imprisonment of  the children of  Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Dae-jung; the impeachment of  President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003 and the subsequent ruling by the 
Constitutional Court in his favor that reinstated him to the office. Obviously, some of  these 
incidents are politically motivated and quite controversial. Nevertheless, presidential democracy has 
managed to survive, and all seems to indicate the relative soundness of  Korean presidential 
democracy and its institutional stability vis-à-vis the formerly authoritarian presidencies. Compared to the 
previous authoritarian era, Koreans now enjoy more freedom of speech, assembly, religion and the like.  
One notable change in Korean politics is the intensification of  regionalism. Regional rivalry has 
been one of  the key factors in Korean electoral politics since 1987. The reason for this is skewed 
development in favor of  the hometown regions of  the previous three presidents: Park Chung-hee, 
Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. There had been splits between the then three most prominent 
opposition leaders, known widely in Korea as the three Kims’ Politics. These three Kims became the 
founding presidents of  Reunification Democratic Party (by Kim Jong-phil), the Peace and Democracy 
Party (by Kim Dae-jung) and the New Democratic Republican Party (by Kim Young-sam). The three 
Kims managed their respective parties strictly through personalized styles and methods, thereby 
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monopolizing National Assembly nomination rights and controlling candidate nomination fees, one 
of  the main sources of  income for political parties. Some even describe the monolithic authoritarian 
party rules under these leaders as an “emperor-like system.”457 
The influence of  the so-called TK power group after the initials of  their hometown (T for Taegu 
and K for Kyoungsang region) during the Roh Tae-woo era became so dominant in all areas of  politics, 
the economy, the bureaucracy and the military, that the conflict between these two regions therein 
became irreconcilable. For instance, in the 1997 presidential election, Kim Dae-jung received 94.4 
percent in the cholla region, while approximately 13 percent from Kyungsang area. Yi Hoe-chang, 
from the Grand National Party, received almost 70 percent in the Kyungsang buk-do and 3.3 percent 
from the cholla region. Kim Dae-jung, who won the presidency with a very narrow margin of  39.7 
against 38.2 percent, strengthened his power base predominantly in his own home district, the Cholla 
region. The regional rivalry between the cholla and Kyungsang regions under his presidency exceeded 
every regional rivalry in Korea’s contemporary history.458 
Despite all these institutional changes, democratic progress, and worsening of  regionalism, there is 
a high degree of  continuity in post-1987 Korean presidential democracy. Even the 1987 Constitution 
retained the institution of  a strong presidency, whose power was seldom constrained “by an effective 
system of  institutionalized checks and balances.”459 A strong state and strong presidency were most 
permanently intertwined in the minds of  the people. Moreover, in the glamor of  economic 
development and its attendant physical transformation of  the cities, houses, attires and foods, both 
the outsiders and Koreans themselves have been too mesmerized to see the hidden, deeply-rooted 
non-capitalist ideology and practices. They are bewildered as to why Koreans cannot be and are not 
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‘truly democratic.’ Until the transition of  1987, “the Korean people had little practical experience with 
democracy.”460 Therefore, the question in the post-1987 period has been “how to operate a formerly 
authoritarian state in a democratic way?”461  
According to Sangmpam, over-politicized behaviors occur even in electoralist countries like South 
Korea that are not “authoritarian but which, although proclaiming their allegiance to liberal 
democracy, violate its most visible tenet of  representative government and liberal compromise, 
especially the electoral process and substance.”462 These behaviors include electoral fraud, electoral 
monopoly, electoral coup and electoral violence. For instance, in the period of  1987-1996, almost 
every presidential and legislative election in Korea was marred by electoral fraud and violence, 
including the 1996 legislative elections when a candidate used a gun to fend off  his rivals.463 Since 
the introduction of  local autonomy in 1995, every local election is tainted by overpoliticization.  
Political continuity is also found in the centralized nature of  state power in favor of  the President 
and the hierarchical collusion between politics and business that lead to pervasive corruption in 
Korean society. In post-1987 Korea, corruption has become widespread and deeply rooted in almost 
every sector of  society. Because politics is understood as a function of  social context, Korean 
politics is ripe with familist collectivism-driven corruption.  
Traditionally, Korean political culture was based on authority.464 In Korean society, the relationship 
between the rulers and the public was based on the traditional family model,465 where the father was 
supposed to work for the entire welfare of  the family. Therefore, challenging the father’s decision is a 
disloyalty to the entire family. As argued in chapter three, familist collectivism is one of  the most 
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important causes of  corruption concerning the collusion between the state and business that tarnished 
Korean politics since its founding in 1948.  In post-1987 democratic period, exacerbated by the 
competitiveness of  democracy, corruption associated with familist collectivism has become more 
pronounced.  Given the preeminence of  the presidency in Korean society, the effects have been felt 
by all post-1987 presidents. The continuity in the centralized presidential power is closely related to its 
dominant role as a provider and distributor of  many socially coveted resources and values.  
Another important continuity is the nature of  Korean presidents themselves as seen in the 
following diagram. All presidents in the post-1987 democratic era were born, grew up and educated 
during the Japanese colonial era and the Korean War. They all went through the oppressive, and 
authoritarian colonialism, the extreme poverty and uncertainty during and after the Korean War. They 
all ruled in a country still strongly altered by American presence. As a result, democratic presidents 
also ruled the country in a new institutional setting with the old ways of  thinking and political practices. 
Diagram 5.1. The Chronology of Korean Presidents’ Lives   
[Opening, Colonialism, American rule]                      [Authoritarian Era]                                      [Democratic Era] 
                 1876~1948                                                     1948 ~ 1987                                              1987 ~ 2009 
 466     Syngman Rhee (1875)                                        1948 ~ 1960 (aged 73-85) 
      Park Chung-hee (1917)                                         1961 ~ 1979 (aged 44-62) 
      Chun Doo-hwan (1931)                                        1980 ~ 1987 (aged 50-57) 
   *  Roh Tae-woo (1932)467                                                                1987 ~ 1993 (aged 55-60) 
 468    Kim Young-sam (1927)                                                                                                   1993 ~ 1998 (aged 60-71) 
      Kim Dae-jung (1924)                                                                                                        1998 ~ 2003 (aged 71-76) 
      Roh Moo-hyun (1946)                                                                                                       2003 ~ 2008 (aged 57-62) 
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President Roh Tae-woo faced the same destiny as that of his predecessor Chun: his involvement 
in the illegitimate military coup as well as his illicit use of coercion to amass wealth. Presidents Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung also fell in disgrace because of their own children’s involvement in 
the abuse of power. Roh Moo-hyun was no exception. The moral failure of all democratic presidents 
excluding Roh Tae-woo was significant because it shows how pervasive the culture of familist 
collectivism is in Korean society and its reflection in Korean politics. In one way or the other, all 
presidents in the post-1987 privatized state power.  
Both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam had been known widely in the United States as 
dedicated fighters for democratization in Korea. Both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam knew the 
power of the United States and thus capitalized on it. As I mentioned in chapter four, Kim Dae-
jung’s life was spared by the American CIA when he was kidnapped by the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency in 1973. The Chun Doo-hwan regime also released Kim Dae-jung as a trade-off 
for his state visit to the United States in 1981.469 Kim Young-sam was denounced by President Park 
Chung-hee for his interview with the New York Times, where he severely criticized Park Chung-
hee’s Yushin system. Even President Roh Moo-hyun, considered anti-American, had to enter a free 
trade agreement with the United States in 2011.  All these episodes and events revealed American 
influence on Korean society and politics even though the impact of such influence on 
overpoliticization was not as big as that of family collectivism in this period.  
In a survey of all political elites470 who served the governments between 1948 and 2012, Ahn 
Byung-man finds that 5,134 (95 percent) out of 5,385 governmental elites were born and raised 
before 1960.  Because of this, the democratic presidents were influenced by Japanese colonial rule, 
                                                          
469 http://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=backtopast&logNo=80001970035. 
470 The elites include all lawmakers, ministerial-level executive officials, mayors and governors and justices of the supreme courts. A 
total of 6,608 were surveyed.  
 
179 
 
American dominion and the culture of familist collectivism.  The general public is not much 
different from the elites.  Korean society during the period of 1987 to 2009, although procedurally 
democratized, is still dominated by familist collectivism as the operating principle and code of 
conduct.  Even during the post-democratization era, Koreans including the presidents and the elites 
valued family ties, its extended version of personal connection through hak-yeon (ties through 
schools), jee-yeon (ties through hometown), and hyul-yeon (ties through blood).  In fact, the 
influence of familist collectivism has been more pronounced in the overpoliticization of Korean 
presidents in the post-1987 presidencies than under authoritarian rule of the pre-1987.   
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CONCLUSION 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness471 
 
This study attempted to understand and explain why there is a patterned downfall of all South 
Korean presidents from 1948 to 2009, despite their undeniable contributions to the country’s 
development amid a series of daunting challenges from within and without.  It is worth indicating 
that I did not intend to evaluate whether particular policies presidents took were successful or not.  
Presidents all over the world make policy blunders, intentional or not.  Nor did I intend to analyze 
the external factors that might have contributed to such downfalls.  Although these factors are 
important in and of themselves, I mainly focused on the linkage between societal characteristics of 
South Korea (in which politics plays out) and political behaviors of presidents.  I defined politics as 
a function of social context.  
I argue that although South Korea developed both politically and economically, the country was 
not a fully capitalized democracy in the period of 1948-2009.  For this study’s thesis, I proposed 
three hypotheses.  Hypothesis one posited Korea’s traditional and cultural traits as an internal modifier 
of capitalism in South Korea.  Hypothesis two examined the nation’s dependent nature of its 
relationships with the United States and Japan, respectively, as an external factor that prevented capitalist 
entrenchment in Korean society.  In testing these two hypotheses in chapter three, I showed that Korean 
society was characterized by familist collectivism as an operational principle and code of conduct for most 
Koreans, as opposed to the liberal individualism in the United States.  The combined effect of these two 
variables is the alteration of capitalism in South Korea that defies the three cardinal rules of democracy.  
                                                          
471 Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. (http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/) 
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Democracy literally means the rule by the people. In a representative democracy, the country is 
ruled by those who are elected by the people.  In this definition, sovereignty of the people is 
premised on the inherent truth that all men are equal and autonomous. This is exactly what the 
American liberal individualism is about; individual liberty and freedom are cherished and are not 
only considered sacred, they are guaranteed and protected through the Constitution with the Bill of 
Rights472.  These fundamental values and beliefs are shared by the people as well as the federal and 
state governments.473  However, this truism did not apply to Korean society, in particular during the 
time period of the present study.  Individuals were not sovereign.  They were not the ultimate 
decision makers for their own life, both at home and in society vis-à-vis the coercive state.  For 
example, it was not uncommon that Koreans did not choose their spouses on their own for most of 
the period between 1948 and 2009.  Furthermore, the government decided on how many children 
married couples should bear and which gender they should have or not have.  Such trivial and 
personal matters as the lengths of skirts and hair and clothes were not decided by individuals but by 
the coercive state.  The military, through its compulsory conscription system as well as and public 
schools through rigid curricula, brainwashed the Korean young minds into becoming more 
conformist than individualist in the sense of American type of liberal individualism, the cornerstone 
of liberal democracy and capitalist market economy.  
More importantly, there was never a consensus about what ‘liberalism’ truly meant for Koreans. 
During the colonial period, liberalism was mainly understood as independence from the colonial 
rule. Therefore, it was a nationalistic liberalism. Because Rhee Syng-man’s presidency was supported 
by the United States, liberalism has been virtually synonymous with anti-communism.  In a divided 
                                                          
472 Even such violent struggles as civil rights movements to secure rights for African Americans, women, and today the LGBTs, have 
been concerned about securing the constitutionally guaranteed individual liberty and freedom. All these have been resolved, though 
sometimes hesitantly, within the confines of political institutions and social norms.  
473 The 14th Amendment to the Constitution (1789) mandates that the state also abide by the constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties 
and freedom to the people.  
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Korea, whether authoritarian or electoralist, all regimes played the card of anti-communism to 
advance their interests and oppress opposition.  Even the so-called democratic fighters, including 
Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who risked their very lives for liberal democracy, 
betrayed the discrepancy between their avowed beliefs in democratic values and their political 
behaviors.  Politicians did not and could not practice what they preached.  Therefore, as Choi Jang-
jip calls for, “now liberalism finds its role in Korean society” because it is “now needed to reinforce 
democracy.”474 In a nutshell, South Korean liberal democracy is a democracy without liberalism.  
An analogy may help here: when a child grows in a good living environment with good nutrition, 
the child will grow taller and healthier than his counterpart in worse conditions.  Therefore, people 
may assume he is an adult.  But once you talk to him, you realize he is only twelve years old.  His 
physical growth, or development, disguises his true immaturity.  Regardless of his physical growth, it 
takes ‘time’ for him to mature mentally and intellectually.  
This analogy applies to Korea.  A traditional Korean society was drastically transformed into a 
modern metropolis, blinding the observers from home and abroad with its brilliant and rapid 
economic prosperity, technological advancement and democratic political institutions.  However, the 
Korean society of 1948 to 2009 was dominated by the familist collectivism as the standard code of 
conduct and operating principle of inter-personal relations and organizational culture. To 
understand the impact of familist collectivism, the example of a Korean couple living in the United 
States with their children may help.  The parents speak only Korean at home but the children go to 
American schools and speak both Korean and English.  As they grow older, the parents cannot 
catch up with their mindset, not to mention the language.  As adults, the parents find it difficult, 
almost impossible to master the language. The children can eat both Korean and American food, 
                                                          
474 Choi, Jang-jip. “The Fragility of Liberalism and its Political Consequences in Democratized Korea.” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 
52:3 (2009): 252-72. 
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although they mostly prefer pizzas and hamburgers to Kimchi.  As they reach puberty, they get 
confused and feel the sense of distance growing between them and their parents.  The parents raise 
them as their friends would do back in Korea: sacrifice, sacrifice and sacrifice.  Naturally, they expect 
their children to be successful in life.  When the couple meet with other Koreans, they force their 
children to bow their heads to show respect to the Korean adults.  In that house, the parents will be 
Korean for the rest of their life although they live in America and drink coffee in the morning.  On 
the other hand, the kids will be Korean and American at the same time.  The family is almost 
schizophrenic. 
This schizophrenic behavior is similar to what happened in Korean politics.  There is a gap 
between the elites (or leaders), including presidents who acted like traditional Confucian parents and 
the general public, which is viewed as subjects or children who need care and provision. The state 
mobilized its efforts to systematically oppress the freedom of speech and disadvantaged those who 
opposed the government.  Presidents had to fight hard to obtain state power, after which they ruled 
like father-kings.  
Against this backdrop, I suggested in hypothesis three that Korean politics was characterized 
dominantly by overpoliticization, or tenuous liberal compromise as opposed to liberal compromise in the 
fully embedded capitalist culture in Western countries.  Consequently, as the nation’s supreme political 
institution, the South Korean presidency manifested the effects of overpoliticization most saliently.  The 
presidential system has operated very differently in the United States and Korea. This different 
functioning is more than differences in institutional arrangements.  The views of and expectations of 
presidents for the dominantly individualistic Americans differ from those of South Koreans, who 
have become individualistic in recent years but are still indoctrinated in collectivist and hierarchical 
mindset.  The Presidency, as the most powerful and visible institution, and the President, as the 
most influential and vulnerable political actor in Korean politics, bear the brunt of the effects of the 
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lack of liberal compromise or overpoliticization.  Although the history of the Korean Presidency is 
not as long as that of the United States, it has been riddled with so many tragic stories, and complex 
problems, both at personal and institutional levels.  
The empirical evidence in chapters four and five supports these hypotheses for the most part. 
Both authoritarian and democratic presidents displayed manifestations of diverse over-politicized 
behaviors.  Under the pretext of national security, all three authoritarian presidents frequently 
resorted to martial law.  They all used illegal coercive means and tactics to oppress the opposition, 
and rewrote at will the constitution to strengthen their power.  Accusations against the opposition 
were often accompanied by fabricated charges of subversion and incitement to revolt.  More 
importantly, this authoritarian leadership style and recourse to overpoliticization left a legacy for 
future Korean presidents even after democratic consolidation in 1987.  Aspects of this legacy 
include the privatization of the presidential power, illicit use of state coercion that leads to 
widespread corruption associated with the hierarchical state-business collusion.  All democratic 
presidents abused their power by relying on an unofficial group of advisers, including their own 
family members, in managing national affairs.  
However, there is a striking difference between the two eras.  Authoritarian presidents were more 
influenced by the external causal variables that altered capitalism because of Korea’s heavy 
dependence on the United States and Japan.  Democratic presidencies were more challenged by 
internal causal variables that modified capitalism, especially the characteristics of familist 
collectivism. This difference does not deny the reality that both eras were under the influence of 
familist collectivism.  Instead, the difference stems from the fact that in the post-1987 
democratization, institutional restraints were in place preventing presidents from resorting to such 
overt dictatorial and authoritarian means as martial laws, outright human rights violations facilitated 
by Japanese and American rules.  Recall that the United States and Japan were more influential 
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during the formative years of Korea because of the nature of the bilateral relationship.  During this 
period, Korea was heavily dependent upon the United States both for security and economic 
reasons. Because the two countries were moving toward a more equal relationship since the late 
1980s with Korea’s political and economic development, the domestic variables surfaced more 
prominently as the cause of the over-politicized behaviors of the presidents.  
Although Korea transitioned to procedurally consolidated democracy in 1987, the presidential 
downfalls during the democratic period (1987-2009) indicate that overpoliticization was still the 
norm rather than the exception in South Korean politics. Although the post-1987 presidents did not 
commit such overt illegal acts as declaring martial law at whims and rewriting constitution for their 
own political gains, they also suffered from the illegality of  their presidential actions.  All democratic 
presidents had their images severely tarnished in no small part by the direct consequence of  the 
prevalent culture of  familist collectivism, the operating principle and standard of  conduct for most 
Koreans both in pubic and in private.  Before 1987, the falls of  authoritarian presidents and the 
over-politicized behaviors that brought the downfalls resulted from a combination of  familist 
collectivism and the impact of  Japanese and American rules on Korean society.  The evidence clearly 
proves that Korea has a mismatch between its capitalist system and its not fully entrenched capitalist 
culture.  
Unfortunately, despite institutionalization of the presidency itself, the fate of post-2009 presidents 
is no different from their predecessors. As of December 2016, South Korea’s National Assembly 
passed a motion to impeach President Park Geun-hye, the daughter of President Park Chung-hee 
for major influence-peddling scandals with and by her close friends.  On March 10, 2017, the first 
female president of Korea was convicted by the Constitutional Court, expelled from her office and 
imprisoned.  History repeats itself in Korea.  Family members, close friends, aides and the brother of 
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former President Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye’s immediate predecessor, have been indicted of 
illegal influence peddling activities including bribery.  
 
Implications for South Korea and other Non-Western Presidential Democracies 
This study has sought to test the validity of Sangmpam’s middle range theory of overpoliticization as 
an empirical and conceptual unity that threads through all non-Western countries.  Further research 
on what particular social characteristics define the politics of other non-Western countries will shed 
more light on the validity of the theory.  Although familist collectivism and dependent capitalism 
served as the two main explanatory variables for South Korea, other developing countries may have 
other variables according to their own specific circumstances and historical experiences.  The 
findings of this study suggest we need to pay more attention to the nature of the underlying society 
in which politics plays out.  Copying particular institutional arrangements of advanced Western 
democracies is no cure for all.  It only obscures the real causes of the widespread over-politicized 
politics in non-Western countries.  Institutional arrangements can be made more easily than 
changing societies and the perceptions and mindset of the people.  Non-Western countries, 
including South Korea, are characterized by a lack of liberal individualism as the dominant operating 
principle and code of conduct, which is the cornerstone of liberal democracy.  The patterned 
downfalls of all presidents reflect Korean society’s unique characteristics involving familist 
collectivism and altered capitalism.  
To solve this problem, it does not depend necessarily on fixing institutional drawbacks of 
presidentialism, as is often suggested. Fukuyama and his associates concluded that the presidency as 
an institution is not necessarily in crisis in presidential countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, 
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South Korea and Taiwan.475 All these countries have used democratic institutions, particularly 
constitutional courts, to resolve problems.  Indeed, they do have a point.  In Korea, the most recent 
example is President Park Geun-hye’s expulsion from her office by the ruling of the constitutional 
court on March 10, 2017.  However, whether the Korean state will sustain or not, the fact is that 
Park Geun-hye did not survive.  This suggests presidentialism as an institution is not the issue any 
longer because she, like all her predecessors, met the same fate: disgraceful downfall, even after all 
the efforts of institutionalization of the Korean presidency.  The state-society relations matter.  
It follows, then, that the implications for South Korea are not to rely on institutions such as 
parliamentary system as some have suggested.  It is likely that doing so would take us back to the 
situation similar to what happened to the Korean society during and after the transitional 
parliamentary regime’s rule in 1960-61. Parliamentarism fundamentally involves the principle of 
majority in the parliament, which, considering the social characteristics of South Korea still 
dominated by familist collectivism, would breed more corruption.  
Therefore, theoretically and logically, my analysis suggests that to solve this chronic problem of 
patterned downfalls of presidents, South Korea needs to adopt the American type of capitalist 
culture that ensures liberal compromise. The real question then becomes: “Is it possible or is it even 
desirable for South Korea to have the American type of capitalism?” The decision is in the hands of 
the Korean people themselves.  I suggest it is high time that South Korea adopted at least the value 
and principle of liberal individualism that respects individuals as autonomous and sovereign entities. 
If South Korea chooses to move toward a fully entrenched capitalist society where liberal 
compromise is the norm, this value and principle of liberal individualism should be taught and 
practiced both at home and schools, the two primary sources of political socialization. Unless the 
                                                          
475 Fukuyama, Francis, Boo-Seung Chang and Bjorn Dressel. Facing the Perils of Presidentialism? Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2 
(2005): 102-16.  
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social causal variable is properly addressed, the problem may remain whether under presidentialism 
or other regime types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Appendix A. The Amendment (Revision) history of South Korean Constitution  
 
Order Promulgation 
Date 
Main Contents Causes Notes 
Founding 
Constitution 
July 7, 1948 - Presidentialism 
- Indirect 
presidential election   
  in National 
Assembly  
- Unicameralism, 4 
year term 
 (reelection for one 
more term) 
Established 
the 
Republic of 
Korea 
Proposals of parliamentary 
system turned into indirect 
presidential election system 
due to rejection of 
President Rhee 
1st Revision July 7, 1952 - Direct presidential 
election 
- Bicameralism 
(Lower House     
  for 4 year term; 
Upper House  
  for 6 year term) 
  (reelection for one 
more term) 
Reelected 
Syngman 
Rhee 
Political crisis due to 
Balchwe476 Amendment;  
Promulgation of martial 
law 
Imprisonment of Nation 
Assembly men 
2nd Revision Nov. 29, 1954 - Repeal of limit on 
the number  
  of reelection of the 
president 
Reelected 
Syngman 
Rhee the 
third time 
Two days after 
announcement of rejection 
on Nov. 29, correction 
announcement of pass 
(sa-sa-o-ip)477 
3rd Revision June 15, 1960 - Parliamentarism 
- Presidential 
election by NA 
- five-hear term with 
one more reelection 
 
April 19 
Revolution 
Birth of DP Government  
4th Revision Nov. 29, 1960 - Punishment of 
antidemocratic 
April 19 
Revolution 
 
Retrospective legislation 
                                                          
476 The opposition, majority party proposed parliamentary system, while the government preferred presidentialism with 
direct election and bi-cameral system. However, both proposals were rejected, and a mixed one of the two proposals was 
passed by the National Assembly. Balchwe is a Korean term to describe the mixing of the two. 
477 On Nov. 27 in a secret NA voting, a total of 202 members were present out of 203 quorum. 135 voted for the 
governmental proposal; 60 voted against it, 7 abstention. The required vote was 135.33 (203 divided by 2/3rds of the 
quorum are required for passing). So, the bill was officially rejected. Two days later, the ruling party insisted that 
according to mathematical calculus, the necessary vote was 135.33, but it is not possible to divide up a human being to 
be 0.33. So, by applying the ‘round up’ principle, the vote of 135 is enough to declare that the bill is passed. This is what 
Koreans call ‘sa-sa-o-ip’ revision of the Constitution 
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actors & illegal 
fortune collectors 
5th Revision Dec. 26, 1962 - Presidentialism 
- Direct presidential 
election 
 (reelection for one 
more term) 
- PR system 
- Unicameralism 
 
May 16 
Military 
Coup  
Establishment of DRP 
government  
6th Revision Oct. 27, 1969 - Allowed third 
presidential  
  reelection 
Third 
reelection 
of Park 
Chung Hee 
Anomalous pass at third 
annexed building of NA  
7th Revision Dec. 17, 1972 - Presidentialism (no 
limit) with  
  indirect presidential 
election by  
  NCR 
 
Park Chung 
Hee’s 
lifetime 
seizure of 
power 
(Yushin) 
Promulgation of martial 
law 
8th Revision Oct. 27, 1980 - 7-year single term 
for the  
  president with 
indirect election 
- PR system  
 
Rise of new 
military 
group after 
December 
12 Incident  
National martial law except 
for Cheju; 
New military group 
nullifies agreed proposal of 
constitutional amendment 
of direct presidential 
election 
9th Revision  Oct. 29, 1987 - Direct presidential 
election  
  with a 5 year single 
term 
- revival of 
parliamentary  
  inspection of 
administration  
June 
resistance 
by the 
public 
June 29 
Declaration 
First agreed on 
constitutional amendment; 
Direct presidential election 
system in 15 years 
(Source: Revised by the researcher from Understanding Korean Politics (2001) 
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Appendix B. Power-point presentation  
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Vogel, Ezra F., and Pyŏng-guk Kim. Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea.  
N.P.: Harvard U Press, 2011.  
 
Weinberg, Meyer. A Short History of American Capitalism. New History Press, 2003. [on-line version]. 
 
Woo Jong-seok. "Security Threats and the Military’s Domestic Political role: A comparative study of  
South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia." PhD dissertation. The University of  
Texas Austin , 2007 
 
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. The Developmental State. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
 
Yang dong-ahn. “Rhee Syng-man’s anti-communism and Korea’s liberal democracy”. Web. 
 
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. L.A.: Sage Publications, 1984. 
 
Yoo, Jong-il. Park Chung-hee’s maeneolgul: pal-in-ui hakja Park Chung-hee gyongje sinhwa jiwooda. Edited. 
Seoul: SisaINbook, 2011 
 
Yoo, Moon-jee. "Patrimonial industrialization dynamics of the state and business organization for  
the case of South Korea." PhD dissertation. University of California Davis, 1992. 
 
Yoon, Yu-joon. Statecraft. Seoul: Medichi Media, 2011 
 
You, Jong-sung. "Land Reform, Inequality, and Corruption: A Comparative Historical Study of  
Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines." The Korean Journal of International Studies 12, no. 1 (2014): 
191-224. 
 
Yu, Yong-tae. Edited. Land Reform and Land Revolution in East Asia. Seoul: National University Press. 2014. 
 
 
217 
 
Biographical Data 
 
Name:         Kyung Hwa Kim  
Place of Birth   Seoul, Korea 
Education:  Master of International Relations (MAIR), 2005, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
                     Master of Art, 1998, Translation in English-Korean, Graduate School of 
                     Interpretation & Translation, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea 
                           Bachelor of Art, 1993, English Literature & Linguistics, Korea National Open University           
Experiences:   2016-2017: Adjunct Professor, SUNY Onondaga Community College 
                         2013-2014: Director of the Graduate School of Interpretation and Translation,       
                                            Handong Global University  
                         2011~2014: Lecturer, Department of International Studies, Languages & Literature  
                 Hangdong Global University, Korea 
                          2011~2014: Lecturer, Handong Graduate School of Interpretation & Translation 
                  Handong Global University, Korea 
                           2005~2009: Teaching Assistant, Political Science PhD Program, Maxwell School,                          
                                               Syracuse University 
                           2004~2005: Research Assistant, Political Science PhD Program, Maxwell School,  
                   Syracuse University 
                           1999~2003: Seoul Metropolitan Government, Korea  
                           1997-1999: Korea Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations,  
                 The Ministry of Public Administration and Security, Korea 
Awards:       (2009) Excellence Award, Seoul Metropolitan Government, Korea 
 
